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POLICIES, ISSUES AND PATTERN OF DISINVESTMENT 
IN INDIA SINCE LIBERALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF 
VIDESH SNACHXfciNIGAM LTD. (VSNL) 
ABSTRACT 
Soon after independence, it was rightly felt that independence 
will be incomplete without economic self reliance and social justice. So 
heavy investment was made in public enterprises (Pes) to : (i) build 
infrastructure, (ii) promote rapid economic growth and 
industrialization, (iii) Secure balanced regional development (iv) Create 
job opportunities where persons belonging to socially disadvantaged 
communities could have their due share (v) Prevent concentration of 
economic power (vi) reduce disparities in income and wealth the 
second five year plan stated in unequivocal terms : "The adoption of the 
socialist pattern of society as the national objective, as well as the need 
for planned and rapid and development, require that all industries of 
basic strategic importance or in the nature of public utility services, 
should be in the public sector". The state has to assume direct 
responsibility for the future development of industries over a wider 
area. 
However, public sector units not only failed to produce surplus, 
which was expected to generate for future growth but the return on 
investment also remained poor. The public sector in India, considered 
to be the vehicle of speedy economic development had run in to rough 
water. The functioning of many public sector units were characterized 
by low productivity, unsatisfactory quality of goods, excessive 
manpower, inadequate human resource development and low rate of 
return on capital. Facing a severe economic crisis such as fiscal deficit, 
balance of payment crisis, increased non development and non-plan 
government expenditure and dismal performance of public sector 
imdertakings. India approached IMF for loans and IMF granted 
structural adjustment loans' to India. These are the loans which are 
based on certain conditions attached to it relating to structural changes 
in the Indian economy. Therefore, the Government of India introduced 
a new era of economic reforms based on these conditions. These 
reforms were liberalization, privatization and globalization. In India 
government policy of privatization in the form of disinvestment, means 
reduction in government equity in public sector enterprises. 
Disinvestment plays an important role in revenue generation. 
Good disinvestment receipts can help the government reduce fiscal 
deficit not only by way of equity sale in public sector units but also for 
the subsequent cap in government transfer to sick public sector units. 
However, the question that is examined in this study is "whether 
disinvestment can lead to better results". The study proposes to 
undertake the case study of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd, to substantiate 
the findings of the study. Going beyond this an attempt is made to 
understand the issues raised in the Indian economy during the 
disinvestment process and future strategies and recommendations are 
suggested to make the disinvestment programme fruitful. 
Privatization of public sector units is not a new field in India. But 
disinvesting of PSUs is quite a new one which means reduction in 
goverrunent equity in public sector enterprises. Very few studies on this 
subject have been conducted during the last ten years. A critical 
examination of several of these studies reveals, among other things, that 
concepts used therein are not quite clear and methods adopted are 
unsatisfactory process. Therefore, need has been felt to spell out clearly 
the methodology and the concepts, which may be adopted in the study 
of disinvestment as has already been given in chapter - 1. Trends in the 
past few years have displayed wide and abysmal differences in 
disinvestment targets and actual receipts. Political hurdles in 
disinvestment, interventions of stakeholders and interest groups as well 
as poor state of public sector imits have all contributed to this 
performance. Besides, there are a number of problems associated with 
the disinvestment process. The number of bidders for equity has been 
small not only in the cases of financially weak public sector units but 
also in that of better performing public sector units. The government 
has often compelled financial institutions, UTI and other Mutual funds 
to purchase the equity which was being unloaded through 
disinvestment. These organizations have not been very enthusiastic in 
listing and trading of shares purchased by them as it would reduce their 
control over public sector units. All this has led to low valuation or 
under pricing of equity. Identification of public enterprises which are fit 
for disinvestment is quite ticklish one and cannot be resorted easily. 
Further, in many cases, disinvestment has not really changed the 
ownership of public sector units as the government has retained a 
majority stake in them. Since the public sector units do not benefit from 
disinvestment they have been reluctant to prepare and distribute 
prospectuses. This in turn prevented the disinvestment process from 
being completely open and transparent. 
If the disinvestment policy is to be in wider public interest, it is 
necessary to examine systematically issues such as the correct valuation 
of shares, the appropriate use of disinvestment proceeds and the 
institutional and other pre-requisites. 
The present study has been divided into six chapters. In chapter I, 
there is an introduction to the study. It gives a brief discussion of 
disinvestment, on designing research methodology and literature 
review. It gives a synoptic view about the plan of the work and the 
techniques used for analytical study of the whole gamut of issues and 
problems that fills the gap in the existing stock of knowledge on the 
subject. It presents study of existing literature on disinvestment and 
VSNL. Chapter II, goes in to the background of public sector enterprises 
and the emerging pattern of disinvestment in India. Further, it gives a 
short view over the benefits that are likely to be derived from 
disinvestment. Chapter III examines the concept and emergence of the 
disinvestment policy in India. It reveals the methods and procedure 
followed for the disinvestment of various public sector enterprises in 
India. It also reflects the target realization of disinvestment proceeds 
from the years 1991-2007. Chapter IV has two parts, first part of the 
chapter deals with the policy implication in the disinvestment 
programme in India and second part of the chapter takes up the issues 
emerged from time to time during the disinvestment of public sector 
enterprises in India. Chapter V takes up the case study of Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. It reveals the company background, its takeover by 
Tata and its performance after disinvestment. Chapter VI sums up the 
study with suitable suggestions and recommendations for the effective 
implementation of future disinvestment programme in India. 
In the thesis, all the important issues relating to the disinvestment 
of public sector enterprises have been thoroughly and critically 
examined and appropriate suggestions have also been given for 
making the disinvestment programme fruitful. These suggestions 
pertain to the existing system and practices of disinvestment. A case 
study of videsh sanchar Nigam Ltd. has been under taken to review the 
programme, videsh sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) was incorporated in 
1986 as a public sector enterprise to cater to overseas communication 
services. VSNL was taken over by Tata on 13 February 2002 and 
acquired a controlling stake in the company. VSNL has an international 
long distance monopoly but now within a six years period, it had 
turned in to global telecommunication power house an Indian 
Multinational corporation. In case of VSNL disinvestment, strategic sale 
was considered appropriate, as it brings financial, technical, marketing 
managerial expertise to the company which results in low cost, less 
regulation and better quality communication for the citizen. The 
findings of the study justify the statement that disinvestment leads to 
better results if carried in a transparent manner. No doubt VSNL, a cash 
Rich public sector enterprise has become from good to better after 
disinvestment. VSNL, a member of the US$29 billion Tata group, is a 
leading global communication company offering next generation voice, 
data and value added services to enterprises carriers and retail 
consumers. VSNL is listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the 
National Stock Exchange of India and its American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In 2005, VSNL 
acquired Tyco Global network. In 2006, VSNL completes acquisition of 
Teleglobe International Holdings Ltd. In 2007, VSNL launches next 
generation dedicated global Ethernet service for the Australia Market. 
Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) 9 and 14 certified global Ethernet Service 
enables Australian Enterprises to connect to India and throughout the 
world. VSNL has been chosen as the network administrator for one of 
the world's largest and sophisticated trans continent cable systems -
SEA - ME - WE (South East Asia - Middle East - Western Europe). 
VSNL's wireless fidelity (wi-fi) enables computers for use high speed 
internet without the need for any wires or cables. In 2008, VSNL, VSNL 
International and Teleglobe have being united as Tata Communications. 
The study has undertaken detailed review of literature on 
disinvestment and it has been classified in to two broad categories (i) 
Background overview (ii) Current view. Further, the present study 
develops four hypotheses, they are: 
1. Whether disinvestment is the need of the hour. 
2. Whether disinvestment leads to better results. 
3. Whether VSNL a Cash Rich Public Sector Enterprise after 
disinvestment have become from 'Good to better' or from 'Good 
to Worst' enterprise. 
4. Whether future strategies are needed to be evolved for effective 
implementation of disinvestment programme in India and to 
remove obstacles confronted during the programme. 
The findings of chapter-2 support the first hypothesis that 
disinvestment is the need of the hour as it was realized that the 
goveniment could no longer meet the growing demands of the 
economy and the government holding had to come down. 
Another reason for the adoption of disinvestment policy in India 
has been inability of the government to raise high taxes, overcome 
balance of payment crisis and budgetary deficit problems. The findings 
of the present study have brought to fore that the disinvestment 
programme undertaken in India till now have some pitfalls given in 
chapter -4. If these pitfalls are removed then disinvestment could lead 
to better results like : 
1. It would improve management. 
2. Raise resources for the public sector units. 
3. Enhance budgetary receipts. 
4. Improve productivity and profitability of enterprises. 
5. Develop capital markets. 
6. Unlock the productive potential inherent in the public sector 
undertakings. 
7. Disinvestment yields will increase GDP Growth and tax 
revenues which ultimately will reduce fiscal deficit. 
The findings of the chapter 5 proves that VSNL a cash rich public 
sector enterprise has become from 'good to better' enterprise within a 
period of six years after disinvestment. The findings of the study have 
highlighted certain issues that emerged during the implementation of 
disinvestment programme in India and that results in to serious 
stumbling blocks in the future disinvestment process. In order to avoid, 
such issues the study proposses certain future strategies and 
recommendations given in chapter-6 for the effective implementation of 
disinvestment programme in India like what to sell and how to sell? 
In India, various methods are adopted for disinvesting Public 
Sector Units like sale to outsiders, management employee buyout, equal 
access voucher, contracting and strategic sale. The growing 
politicization and intransparency in the methods and process of 
disinvestment has marred the objectives of the policy especially in case 
of BALCO, HPCL and BPCL. The present study is an attempt to assess 
10 
the available document within the relevant policy frame and identify 
major issues that need to be taken into consideration in the design and 
implementation of the disinvestment programme in India. The study 
proposes that intensive moiutoring, detailed implementation plan and 
guidelines to ensure fair access to the network also need to be designed 
in the restructuring plans. Fair, just and equitable procedure should be 
followed in carrying out disinvestment, lack of transparency and the 
decisions taken in hurry should be avoided. The role of organizational 
culture and management of various interest group is critical to a 
successful disinvestment programme. The study is important as it finds 
that the process of disinvestment in India has been ineffective because it 
has been difficult to find private bidders who are confident of 
restructuring the enterprise. Disinvestment has been successful in china 
because the proceeds of disinvestment go to the enterprise not like India 
where the government use the disinvestment proceeds for reducing its 
fiscal burden. 
Last, but not the least, the study proposes suggestions and 
recommendations to make the disinvestment programme more fruitful. 
Disinvestment which is onsidered essential for ensuring efficiency, 
profitability, introduction of new products and services, innovation 
11 
should be adopted as it is the need of the hour by making necessary 
amendment in the policy. 
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PREFACE 
Public Sector Enterprises were cor\structed iri the Indian 
Economy during the post independence period with a view to speed up 
the industrialization of the country, to give added impetus to economic 
growth and to achieve certain socio-economic goals. The first industrial 
policy declared on April 6,1948 by imion industry minister Mr. Shyam 
Prasad Mukheijee established a base of mixed and controlled economy 
in India and clearly divided the industrial sector into private and public 
sector. 
How ever, over the period of time it was realized that these 
enterprises were failing miserably to meet the socio-economic objectives 
set for them and began imposing burden on budget to meet its 
investment needs. The reasons assigned to their lack-luster performance 
were long gestation period, low efficiency and underutilization of 
installed capacity. 
Hence, in 1991 India facing a severe economic crisis such as fiscal 
deficit and Balance of payment approached IMF for loans and IMF 
granted 'structural adjustment loans' to India. These are the loans 
which are based on certain conditions attached to it relating to 
structural changes in the Indian economy. Therefore, the government of 
India introduced a new era of economic reforms based on these 
conditions. The new policy of liberalization, privatization and 
globalization de-emphasized the role of the public sector in the nation's 
economy. Market economy started gaining momentum. It was here 
orily that the disinvestment of public sector enterprises was recognized 
as a proper and effective tool for economic transformation and 
development. It was also significant for modernization and upgradation 
of public sector enterprises, creatiori of new assets and retiring of public 
debt. 
Disinvestment of public sector enterprises, results in better 
management of the enterprises, which encourages entrepreneurship 
and helps to accelerate the pace of economic development has been 
justified by the present study. To substantiate the findings a case study 
of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. has been undertaken, which had become 
from 'good to better' enterprises after disinvestment. 
The present study regarding disinvestment of public sector 
enterprises is designed to analyse the emerging issues in implementing 
the disinvestment programme in India. An attempt has been made in 
the present study to evolve future strategies with a view to make 
disinvestment programme more effective. 
It is hoped that the present study would be useful for future 
scholars for further researches on the subject as all the available and 
suitable information regarding disinvestment have been studied and 
collected from government publications, published and unpublished 
sources, journals and articles by enunent economists. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
DESIGNING AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
DESIGNING AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The proposed research is an academic attempt to examine the 
pros and cons of the government pohcy of privatization in the form of 
disinvestment which involves the sale of the public sector equity to the 
private sector and reduction or withdrawing of investment. 
Disinvestment plays an important role in revenue generation. Good 
disinvestment receipts can help the government reduce fiscal deficit not 
only by way of equity sale in public sector units but also for the 
subsequent cap in government transfer to sick public sector units. But 
has the government been successful in this context. Trends in the past 
few years have displayed wide and abysmal differences in 
disinvestment targets and actual receipts e.g. for the year 2001-2002, the 
targeted receipts were 12,000 but the actual receipts were 5632. Political 
hurdles in disinvestment, intervention of stakeholders and interest 
groups as well as poor state of public sector units have all contributed 
to this performance. Thus, the public sector in India, which was 
perceived to be the vehicle of speedy economic development, has run 
into rough waters. It not only failed to produce surplus, which it was 
expected to generate for future growth but the return on investment 
remained poor. The question that is examined in this study is "whether 
disinvestment can lead to better results". 
The study proposes to undertake the case study of Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. to substantiate the findings of the study. Going 
beyond this an attempt is made to understand the issues raised in the 
Indian economy during the disinvestment process and future strategies 
and recommendations are suggested to make the disinvestment 
programme fruitful. 
1.2. Issues and Statement of Problem 
The thrust of India's disinvestment has been on off setting the 
large chunk of the fiscal deficit rather than infusion of more private 
investment capital. When the government started disinvestment there 
was some confusion regarding strategic and non-strategic areas, which 
to some extent delayed the process. Some people made a case for 
excluding profit making companies from disinvestment. It was said that 
they contributed to the exchequer, that companies like ONGC and 
Indian Oil had found a place in fortune 500. However we should not 
forget that these companies are doing well under monopoly conditions. 
A number of problems are associated with the disinvestment 
process. The number of bidders for equity has been small not only in 
the cases of financially weak public sector units but also in that of better 
performing public sector units. Besides, the government has often 
compelled financial institutions, UTI and other mutual funds to 
purchase the equity, which was being urUoaded through disinvestment. 
These organizations have not been very enthusiastic in listing and 
trading of shares purchased by them, as it would reduce their control 
over public sector units. All this has led to low valuation or under 
pricing of equity. Identification of public enterprises that are fit for 
disinvestment is quite ticklish one and caimot be resorted easily. 
Further, in many cases, disinvestment has not really changed the 
ownership of public sector units as the government has retained a 
majority stake in them. Since the public sector tmits do not benefit from 
disinvestments they have been reluctant to prepare and distribute 
prospectuses. This in turn prevented the disinvestments process from 
being completely open and transparent. 
To make the disinvestments policy in wider public interest. It is 
necessary to examine systematically issues such as the correct valuation 
of shares, the appropriate use of disinvestments proceeds and the 
institutional and other pre-requisites. 
1.3. Comprehensive Review of Literature 
In this section, detailed review of literature on disinvestments has 
been imdertaken and it has been classified in to two broad categories (i) 
Background Overview (ii) Current View. 
(a) Background Overview 
1. Ramanadham (1988) viewed that "the best aiiswer to the 
issue of privatization is to take the necessary steps to improve the 
efficiency of public enterprises by making suitable changes in the 
management structure and their relatioriship with the government and 
parliament. Steps should be taken to replace the civil services culture by 
commercial culture in public enterprises". 
2. Bamekov and Raffel (1990) highlighted :on productivity of 
services among the public and private enterprises. They claimed that 
the shift from public to private provision of a service is no panacea for 
greater productivity. The best opporttmity for improving productivity 
using privatization occurs when the service is easily measured and 
monitored, but productivity effects are more ambiguous when the 
situation is complex, as in such fields as human services and 
education". 
3. Momtazuddin (1991) in his article entitled "Privatization: 
Present Status and Future Potentials as Policy Options Development", 
presents a conceptual guideline regarding privatization. He expressed 
his opinion that privatization should be considered from both economic 
and ideological view points from economic point of view, privatization 
is identified as a means of increasing output, improvement of quality 
and minimization of cost. On the other hand from the philosophical 
point of view, privatization broaden the base of ownerships that an 
individual has a stake in the economic system. 
4. Prasad (1991) opined that public enterprises lack 
autonomy. It is bureaucracy that takes major decisions for the 
organization on the other hand, the private sector organization model 
has several elements, which ensure efficient management apart from 
market forces. 
5. Singh (1991) threw light on a basic issue that whether the 
new pattern of ownership leading to privatization of public sector 
undertakings results in greater efficiency or not. The resource factor and 
management factor are the two cardinal elements, which need to be 
considered in any move on privatization. 
6. Bishop and David (1992) advocated that change of 
ownership brings about the change in regulatory environment, which 
compels the organization to perform more effectively. 
7. Reddy (1993) in an article entitled "privatization as 
development strategy", observes that privatization by itself does not 
automatically lead to better efficiency but needs to accompany overall 
packages of employment, technology modernization, productivity and 
professional management, it reduces government's budgetary 
commitments, political and bureaucratic interference and ensures 
overall economic development. So the process of privatization may 
become an instrument of public enterprise reform and development of 
economy. 
8. Schregle (1993) in his article, "Privatization and Industrial 
Relations: General Perspective", has highlighted on some of the major 
industrial relations problems arising from privatization. If privatization 
policies are to be carried through with a minimum of labour troubles 
and a maximum of economic, social and political stability and 
efficiency, it is required to promote a close constructive dialogue 
between public authorities employee's organizations and trade imions. 
9. Sunita Kikeri and Others (1994) in their research paper 
captioned "Privatization lesson from Market Economies", Examine the 
objectives of privatization and the strategies for achieving them in both 
competitive and non-competitive markets. The authors analyzed the 
various tactics that can be or have been employed in relation to scope, 
pace, sequencing and methods of implementation. The evidence shows 
that privatization produces benefits of efficiency if done right. 
10. Deogiriker (1994) in his research paper "Privatization: A 
Global Survey", concludes that the strategy of reform for the less 
developed countries should be improvement of efficiency. The success 
of privatization depends on economic, political and social factor and 
managerial considerations. 
11. Bhaskaran (1994) viewed that talking about privatization is 
easy but implementing it may not be so. The transition needs to be 
brought in very carefully and the impediments need to be tackled 
tactfully. There is need to do the homework in a systematic manner, 
only then can we bring about the desired change without pain, panic 
and trauma. 
12. Bimal Jalan (1996) viewed that "Political interference is 
imavoidable in public corporations and is a major cause of decline in 
operational efficiency, such political decision-making reflects itself in 
the less than optimal choice of technology or location, overstaffing, 
inefficient use of input and purchase or price preferences for certain 
suppliers. Most government also impose non-economic objectives on 
public enterprises". 
(b) Current View 
13. Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2000) viewed that "we will 
strengthen the capability of our public sector, give greater managerial 
autonomy, foster technological up gradation for enabling them to 
effectively meet the new challenges of globalization and increased 
competition". 
14. Arun Shourie (2001) [former disinvestment miruster] said, 
"The disinvestment exercise needs to be divorced from the fiscal health 
of the central exchequer". 
15. Nandini Gupta (2001) said, "The background of the 
disinvestment process in India leads us to believe that dynamic 
selection is not a major problem. The debate in policy circles and in the 
media has focused on the absence of a privatization plan like which 
firms to sell, how much to sell and when to sell. The disinvestment 
programme of the government is completely incoherent and lacks 
transparency and conviction". 
16. Department of Disinvestment (2001) report. In the 
governments own words, "Disinvestments would help in releasing 
huge amount of scarce public resources locked up in non-strategic 
public sector enterprises for deployment in areas such as public health, 
education etc., stemming the further outflow of scarce public resources 
for sustaining the unviable enterprises, reducing public debt, 
transferring the commercial risk, to which tax payer's money is 
exposed, to the private sector, releasing other tangible and intangible 
resources, such as, large manpower currently locked up in managing 
public sector enterprises, for redeployment in areas that are much 
higher on the social priority". 
17. Gargi Parsai (2001) opined, "the disinvestment of Air India 
and Indian Air Lines has run into heavy turbulence. If Air India's 
disinvestment has hit an air poket with only one bidder left in the fray, 
Indian Airlines has virtually been grounded with no bidder left. When 
the centre set out to disinvest in Air India and Indian Airlines, the 
market was showing signs of growth. But sudderUy there has been a 
slump capacity is available and fares have fallen. Also about seven 
airlines are up for sale in the world, including three Latin American 
airlines and Iberia of Spain, Malaysian Airlines, Thai Airways and 
Ansett of Australia. But there were no takers. In that sense, it was a 
good time for bidders to buy, but bad time for the government to sell". 
18. S. Swaminathan (2001) in his article said "that all the fervid 
debates on the gains and pains of liberalization over the last ten years, 
have almost invariably skirted the central problem of economic 
restructuring which is that of withdrawal of govenunent from 
manufacturing activities whenever competitive market mechanisms can 
deliver better. If the public sector constellation stood for the "command 
and Control" economy, the new paradigm would dictate the transfer of 
public enterprises to the private sector such that competition replaced 
monopoly power. Ten years down the road, economic reforms in India 
have already made a difference to the sprawling 'empire' of the public 
sector. This despite high-level committees (such as the Rangarajan 
Committee) advocating disinvestment of goveniment equity down to 
26 percent in the vast majority of enterprises excepting those considered 
"strategic" entities demanding government tutelage". 
19. G. Ganesh (2002) (Former Secretary of the Disinvestment 
Commission) said in his article "Public support for the disinvestment 
process can be secured only when the proceeds of the disinvestment are 
spent for specific social purposes, instead of going to meet budgetary 
deficits. The stated aim of the government is to reduce public debt and 
provide funds for social sector from the proceeds of disinvestment. But 
till date no data is available on the use of disinvestment proceeds". 
20. G. Ganesh (2002) in mid term economic review opined, 
"disinvestment should not be viewed purely from the revenue 
perspective. It must aim to unlock the productive potential of public 
sector enterprises. Besides disinvestment should galvanize these 
enterprises to promoting high quality employment as well as 
competition in the Marketplace". 
21. Editorials Opinion (2002) "Disinvestment programme has 
been one of the most controversial Reform measure. Despite some 
recent significant success in carrying forward the programme, there was 
always the possibility that it might stall on account of one or other of 
the controversies that were never fully doused. The latter for instance, 
the methodology to divest has remained in the background. Even as the 
public sector sale programme was gathering steam. Since there has been 
no convincing resolution of the major issues - admittedly easier said 
than done - the programme was bound to hit a roadblock, as it did 
recently". 
22. D. Varadarajan (2002) opined in his article "the recent 
VSNL controversy highlighted the non-adherence to the secretarial 
standards prescribed by the institute of company secretaries of India. 
The salutary principles of corporate governance need to be developed 
and crystallized at the earliest to pre-empt any further unsavory 
corporate episodes. The present committee requires to be revamped and 
broad-based immediately, to eiJiance credibility and stature, if the DCA 
is really serious about evolving edifying corporate governance 
standards". 
23. V. Sridhar (2002) said that "controversy continues to dog 
the union governments disinvestment programme and ensnared in it 
are some of India's leading corporate entities. The latest involves the 
Tatas, one of the country's oldest and biggest business groups, which in 
February acquired Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), one of the 
public sector crown jewels. The controversy erupted as soon as the 
Tatas announced in late may that VSNL would invest Rs. 1200 crores in 
one of its own group companies in Tata Tele Services Ltd. (TTSL). The 
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union cabinet was divided, amid speculation that it was but a reflection 
of an ongoing corporate tussle over, how the kidian 
Telecommunications pie was to be divided among private corporate 
entities". 
24. George Femandes (2003) (Former Defense Minister of 
India) in his article "I believe that the objective for disinvestment should 
be to benefit the public, the consumer and the investor and at the same 
time, to improve competitiveness and eliminate monopoly.. Our 
disinvestment policy should therefore, be to offer these companies to 
the public of India. The current system of strategic sale is tantamount to 
handing over the entities created with the wealth of the people of India 
to further enrich the already rich.. In the transfer of VSNL and IPCL we 
have created monopolies with Tata and Reliance cases of rich becoming 
richer with people's money. If we pursue the strategic sale route in the 
aluminum and petroleum sectors, it is very likely that we will create 
monopolies within these vital sectors of the economy. State monopolies 
will become private monopolies. Is this good for the Indian consumers? 
25. C.P. Chandrashekhar (2003) in an article viewed that "the 
lack of executive accountability to parliament in the matter of 
privatization of public sector units, besides being constitutionally 
incorrect, is disastrous from the point of view of economic policy. 
26. Naib (2004) viewed that "After a great deal of initial 
excitement and reservations, disinvestments of Public sector enterprises 
has become on going process in the country. But the debate continuous, 
with some enthusiastically endorsing it and others expressing 
apprehensions and opposition. By and large, this debate has been at the 
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ideological level. Ideology cannot be kept out of the debate, but 
disinvestment has other dimensions too. The modalities of 
disinvestment are important. So are its consequences". 
27. Bimal Jalan (2004) (Former RBI Governor) said at FICQ 
conference that "I don't think there is any difference in view that we 
want high growth, lower poverty, low inflation, financial stability and a 
strong market.. Unless you correct the fiscal problem, you cannot 
achieve what you want". 
28. Monica Sethi (2005) in his article said that "Selling of public 
sector enterprises on which crores of rupees have been wasted will give 
a large one time capital gain, which itself can be a panacea for a debt 
ridden country like India." 
29. C.R.L. Narsimhan (2005) said "The decision not to let the 
government stake fall below 51% in public sector banks is not 
surprising. The debate over the appropriateness of one method over the 
other is far from over and is at the core of the opposition to 
disinvestment. The shelving of the strategic sale route in 13 profit 
companies therefore has not come as a surprise. It is possible that the 
government may still find a way to gamer political support and sell 
small lots of shares in profit-making public sector enterprises without 
ever countenancing a dilution to below 51 percent". 
30. Nagraj (2005) in his research paper "Public sector 
enterprises financial losses were not the principal cause of the growing 
fiscal in the 1980's and infact public sector enterprises share in the fiscal 
deficit had steadily declined in the decade. In other words, the 
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government per se was largely responsible for the growing fiscal deficit, 
not the enterprises owned by it", 
31. N. Sridhar (2006) said, "There is something eerie about the 
way public assets are disinvested. Announcement of impending 
disinvestment of publicly owned companies usually come without 
warning. The objective appears to be more to catch the public by 
surprise than to carry out a transparent or logical exercise. The recent 
decision of the union government to sell 10 percent of its equity in 
National Aluminium Company Ltd. (NALCO) and the fierce resistance 
it has met with, highlights why disinvestment has been controversial in 
India". 
32. Dr. Mamnohan Singh (2007) (Prime Miiuster) said, "I 
believe that many joint ventures and alliances both between Public 
Enterprises and between Public and Private Enterprises are being 
worked out. That truly is a healthy development. Such joint ventures 
and public - private partnerships can help the public sector benefit from 
the private sector's competitive advantages where ever it might exist". 
33. P. Chidambaram (2008) (Finance Minister) said that the 
"Surveys have shown a vast majority of people at the grassroots level 
feet that disinvestments or privatization of public sector is not always 
the best, without consensus on the issue, there is no way to take 
forward this agreement. I believe we must approach disinvestments 
very objectively. Disinvestment should not be equated with 
privatization and nor should it be considered the only way of reforming 
the public sector". 
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1.4. Need and Scope of the Study 
Disinvestment of public sector enterprises had always been a 
hotly contested and needlessly controversial issue in the Indian 
economic scenario. Whether, it is related to methodology, valuation, or 
selling of profit making enterprises. The present study gives a 
comprehensive view of the disinvestment programme in India; it 
highlights the issues arising during the disinvestment of various public 
sector enterprises in India. A case study of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
has been under taken to review the programme. The study gives 
suggestions, recommendations and future strategies for the effective 
implementation of disinvestment programme in India. As India is 
slowly moving from a closed economy to a competitive one. The 
present study is an attempt to assess the available document within the 
relevant policy frame and identify major issues that need to be taken in 
to consideration in the design and implementation of the disinvestment 
programme in India. The study proposes that intensive monitoring, 
detailed implementation plan and guidelines to ensure fair access to the 
network also need to be designed in the restructuring plans. The role of 
organizational culture and management of various interest groups is 
crucial to a successful disinvestment programme. The study is 
important as it finds that the process of disinvestment in India has been 
inadequate because it has been difficult to find private bidders who are 
confident of restructuring the enterprise. Disinvestment has been 
successful in China because the proceeds of disinvestments go to the 
enterprise not like India where the government use the disinvestment 
proceeds for reducing its fiscal burden. The suggestions and 
recommendations of the study will help the policy makers to chalk out 
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the proper policies regarding future disirivestment in India. It would 
also be helpful for the management of the privatized enterprises to 
overcome their existing difficulties in running their industries 
effectively. The present study is useful as it focuses that disinvestment 
which is considered essential for ensuring efficiency, profitability, 
introduction of new products and services, innovation should be 
adopted as it is the need of the hour by making necessary amendment 
in the policy. 
1.5. Objectives of the Study 
The purposes of the study are as follows: 
1. To evaluate the performance of public sector enterprises in 
India. 
2. To examine the nature of disinvestment policy and issues. 
3. To develop base for further researches on the subject matter of 
disinvestment. 
4. To make contribution to the existing stock of knowledge on 
disinvestments of shares of public sector enterprises in India. 
5. To suggest strategies for future disinvestment. 
6. To advance knowledge by suggesting solutions to 
contemporary problems. 
7. To draw conclusion and suggest recommendations for 
productive disinvestment. 
8. To propose measures relating to better functioning of public 
sector enterprises. 
1.6. Hypotheses 
The present study develops four hypotheses. They are: 
1. Whether disinvestment is the need of the hour. 
2. Whether disinvestment leads to better results. 
3. Whether VSNL a Cash Rich Public Sector Enterprise after 
disinvestment have become from 'Good to better' or from 'Good 
to Worst' enterprise. 
4. Whether future strategies are needed to be evolved for effective 
implementation of disinvestment programme in India and to 
remove obstacles confronted during the programme. 
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Hypothesis One:- The findings of chapter - 2 support the first 
hypothesis that disinvestment is the need of the hour as it was realized 
that the government could no longer meet the growing demands of the 
economy and the government holding had to come down. Another 
reason for the adoption of disinvestment policy in India has been 
inability of the government to raise high taxes, overcome balance of 
payment crisis and budgetary deficit problems. It has also been 
observed that the functioning of many public sector units is 
characterized by low-productivity, unsatisfactory quality of goods, 
excessive manpower utilization, inadequate human resource 
development and low rate of return on capital. 
Table-1: Table for Paid Up Capital 
In 18 companies revival scheme sanctioned 
In 7 public sector Corporations, Draft scheme circulated 
In 6 companies winding up notice issued 
13 companies were under enquiry 
4 companies failed & reopened 
In 11 companies winding up recommended 
2 companies dismissed as non-maintain-able 
2 companies dismissed as non-maintain-able 
2 companies declared no longer sick 
1 dropped as net worth become positive 
TOTAL 
Paid up capital 
(Rs.Cr) 
%1.75 
703.4 
341.4 
43%.49 
192.18 
192.18 
39.19 
158.29 
121.05 
80.38 
9112.72 
Accumulated 
loss (Rs. Cr) 
2740.57 
5197.41 
5152.79 
1762.45 
1797.86 
1053.80 
3218.62 
180.86 
33.68 
2789.15 
38638.59 
Source: Department of Public Sector Enterprises and Public Enterprises Suroey, 1999-2000, Vol. 1. 
6 0 0 0 T 
• Paid up capital (Rs. Cr) 
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Thus to improve the level of economic performance of enterprises 
both on production and distribution fronts and for generating fiscal 
incomes through sale of assets. Disinvestment of public sector uiuts was 
considered as a panacea for a debt ridden economy like India. 
Hypothesis Two:- The findings of the present study have brought to 
fore that the disinvestment programme undertaken in India till now 
have some pitfalls as given in Chapter - 4. If these pitfalls are removed 
then disinvestment could lead to better results like:-
1. It would improve management. 
2. Raise resources for the public sector imits. 
3. Enhance budgetary receipts. 
4. Improve productivity and profitability of enterprises. 
5. Develop capital markets. 
6. Unlock the productive potential inherent in the public sector 
undertakings. 
7. Disinvestment yields will increase GDP Growth and tax 
revenues which ultimately will reduce fiscal deficit. 
Further disinvestment proceeds could be used:-
1. for creating National Renewal fimd for assistance to workers 
in unorganized sector, 
2. for special employment schemes in backward areas. 
3. for meeting volimtary retirement scheme needs. 
4. for creating a restructuring fund for public sector units. 
5. to fund social and infrastructure sectors. 
6. for creating worker's safety net. 
7. for public debt reduction. 
8. for creating disinvestment fund to direct proceeds for specific 
uses. 
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Hypothesis Third:- The findings of the chapter - 5 proves that VSNL's 
a Cash Rich public sector enterprise has become from 'Good to better' 
enterprise within a period of five years after disinvestment. The above 
statement is also supported by the following data showing the 
performance of VSNL after disinvestment. 
EBIDTA of VSNL 
(Earning Before Interest, Depreciation Taxes and Amortization) 
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Source : VSNL Annual Report, 2003, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08 
VSNL, a member of the US$29 billion Tata Group is a leading global 
communication company offering next generation voice, data and value 
added services to enterprise carriers and retail consumers. VSNL's 
customer base includes 1500 Global carriers, 450 mobile operators, 
10,000 enterprises, 1,00,000 broadband and internet subscribers and 300 
wi-fi public hotspots. VSNL has offices in over 35 countries including 
the uruted states of America, Canada, the United Kingdom, South 
Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and India. VSNL is listed on 
the Bombay stock exchange and the National stock exchange of India 
and its American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are listed on the new 
York stock exchange. Further the progress of VSNL can be analysed as 
follows: 
a. In 2005, VSNL acquired Tyco Global Network. 
b. In 2006, VSNL completes acquisition of teleglobe 
international holdings ltd. 
c. In 2007, VSNL launches next generation dedicated 
Global Ethernet Service for the Australia market. Metro 
Ethernet Forum (MEF) 9 and 14 certified Global 
Ethernet Service enables Australian Enterprises to 
coimect to India and throughout the world. 
d. VSNL has been chosen as the network administrator for 
one of the world's largest and sophisticated trans 
continent cable systems - SEA - ME - WE 4 (South East 
Asia - Middle East - Western Europe) 
e. VSNL's Wireless Fidelity (wi-fi) enables computers to 
use high speed internet without the need for any wires 
or cables. 
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f. In 2008, VSNL, VSNL International and Teleglobe have 
being united as Tata communications. 
Currently the company has 52 subsidiaries in 21 countries as well 
as operations across four continents. VSNL international a subsidiary of 
the company, takes care of its international operations. It offers the 
greatest diversity for connectivity services to India. This is coupled with 
a powerful domestic network that covers over 300 cities in India. 
Hypothesis Fourth:- The findings of the study have highlighted certain 
issues that emerged during the implementation of disinvestment 
programme in India and that results in to serious stumbling blocks in 
the future disinvestment process. In order to avoid such issues the 
study proposes certain future strategies and recommendations which 
are given in Chapter - 6 for the effective implementation of 
disinvestment programme in India like what to sell and how to sell? 
1.7. Research Design and Methodology 
The data for the present study have been collected basically from 
the secondary sources. Annual reports of ministry of disinvestment, 
research reports of world bank, debates and seminars, visual analysis of 
different websites concerning disinvestments, company annual reports, 
annual reports of the Bureau of public enterprises, economic survey 
annual reports, public sector enterprises survey reports, reserve bank of 
India annual reports. Ministry of Finance, Industry and labour, 
government of India and a centre for monitoring Indian economy. 
A number of professional bodies such as federation of Indian 
chambers of corrunerce and industry, VSNL Annual Reports, VSNL 
international website, leading dailies like the economic times. The 
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financial express. The Hindustan Times, The Times of India, The 
Tribune - Chandigarh, India - Business have being studied for latest 
information on the subject. Besides this various magazines like frontline 
(India's National Magazine, from the publishers of Hindu group. 
Business line, India Today, Business Today, Economic and Political 
weekly, Pratiyogita Darpan, Indian Economy Edition, Civil services 
chronicle Indian economy. Special edition of various years. Journal of 
monetary economics. Journal of Public Economics, Journal of political 
economy have been studied to have a clear view of disinvestment 
programme in India. 
Further various research papers and publicatioiis have also been 
studied profoundly like working papers of National Bureau of 
Economic Research, rage publications, Bombay : Himalaya House 
Publications, Pragati Publications and Vidhi's manual. 
1.8. Scheme of Chapterization 
The study is divided into six chapters. 
1. Chapter - I is an introduction to the study. It gives a brief 
discussion of disinvestments, on designing research 
methodology and literature review. It gives a synoptic view 
about the plan of the work and the techniques used for 
analytical study of the whole gamut of issues and problems 
that fills the gap in the existing stock of knowledge on the 
subject. It presents study of existing literature on 
Disinvestment and VSNL. 
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2. Chapter - II goes in to the background of pubhc sector 
enterprises and the emerging pattern of disinvestment in 
India. Further, it gives a short view over the benefits that are 
likely to be derived from disinvestment. 
3. Chapter - III examines the concept and emergence of the 
disinvestment policy in India. It reveals the methods and 
procedure followed for the disinvestment of various public 
sector enterprises in India, It also reflects the target fixed by 
the government and actual realization of disinvestment 
proceeds from the years 1991-2007. 
4. Chapter - IV This chapter has two parts. First part of the 
chapter deals with the policy implication in the disinvestment 
programme in India and second part of the chapter takes up 
the issues emerged from time to time during the 
disinvestment of public sector enterprises in India. 
5. Chapter V takes up the case study of Videsh Sanchar Nigam 
Ltd., it reveals the company background, its takeover by Tata 
and its performance after disinvestment. 
6. Chapter VI sums up the study with suitable suggestions and 
recommendations for the effective implementation of future 
disinvestment programme in India. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES 
IN INDIA 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
ENTERPRISES IN INDIA 
A public sector enterprise is one which is owned, managed and 
controlled by the central government or state government or local 
authority. For example Railways, posts, telegraphs and Life Insurance 
Corporation etc. 
2.1. The Evolution of the Public Sector in India 
Prior to 1947, there was no "public sector" in the Indian economy. 
There were only Railways, Posts and the Telegraphs, the post trusts, the 
ordinance and aircraft factories and a few state managed undertaking 
like the govenunent salt factories, quinine factories etc. It was only after 
independence, the first industrial policy was declared on April 6,1948 
by union industry hiinistry Mr. Shyam Prasad Mukherjee. This policy 
established a base in mixed and controlled economy in India and clearly 
divided the industrial sector in to private and public sector.^ 
a) Industrial Policy Resolution, 7'^ April 1948 
The Nehruvian approach dominated the scene after 
independence. According to this resolution, industries were divided 
into three broad categories. The first covered the manufacture of arms 
and ammimition, the production and control of atomic energy, and the 
ownership and management of railway transport which were to be "the 
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exclusive monopoly of the central government". For the second, the 
state including the central and state governments and public authorities 
like municipal corporations, were to be "exclusively responsible for the 
establishment of new undertakings", except when the private 
corporation was needed in the national interest. This category covered 
six industries, namely, coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, ship 
building, manufacture of telephone, telegraph and wireless apparatus 
and mineral oils. The rest of the industries were normally to be left to 
private enterprise subject to his proviso that the state will also 
participate in this field, and will not "hesitate to intervene whenever the 
progress of an industry under private enterprise is unsatisfactory". 
Thus, the important features of IPR1948 are: 
(a) Development of industries in those areas where industries 
have not made any progress. 
(b) Development of mixed economy. 
(c) Categorization of industries in to four. 
(i) Industries having both public and private sector 
involvement. 
(ii) Industries exclusively under central government. 
(iii) Industries of vital importance. 
(iv) Other industries left open.^ 
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b) Constitution of India 
The preamble of the constitution envisages India as a 'socialist' 
republic, and its article 39(b) and (c) directs the state to secure "that the 
ownership and control of the material resources of the community are 
so distributed as best to subserve the common goods" and "that the 
operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment". According 
to Article 38, "The state shall strive to promote the welfare of the people 
by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in 
which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life". Thus, publicly owned financial, 
commercial, industrial, developmental, promotional and welfare 
institutions become relevant and should play an important role in the 
economy. 
It is an important issue whether the present move to dismantle 
Public Enterprise and allow free play to private enterprise is consistent 
with the provisions enshrined in the constitution. 
c) First Five-Year Plan 
The plan presented to the government by the planning 
commission in December 1952, indicated the need for "a rapid 
expansion of the economic and social respoiisibilities of the state" to 
satisfy the "legitimate expectations of the people". It however stated 
that this "need not involve complete nationalization of the means of 
production or elimination of private agencies in agriculture or business 
and industry". 
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Only a progressive widerring of the public sector and a re-
orientation of the private sector to the needs of "planned economy" was 
envisaged. The plan idealized by stating that "the concept of private 
enterprise, as indeed, of private property, is undergoing rapid change, 
and the view that private enterprise can function only on the basis of 
uiuregulated profits is already an anachronism". It was also stated that 
"the private and the public sectors cannot be looked upon anything like 
two separate entities, and must ftmction as parts of a single organism. 
d) Decision for a Socialist Pattern of Society 
On 21*' December 1954, the Lok Sabha after a debate on economic 
situation resolved, among others, that "the objective of our economic 
policy should be a socialist pattern of society". The second plan 
document mentions the following ingredients of this concept: 
(i) The basic criterion for determirung the lines of advance must 
not be private profit but social gain. 
(ii) The pattern of development and the structure of socio-
economic relations should be so planned that they result not 
only in appreciable increases in national income and 
employment but also in greater equality in income and wealth. 
(iii) Major decisions regarding production, distribution, 
consumption and investment must be made by agencies 
informed by social purpose. 
(iv) The benefits of economic development must accrue more and 
more to the less privileged classes of society. 
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(v) There should be progressive reductiori of the coricentration of 
wealth and economic power. 
According to the plan document, for achieving the above 
objectives (i) the state was to take on heavy responsibilities as the 
principal agency speaking for and acting on behalf of the commuiuty 
and (ii) the public sector was to expand rapidly and play the dominant 
role in shaping the entire pattern of investment in the economy.^ 
e) Industrial Policy Resolution, 30* April, 1956 
This policy resolution referred to the directive principles of state 
policy, the socialist pattern of society and the need for a planned and 
rapid development, and declared that "all industries of basic and 
strategic importance or in the nature of public utility services should be 
in the public sector. Other industries "which are essential and require 
investment on a scale which only the state could provide have also to be 
in the public sector". 
Thus, the expansion of the public sector was based on the 
industrial policy resolution of 1956, which assigned a strategic role to 
the public sector. This policy resolution may be described as the 
"economic constitution" of India and emphasis was on 
(i) Accelerating the rate of economic growth. 
(ii) Speeding up industrialization 
Expanding the public sector and building up a large and growing 
cooperative sector was an essential feature of this policy. The resolution 
classified industries in to three broad categories. 
31 
(i) Schedule 'A':- 17 industries including arms and ammunitions, 
atomic energy, heavy and core industries, aircraft, oil, 
railways, shipping etc. The state assumes the exclusive 
responsibility of development in these areas. 
(ii) Schedule 'B':- 12 industries which would be progressively 
state owned. The state here would take the initiative of setting 
up industries, but private sector who expected to supplement 
the efforts of the state. 
(iii) Remaining industries, the development of which lay in the 
hands of the private sector initiative and enterprise subject to 
relevant regulations and legislations. 
Hence, the policy laid emphasis on the state assuming a 
predominant role in the economy and direct responsibility for setting 
up new industrial undertakings. But at the same time private industries 
were to be allowed to develop and expand within national priorities.^ 
f) Nationalization in India: A Brief Review 
A review of the various nationalization measures since 
independence shows that the nationalization measures were guided by 
the socialist ideology, though the state ownership of means of 
production was always in the background and came handy when 
necessary. 
(i) Air Companies: - Many of the nine air companies were 
continuing to be financially imsound inspite of the financial 
help by the government. The Air Transport Enquiry 
Committee's recommendations could not improve the 
industry, which continued to ask for large government 
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subsidies. Hence, nationalization of the air companies 
resulting in Indian Airlines and Air India in 1953. 
(ii) Imperial Bank of India: - It was nationalized and converted 
into the state bank of India in 1955, as the former had failed to 
open the required number of branches in rural areas, which 
were not likely to yield profit. 
(iii) Life Insurance Business :- In 1956, 170 companies were 
nationalized because the industry was not playing the role of 
spreading the message of life insurance to the masses, also the 
concept of trusteeship, which should be the comer stone of life 
insurance, was lacking. 
(iv) Commercial Banks: - Fourteen major Indian Commercial 
Banks were nationalized in 1969. So that they could serve the 
masses and not confine their activities to the classes. The 
Government's effort of social control over the banks had 
failed. The stated policy of nationalization was "to control the 
commanding heights of the economy and to meet 
progressively and serve better the needs of development of 
economy in conformity with the national policy and 
objectives". Six more banks were nationalized in 1980. 
(v) General Insurance: - The reasons for nationalizing the 
business of 107 insuring companies in 1971 were both 
pragmatic and political. The government wanted "to break 
new grounds and see new horizon" through nationalization. 
Secondly, the investment policies of the general insurance 
compaiues were to be more socially oriented. 
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(vi) Coal Mines: - Nationalization of the coal industry was done 
a. To avoid mining of coal in a wasteful manner, eg. 81% of 
the collieries in the Jharia Coal Fields, where the major 
portion of the coking coal reserves are located, produced 
less than 1000 tonnes a day, whereas the full economies of 
three to four thousand tones a day. 
b. The coal industry was not in a position to raise resources 
consistent with the growing requirements of coal needed 
by the country. 
c. The socialist objective that the ownership and control of the 
national resources should be so distributed as to serve the 
common good was also mentioned as a reason for 
nationalization. 
(vii) Foreign Oil Companies: - These were taken over largely due 
to the nationalistic consideration of holding a commanding 
position in regard to a strategic product like oil. 
(viii) Nationalization of Sick Units: - A large number of sick units 
including over 100 textile mills were nationalized till the early 
eighties. Some of these were: India Iron & Steel Company 
(1976), Andrew Yule & Company (1979) and British India 
Corporation (1981). The "Statements of Objects and Reasons" 
as appended to various nationalization bills presented to 
parliament generally mentioned 
(i) The avoidance of large unemployment and 
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(ii) Saving of the useful production capacity of the 
terminally sick units, as reasons for nationalization. In 
most cases, more money was needed to make these 
units viable, which the government wanted to invest 
only when it kept the control in its hands. In many 
cases, the sick imits had substantial investments from 
the public financial institutions and nationalized banks, 
which helped the process of nationalization.^ 
g) Industrial Licensing 
The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 
empowered the government to issue licenses for the setting up of new 
industries, expansion of existing ones and for diversification of 
products. The Hazari Committee was appointed in 1966 to review the 
working of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act 1952. The 
report pointed out the influence of big business in Industry which 
prevented the entry of new entrepreneurs and acted as a hindrance to 
industrial development. The government appointed an industrial 
licensing policy enquiry committee (known as Dutt Committee) in 1969. 
It submitted its report in 1969, which revealed that the system of 
Industrial Licensing had resulted in increased concentration of 
economic power in the hands of few business houses; it led to 
formulation of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) 
Act in 1969, which came into force in June 1970. The licensing policy 
statement of 1970 classified industries into core sector, non-core sector, 
heavy industries sector, middle sector, joint sector, unlicensed sector 
and the small-scale industries sector. It was also indicated that 
investment by large houses would be encouraged in certain areas 
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needing heavy investment while the core sector would be reserved for 
the state sector." 
2.2. Objectives of Public Sector in India 
Some of the main objectives of public sector undertakings in India 
are: 
1. Rate of economic growth should be maximized. 
2. Living conditions and standard of the workers should be 
improved. 
3. Sound economic foundations should be laid down, so that 
the people are in a position to have gainful employment. 
4. Disparity of income and wealth, which is created by private 
sector, should be reduced to the minimum. 
5. Growth of private monopolies and concentration of 
economic power in the hands of orUy few persons should 
be checked and protected. 
6. To properly channelize small savings and deepen its scope. 
7. To develop the agro-based infrastructure including 
irrigation facilities and power and energy. 
8. To establish a strong industrial base comprising 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water 
supply. 
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9. To provide commercial surplus with which to finance 
further economic development. 
10. To make an important contribution towards achieving a 
socialist pattern of society through their multifold role 
providing an infrastructure, acting as ideal employer and 
well wishers of the workers. 
2.3. Performance of Public Sector Enterprises in India 
At the time of independence, India had a weak industrial base, 
low level of savings and investment and hardly any infrastructural 
facility worth the name. Serious imbalances existed in employment 
opportimities and income levels. The public sector enterprises (PSEs) 
have provided direct employment to over two million people. They 
have also been instrumental in providing basic infrastructure, a 
technological base and a considerable degree of self-reliance to the 
country. They are also incurring heavy recurring expenditure on 
maintenance of townships, administration and social overheads like 
education, medical and cultural facilities. Much of the regional 
imbalance in industrial location has been removed by the setting up of 
public sector enterprises in remote and backward areas. The 
contribution of Central Public Sector Enterprises in the production of 
coal, lignite and petroleum was more than 90% of the country's total 
production during 1999-2000. The Public Sector Enterprises have a 
wider ownership of economic power to prevent its concentration in a 
few hands. 
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Table-2 
Overall Profitability of Central PEs from 1995-96 to 1998-99 
(Rs. in crore) 
No. of Operating PEs 
Paid-up Capital (Rs.) 
Net Profit (Rs.) 
Dividend declared (Rs.) 
No. of PEs declaring 
dividend 
Retained profit (Rs.) 
% of net profit to paid-up 
capital 
1995-96 
239 
60,743 
9,574 
2,205 
79 
7,389 
15.76 
1996-97 
238 
69,985 
10,186 
2,836 
80 
7,089 
14.55 
1997-98 
236 
72,122 
13,720 
3,609 
88 
9,647 
19.02 
1998-99 
235 
77,066 
13,235 
4,932 
83 
7,746 
17.17 
Source: - Report of the eleventh finance commission, annexure IV-1 
According to public enterprises survey, 1998-99, presented to 
parliament in 2000, the net profit after tax of central autonomous Public 
Enterprises (PEs) was Rs. 13,235 crore for the year 1998-99, as compared 
to Rs. 13,720 crore for 1997-98. Out of 240 PEs covered in the survey, 127 
earned a net profit of Rs. 22,509 crore and 106 PEs suffered a net loss of 
Rs. 9,274 crore. Of the rest, 5 PEs were under construction and two PEs 
broke even. 
Table given above provides a synoptic view of the financial 
performance. Most of the data in the table is self-explanatory. We find 
that out of 127 profits earning PEs only 83 declared amounting to Rs. 
4,932 crore. Though taken as a whole, PEs give a net profit of 17.17% on 
their paid up capital during 1998-99 and even higher in the earlier year, 
the poor management of resources available to them is a matter of 
common and has been considerable at various time. 
The Public Sector Enterprises have also been making substantial 
contribution to augment the resources of central government through 
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payment of dividend, interest, corporate taxes, excise duties etc. 
Thereby helping in mobilization of funds to meet financing needs for 
planned development of the country/ 
Table-3 
List of PEs which Generated more than Rs. 100 crore of Internal 
Resources during 1998-99 j^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Name of PE 
I 
ONGC 
NTPC 
Indian Oil 
MTNL 
VSNL 
Indian Railway Financial 
Corporation 
Gas Authority of India 
Hindustan Petroleum 
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Power Grid Corporation 
Bharat Petroleum 
Neyveli Ligrute 
BHEL 
Nuclear power corps 
Coal India 
Power Finance Corporation 
National Aluminxmi 
Northern Coal Fields 
Shipping Corporation 
South eastern coal fields 
Airports authority 
Cochin refineries 
Indian Airlines 
Mahanadi coal fields 
Western coal fields 
IPCL 
Bum Standard Co. 
Rural Electrification Corp. 
Depreciation 
II 
3,191 
1,986 
1,053 
675 
80 
901 
339 
0 
521 
404 
315 
143 
209 
14 
41 
279 
218 
259 
154 
213 
52 
287 
105 
144 
270 
4 
6 
DRE* 
III 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
625 
2 
0 
93 
11 
5 
0 
0 
4 
-66 
21 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
12 
15 
0 
0 
Retained 
Profit 
rv 
1,884 
2,094 
1,652 
1,088 
1,241 
254 
731 
1,029 
422 
498 
476 
477 
306 
478 
421 
162 
293 
154 
231 
163 
311 
13 
227 
143 
2 
282 
245 
Total 
V 
5,075 
4,080 
2,705 
1,745 
1,321 
1,155 
1,070 
945 
902 
884 
631 
520 
492 
462 
445 
445 
434 
385 
376 
373 
300 
332 
299 
287 
286 
251 
* Deferred Revenue Expenditure written off during the year. 
Source: - Public Enterprises Survey, 1998-99, Vo. I. 
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It may be noted that in cases of profit making PSUs the profits are 
largely due to their monopolistic characters or an administered price 
regime whether in the oil sector or in the non-oil sector. 
The central public enterprises have a total of 22.09 lakhs regular 
employees on their rolls. This represents roughly one eight of the total 
labour force employed in the government and the entire public sector 
and aroimd one fourth of total employment in the organized sector. In 
terms of value added by manufacturing/producing enterprises, they 
contributed about Rs. 25,000 crore to the national output, representing 
about 8 percent of GDP, Public enterprises have made a distinct 
contribution to the course of economic development.° 
Highlights of Report on Central Public Enterprises (2000-2001) 
• 9.22% growth in net profit of 234 working enterprises 
• Joint turnover (2000-01) of Rs. 3, 89,199 crore (which is 17.73% 
higher over last years turnover) 
• Employed Capital (2000-01) of Rs. 3, 30,649 crore (9.17% higher 
than that of last year). 
• Foreign Exchange earnings of Rs. 24,772 cr. 
• Dividend to government Rs. 8260 crore. 
• ONGC tops the list of enterprises showing net profit. 
• Hindustan fertilizers gave the maximum net loss during 2000-01. 
• Top 10 public enterprises showing net loss during 2000-01 (In 
descending order): ONGC, NTPC, IOC, VSNL, MTNL, GAIL, 
HPCL, NPCIL, BPCL, PGCIL. 
40 
• Top 10 public enterprises showing net profit during 2000-01 (In 
descending order) : Hindustan fertilizers, Bharat coking coal, 
fertilizer corporation. Eastern Coal Fields, Central Coal Fields, 
SAIL, Konkan Railways, Hindustan photo, NJMC, RINL. 
The profits of public sector units are found to be much lower 
when compared to international norms. Over the years, these 
companies have become high cost producers. Since there have been 
hardly any consistent and strategic mechanisms for cost reduction and 
cost control. As a matter of fact, many of these profit making PSUs are 
really cases of implicit losses and determined and decisive measures are 
required to be taken to upgrade the profit /resource generation 
capacities of such public enterprises. 
There is no doubt that the public enterprises established an 
industrial base of the economy by providing infrastructural facilities 
like generation of employment, protection of employment in taken over 
units, promotion of balanced regional development, employee welfare, 
and other social obligations, fostering development of SSI. Public 
enterprises began to expand in all areas of the economy including non-
infrastructure and non-core areas, which resulted in poor overall 
performance of the public sector and infested itself in low or negative 
return to public investment. In 2000-01 Departments of public 
enterprises has evaluated the aimual MoU performance of these PSUs 
on the basis of provisional data. Out of 108, 49 were rated excellent, 26 
very good, 12 good, 12 fair and 7 poor. BALCO has been excluded from 
evaluation as it ceased to be a PSU during the year.^ 
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2.4. Public Sector Enterprises Sickness 
However, the public sector did not become all that was visualized 
by the 1956 policy. 
(i) It began imposing an increasing burden on the budget for its 
investment needs, primarily because of its failure to generate 
adequate resources on its own and 
(ii) Due to overall inefficiency the basic inputs that public sector 
enterprises produce eg. Steel, coal and power had to be priced 
high, thus, escalating cost of production all along the lines. 
No doubt, in 1980, India was one of the most advanced countries 
of the third world with its wide range of locally made industrial goods. 
Nearly everything was "made in India" from cosmetics to heavy 
equipment. Imported goods had been cut by very high tariff and non-
tariff barriers. India had relied too heavily on import substitution 
without being able to promote an export oriented policy as South Korea 
and Taiwan did with so much success. 
As a result after the early industrial expansion of public sectors 
with large imports of equipment goods. Until the mid 1960's India did 
not benefit from large transfers of technology from outside. Many 
factories had become obsolete in the 1980 from steel mills to the textile 
industry. Many manufactured goods were not competitive on world 
markets.l^ 
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Table-4 
List of PEs which Incurred Cash Loss of Rs. 100 crore and above 
during 1998-99 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Fertilizer Corporation of India 
Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation 
Steel Authority of India 
Indian Iron and Steel Company 
Bharat Coking Coal 
Hindustan Steel Works Construction 
Hindustan photo films 
Konkan Railway 
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
NTC (Maharashtra North) 
Miiung and Allied Machinery Corporation 
Cement Corporation 
NTC (South Maharashtra) 
Eastern Coal Fields 
NTC (Uttar Pradesh) 
Rehabilitation Industries Corporation 
Hindustan Cables 
National Jute Manufactures corporation 
816 
493 
439 
331 
285 
279 
270 
267 
185 
174 
170 
162 
162 
157 
133 
126 
118 
113 
Source:- Public Enterprises Survey, 1998-99, Vol. I 
It has been found that nearly one third of the total losses of 
central public enterprises in 1988-89 i.e. Rs. 640 crore out of Rs. 1907 
crore was attributable to these units. Explicit losses occurs mainly due 
to errors in the original investment decisions or an inadequately 
cor\sidered investment decision losses have a direct bearing on the 
profitability of public enterprises which in turn affects their ability to 
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generate adequate surpluses and mobilize resources needed for their 
own development as well as for the development of other priority 
sectors of the economy. The public enterprises in successive plans have 
proved inadequate in realizing the targets of resource mobilization. 
Whatever, title has been achieved is largely due to frequent price 
revisions and large doses of depreciation. The shortfall in the domestic 
savings rate during the seventh plan period is mainly due to inadequate 
savings generated by the public sector. The gravity of the situation is 
heightened by the fact that the investments in public sector had to be 
financed by drawing heavily from the savings of the household sector, 
as well as from borrowings both in India and abroad. It will be noted 
that while the dependence on the budgetary support is reducing, the 
share of internal resources to the plan. Outlays of public enterprises 
have remained constant at about one third level during this period. The 
shift really is towards more borrowings which has increased from 16% 
in 1985-86 to 35% in 1989-90, entailing a higher interest burden and debt 
service / redemption obligation, thus, and further reducing their 
capacities to generate internal resources. In view of these facilities, there 
is an urgent need to look at the future of public enterprises with greater 
realism. Thus, public sectors have become a drain on the national 
economy. For example in 1990-91, Public sector recorded 4.4% return on 
capital employed as against 2.66% in 1974-75 and five percent in 1983-
84. Out of the 244 major enterprises, only half showed profit and that 
too before taxes. Ninety units incurred losses in 1990-91. Total profit 
earned by public sector enterprises was Rs. 2,730 crores on employed 
capital of more than Rs. 1, 00,000.11 
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Table-5 
Top 10 Wealth Destroyer's between 1996-97 & 1999-2000 
Company 
Oil & Natural Gas Corp. 
Indian Oil Corp 
Gas Authority of India 
Tata Engg. & Locomotive 
Co. 
Nejrveli Lignite Corp. 
Shri Shakti LPG 
Steel Authority of India 
Mahanagar Telephone 
Nigam Ltd. 
Bajaj Automobiles Ltd. 
Tata Iron & Steel Co. 
Source: - Business Today, v 
Decrease in 
(MVA) (Rs. 
cr.) 
29,814 
10,321 
9,496 
8,890 
8,867 
6,696 
6,395 
4,939 
3,961 
3,590 
UQe 64. Mard 
Capital 
Growth 
28% 
78% 
178% 
63% 
24% 
51% 
-8% 
13% 
116% 
36% 
1 6. 2001. 
Efficiency 
Improvement 
2% 
3% 
-7% 
-14% 
-1% 
-27% 
-10% 
2% 
-9% 
-5% 
Current 
Role 
10% 
10% 
12% 
2% 
7% 
-13% 
-3% 
10% 
12% 
5% 
Looking at these figures it can be rightly said that our public 
sector enterprises have become bleeding ulcers^^^ which can further be 
proved by an example. 
Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL):- India's largest car maker public 
enterprise. Maruti declared its results for 2000-01. The amoimt was big 
enough in isolation, but gargantuan when viewed against the profit of 
Rs. 330 crore in the last financial year and Rs. 522 crore in the year 
before. Infact the Maruti board was told nearly two years ago that the 
2000-01 bottom line looks non-too impressive even if the overall car 
market expanded 10%, what happened instead was that the market has 
actually shrtmk 10% so far, and Maruti's sales have declined to about 
2,28,000 in April-December 2000. Compared to about 2, 81,000 in the 
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same period of 1999. Worse sale of its most profitable 'A' class models, 
Maruti 800 and Omni have fallen 54,000, while 'B' class vehicles Zen, 
Wagon R and the two Alto models - Maruti actually makes losses on 
the sale price, of the last three - have gone up by 11,000. Five models -
Baleno, Wagon R, Baleno Altura and the Alto twiris - were launched 
between November 1999 and September 2000. The total capital 
expenditure in the last three years, thus, touched Rs. 3000 crore. As a 
result, depreciation this fiscal is likely to stand at Rs. 330 crore. The fall 
of the Japanese currency against the greenback last year has not helped 
matters. The local content of the new model's - Baleno was 27% at the 
time of its launch, while Wagon R had 65% and the Alto models 71% -
means increase in Maruti's imports. If the Yen falls, these imports take 
the hit twice as the payments are first converted from rupee into dollar 
and then into yen. 
Maruti's bottom line suffers another hit because of the 
disappearance of other income. The other income was the result of 
investments made with the cash accumulated in the car maker's high 
profit years as well as the interest it earned on the booking amounts that 
customer's deposited with dealers during the period that Maruti 
models enjoyed a waiting period. With the onset of competition, those 
queries of buyers have disappeared. Besides a tough market has made 
sure that prices carmot be increased to even fully absorb the cost of last 
year's engine upgrades for the 800, Zen and Esteem. In short, the road a 
head is full of potholes for Maruti. Maruti 800 is now seen in most 
urban areas as the maximum acceptable benchmarks. This could have 
serious implications for Maruti's bottom line and its ability to compete 
aggressively in the high technology sector. 
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Bottom Line Blues 
D The car market has shrunk 10% in April - December 2000. 
D Sales of Maruti's profitable models have fallen sharply. 
D Five models launched between November 1999 and September 
2000. 
D Existing models upgraded with MPFI engines. 
D Depreciation surges with higher capex. 
D Low local content of new models pushes cost up. 
D The yen fell agairist the US greenback. 
D No scope of earning other income. 
D Process can no longer be increased with rising costs 
It is high time; public sector enterprises will have to either pull up 
their socks and perform well or perish under the onslaught of 
competition. 
Last but not the least in the words of Gunnar Myrdal: "Taking a 
good hard look at what infact has happened in India. Over the last 
decade and a half, it is evident that public and private enterprises have 
not remained in the categories prescribed by the Industrial policy 
resolution".^^ 
2.5. Main causes of Public Sector Enterprises Sickness 
There are a number of causes of public sector enterprises 
sickness, which are as follows: 
1. Managerial weaknesses 
2. over manning and low work ethics. 
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3. Technical inefficiencies. 
4. over capitalization due to substantial time and cost over-runs. 
5. Faculty investment decisions. 
6. Political and bureaucratic interferences. 
7. The burden of taken over private sector sick units. 
8. Subsidized pricing. 
9. Unprofitable product Mix 
10. Excessive social welfare expenditure. 
11. Under investment using the public enterprises for private 
purposes. 
12. It is no body's concern. 
13. Lot of routine and red-tapism. 
14. Objectives are quite often not clear. 
15. Corruption and Nepotism is quite ramparting in Public Sector 
undertakings. 
Thus, the Lacunae in the operation showed up: inefficiency due 
to a lack of continuity at the top management level, conflict between 
political ideology and good management practices leading to low 
productivity, bad quality and mismanagement of resources, dominance 
of political leadership affecting effective economic functioning. 
Something had to be done to improve the performance of the public 
sector enterprises for huge investments had been sunk in them and they 
had built up large. 
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2.6. Steps Taken By the Government to Improve the Performance of 
the Public Sector 
The Government of India announced in July 1991 the new 
Industrial Policy, in line with the liberalization measures taken during 
the eighties. 
New Industrial Policy, 1991 
The new industrial policy marks a drastic shift from earlier policy 
initiatives, practically relegating them to history. It deregulates the 
industrial economy to a large extent. The major objectives of the new 
policy are to build on the gains already made; correct the distortions 
that might have developed maintain a sustained growth in productivity 
and gainful employment and attain global competitiveness. These 
objectives guide the series of initiatives that the government announced 
in the new industrial policy. 
Industrial Licensing 
The new policy abolished all industrial licensing, irrespective of 
the level of investment, except for certain industries related to security 
and strategic concerns, social/reasons, concerns related to safety and 
overriding environmental issues, manufacture of products of hazardous 
nature and articles of elitist consumption. 
Originally, there were 18 items on the negative list, but by 1999-
2000, there were just six items requiring license for production. 
The new industrial policy contained a number of features 
directed at restructuring and ensuring health of the public sector units, 
which are as follows: 
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1. There would be no further nationalization and budgetary 
support to sick units would be reduced. 
2. The number of industries reserved for public sector was 
reduced with the introduction of competitive element in 
the remaining reserved area. 
3. The government adopted a policy of phased disinvestment 
of equity shares in selected public enterprises. 
4. Law was amended so that like private sector units, sick 
units of the public sector could also be referred to BIFR 
(Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstructions). 
5. The concept of performance contracts and memorandum of 
understanding have been introduced for improving the 
performance of both the unit of the govenunent. MOU tells 
the mission, objectives and annual targets of an enterprise 
with their respective weights. MOU imposes financial, 
administrative and physical obligations upon the 
goverriment also. 
6. More and more public sector uiuts are being permitted to 
raise finance from the market. Some of their services may 
even be privatized. 
7. The eighth plan provides for restructuring of public sector 
units including their modernization, technological 
upgradation, rationalization of capacity, changes in 
product mix, greater managerial autonomy with 
accountability in performance and so on. 
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8. The case of chronic sick units is engaging the attention of 
the authorities. Before the adoption of the new policy, 
public sector units were beyond the purview of both Board 
of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and 
MRTP Act. These limitations have now been removed. Sick 
public sector units can be referred to BIFR for working out 
their rehabilitation and revival plans. In case a particular 
public sector unit is beyond redemption, it may even be 
closed down which means that the newly adopted exit 
policy for the private sector stands extended to the public 
sector as well. 
9. However, a sick public sector imit would not be closed 
down if its employees are ready to take it over and run it as 
a cooperative. In that case government will write off its 
existing losses but it would not get fresh budgetary support 
in future from the government. The new management 
would have to erisure its commercial viability. 
10. The new policy provides for a "social safety net" for 
workers of those units which are closed down or in which 
the strength of labour has to be reduced. For this purpose 
the government has created a "national renewal ftmd" to 
which contributions are made in budgets. The fund is used 
for covering cost of retraining and redeployment of labour 
arising out of modernization and restructuring of an 
industrial unit. Thus, the entire approach is that of 
restructuring of public uruts with a "Human face". 
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2.7. 
11. The government is taking steps to free public sector units 
from its day to day regulation and allow them to respond 
to market signals. This approach not only entails greater 
freedom for administrative and managerial decisions but 
also for revision of product prices.!'^ 
Revival of Sick Public Sector Units 
In pursuance of the new industrial policy 1991, the government 
brought out a monograph on the performance of the public sector 
enterprises and decided to refer the chronically sick enterprises of the 
BIFR for the formulation of revival rehabilitation schemes. 
Table-6 
The Ailing UnitslS 
Year of 
Registration 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
TOTAL 
Cases Filled 
311 
298 
202 
151 
155 
177 
152 
193 
115 
97 
233 
370 
413 
429 
3,296 
Companies 
revived 
63 
56 
37 
26 
27 
11 
11 
16 
4 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
254 
Winding up 
recommended 
127 
110 
75 
63 
65 
56 
44 
69 
51 
41 
76 
40 
7 
0 
824 
Cases 
dismissed 
53 
86 
35 
23 
30 
42 
61 
32 
22 
18 
26 
69 
134 
57 
688 
Pending 
cases 
17 
16 
19 
16 
12 
23 
17 
39 
23 
28 
103 
239 
268 
372 
1,192 
Source: - Business today March 6, 2001, p. 102. 
More than 25% of central PEs have a negative net worth and 
many of these are out of the turn-around zone. For years, they have 
continued to be a big drain on the national exchequer. The reasons of 
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this phenomenon are many and vary from case to case. However, two 
factors are common in almost all cases. First, the impact of economic 
reforms and denial of a level playing field to PEs. Second, management 
failure, mostly because of an inadequate top management, frequent 
changes of the chief executive, long intervals between one chief 
executive leaving and the successor taking over. 
When the sickness is not handled in the initial stages, it snow 
balls and the situation worsens with heavy interest burden, resource 
crunch and reluctance of financial institutions and banks to provide 
support, which could have saved in the situation in some cases. PEs 
suffering from out dated technology, wrong location, huge surplus 
manpower and other structural defects would need drastic and decisive 
steps on an urgent basis to meet the situation. Such an approach being 
alien to the government system, the recourse was taken to refer the 
cases to BIFR in the hope of a solution to the problem. 
The extent of BIFR involvement is given in the table below. It lists 
65 PEs with paid up capital of Rs. 9,112.72 crore, and four times over 
accumulated losses of Rs. 38,638.59 crore as on 31.3.2000. 
From 1992 onwards, references were made to BIFR in accordance 
with the industrial policy statement of 1991, which, interalia had stated: 
"Public enterprises which are chronically sick and which are unlikely to 
be turned around will, for the formulation of revival/rehabilitation 
schemes be referred to BIFR or other similar high level institutions 
created for the purpose". The government preferred the easier route to 
imburden itself instead of a more meaningful PE - specific institutional 
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arrangement, which could have avoided the costly delays caused by the 
BIFR route. 
The united front government wanted the sick or potentially sick 
PEs to be rehabilitated "through a menu of options that may include 
handing over the management to professional groups or worker's 
cooperatives". 
Table-7 
Status of PEs which stood referred to BIFR as on 30.09.2000, along 
with their paid up capital and accumulated 
SunO 
S. 
I 
Reviva 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Case NO. 
II 
Scheme San 
533/92 
538/92 
526/92 
501/92 
525/92 
528/92 
508/94 
511/92 
509/93 
531/92 
503/97 
514/92 
521/92 
506/94 
509/92 
Name of the Company 
III 
ictioned 
Bengal Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Bengal Immxmity Ltd. 
Bharat Brakes & Valves Ltd. 
Bharat Pumps & Compressors 
Ltd. 
Bharat Refractories Ltd. 
Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. 
Burn Standard Co. Ltd. 
Heavy Engineering Corp. Ltd. 
Instrumentation Ltd. 
National Instruments Ltd. 
North Eastern Regional Agri. 
Marketing Corp. Ltd. 
Orissa Drugs & Chemicals Ltd. 
Projects & Development India 
Ltd. 
RBL Ltd. 
Richardson & Cruddas (1972) Ltd. 
oss as on 31.03.2000. 
Paid Up 
Capital 
(Rs. Cr.) 
IV 
13.96 
17.99 
8.13 
52.03 
103.90 
94.90 
46.07 
448.12 
24.05 
6.31 
4.15 
1.32 
53.52 
1.50 
54.83 
Accumulate 
d Loss (Rs. 
Cr.) 
V 
63.51 
107.49 
36.67 
102.22 
169.06 
118.98 
297.21 
1152.41 
101.30 
222.50 
1.26 
8.46 
98.26 
15.84 
48.75 
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16. 
17. 
18. 
Drafts 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Windit 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
Under 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
529/92 
507/92 
512/92 
cheme Circu 
532/92 
501/96 
534/92 
501/94 
536/92 
505/93 
523/92 
ig up Notice ] 
503/95 
535/92 
501/93 
504/93 
503/92 
530/92 
inquiry 
503/98 
501/99 
501/00 
501/92 
516/92 
502/00 
Smith stain street & 
pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Triveni Structural Ltd. 
Vignyan Industries Ltd. 
TOTAL 
ated 
Bharat Ophthalmic Glass Ltd. 
Cement Corp. of India Ltd. 
NIC (A. Pradesh, Kamataka, 
Kerala, Mahe) Ltd. 
NTC (Delhi, Punjab & Rajasthan) 
Ltd. 
NTC (Maharashtra North) Ltd. 
NTC Maharashtra South) Ltd. 
Tyre Corp. of India Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Issued 
Hindustan Photo films 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
NTC (Gujarat) Ltd. 
NTC (M.P.) Ltd. 
NTC (U.P.) Ltd. 
NTC (West Bengal, Assam, Bihar 
& Orissa) Ltd. 
UP Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Bharat Immimological & 
Biological Corp. Ltd. 
Birds, Jute & Exports Ltd. 
Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. 
Fertilizer Corp. of India Ltd 
Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. 
Hindustan fertilizer Corp. Ltd. 
7.16 
21.02 
2.79 
961.75 
7.14 
416.56 
58.29 
28.43 
59.59 • 
49.10 
84.29 
703.4 
197.49 
24.84 
33.57 
40.61 
44.84 
00.64 
341.99 
18.85 
0.39 
2218.45 
734.74 
44.41 
746.11 
70.42 
120.61 
5.62 
2740.57 
237.49 
1191.67 
621.89 
383.24 
1222.39 
1082.37 
458.36 
5197.41 
1146.84 
879.40 
785.07 
1022.21 
1038.28 
280.99 
5152.79 
49.26 
32.15 
2929.31 
5904.11 
161.48 
4192.97 
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38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
Failed 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
Stay Oi 
49. 
Windir 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
502/99 
505/94 
506/93 
502/98 
504/98 
503/99 
503/99 
& Reopened 
507/94 
503/92 
502/95 
504/94 
rder by Court 
510/92 
ig up Recomi 
505/92 
520/92 
518/92 
527/92 
508/92 
519/92 
502/96 
522/99 
513/92 
' Y 
Hindustan Sales Ltd. 
Hindustan Vegetable Oil 
Corporation Ltd. 
Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 
National Jute Manufacturers 
Corp. Ltd. 
Nepa Ltd. 
Praga tools Ltd. 
Pyrites, phosphates & Chemicals 
Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Hindustan Flurocarbon Ltd 
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd. 
Jessop & Co. Ltd. 
Southern Pesticides Corporation 
Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Mining & Allied Machinery Corp. 
Ltd. 
nended 
Bharat Gold Mine Ltd. 
Bharat Process and Mechanical 
Engineers Ltd. 
British India Corp. Ltd. 
Cawnpore Textiles Ltd. 
Cycle Corp. of India Ltd. 
Elgin Mills Company Ltd. 
Maharashtra Antibodies & 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Mandya National Paper Mills Ltd. 
National Bicycle Corp. of India 
Ltd. 
y^-A / . 'i 
to7^^.^ lo.m^^'J 
7.71 •. .^^ 
387.67 
55.80 
64.86 
15.73 
95.40 
4396.49 
19.61 
116.88 
49.16 
6.53 
192.18 
39.19 
51.06 
4.86 
44.66 
0.60 
11.87 
1.10 
1.24 
21.75 
5.65 
33;§8,^g^ 
429.96 
2427.78 
124.30 
185.05 
245.50 
16725.45 
48.62 
1425.21 
302.41 
21.62 
1797.86 
1053.80 
502.02 
214.87 
411.61 
118.04 
483.75 
659.63 
10.48 
254.75 
187.36 
56 
59. 
60. 
506/92 
524/92 
Tannery & Footwear Corp. of 
India Ltd. 
Weighbird (India) Ltd. 
TOTAL 
15.24 
0.26 
158.29 
329.02 
47.09 
3218.62 
Dismissed As Non-Maintainable 
61. 
62. 
504/97 
502/92 
Manipur State Drugs & 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Nagaland Pulp & paper 
Company Ltd. 
TOTAL 
0.85 
120.20 
121.05 
6.52 
174.34 
180.86 
Declared No Longer Sick 
63. 
64. 
517/92 
504/91 
Biecco Lawrie Ltd. 
Scooters India Ltd. 
TOTAL 
42.00 
38.38 
80.38 
33.68 
Nil 
33.68 
Dropped As Net Worth Become Positive 
65. 
Total 
504/95 
9,112.72 
Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. 
38,63859 
2,118.00 2,789.15 
Source: - Department of Public Enterprises and public enterprises Survey, 
1999-2000, Vol. I 
In case where the Public enterprise do not serve any strategic or 
social purpose government will consider need for partial or full 
divestiture either by allowing workers to run the units on a cooperative 
basis or by sale to private parties. Where it is found that a unit cannot 
be turned around, as also partial/full divestiture not feasible, the option 
of closure would have to be taken recourse to, as a last resort, since their 
closure will in no way adversely affect the availability of essential goods 
or services for the overall national economy. In the event of a decision 
for closure, every effort will be made not to render the workers jobless. 
Possibilities would be explored to re-employ them, if necessary after 
retraining, in the new industrial undertakings either in the public sector 
or in the private sector. 
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The government has also been opening out certain important and 
strategic areas to the private sector. The power sector is being opened to 
the foreign companies. Similarly, the government has to invite 
multinationals in the telecommunication sector. As there is very strong 
resistance by the trade union towards the move of privatization, the 
government pushes its policy of opening out areas reserved for the 
public sector to private sector indigenous or foreign cautiously. The 
main elements of government policy towards public sector 
undertakings are: 
(i) Bring down government equity in all non strategic public 
sector units to 26% or lower if necessary. 
(ii) Restructure and revive potentially viable public sector units. 
(iii) Close down public sector units, which cannot be revived. 
(iv) Fully protect the interest of workers.-*-" 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme to Shed the Load of Excess Workers 
The government had been making an effort to shed the load of 
excess workers in the public sector. It initially adopted the idea of exit 
policy but abandoned it due to the strong resistance by the trade 
unions. It followed a policy of offering a package for Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme (VRS) and it had succeeded. Public Enterprises 
Survey (1992-93) "large scale employment generation by public 
enterprises has over the years led to a situation where some of the 
enterprises are saddled with over employment or excess manpower 
resulting in low level of manpower productivity. Goverrmient had 
initiated a voluntary retirement scheme in public enterprises during 
1988 to help them shed excess manpower and to improve the "age-mix 
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and skill mix". As a result of VRS, number of regular employees, which 
stood at 22.19 lakh in 1990-91, has been brought down to 17.42 lakh in 
2000-01. The National Renewal Fund (NRF) was created in February 
1992 to provide a safety net for persons seeking voluntary retirement. A 
sum of Rs. 540 crores were released in 1993-94 and till March 1988, a 
total sum of Rs. 1500 crores were released for NRF. The government has 
revised the VRS and made it more attractive. As a consequence, 
according to public enterprises survey 2000-01, 3.69 lakh employees 
opted for VRS up to 31 March 2001. All this is being done to reduce 
surplus manpower in public sector imits. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
In order to give greater autonomy to Public Sector Enterprises 
and make them accountable for the achievement of their objectives, the 
concept of memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been 
implemented by the government since 1988. The main goal of the MoU 
policy is to reduce the "quantity" of control and increase the "quality" 
of accountability. This is sought to be done by specifying in clear terms 
the measurable goals and giving each PSE greater operational 
autonomy to achieve them. The real purpose of MoU is to manage PSEs 
with management by objectives rather than management by control. By 
holding them accountable for procedures, MoU policy has become 
market-oriented and in tune with other reforms initiated by the 
government. For the first time, since the inception of the public sector, 
an attempt has been made to free them from the administrative control 
of the ministers and permit them to operate in a competitive 
environment. 104 public sector enterprises (PSE) had signed MoUs for 
the year 2001-02. According to the public enterprises survey (2001-02) 
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on the basis of the self evaluation by 104 PSE, 42 were rated excellent, 24 
very good, 15 good, 12 fair and only 3 were rated poor. 
Other Measures Taken to Overcome Problems 
The curtailment of budgetary allocation for the Public Sector 
Enterprises annual plans which had begun in the seventh five year plan 
gained momentum with a view to improve the capacity utilization and 
productivity, which in turn would reduce cost of production. Thus, 
making the public sector companies more competitive in the domestic 
market as well as international markets, emphasis was laid on renewals 
and replacements, besides upgradation of technology and 
diversification in to new areas. The Public Sector Enterprises were 
compelled to raise their resources from external sources in the forms of 
share capital, long term and medium term loans and cash credit from 
banks besides internal sources generated by the companies from their 
retained profits, depreciation etc. The government also decided to allow 
public sector companies to go to the market and raise resources directly 
in the form of bonds to finance their new projects and also to meet the 
working capital requirements. During 1992-93 the finance ministry took 
a radical decision to make the public sector bonds more attractive. 
Navratnas and Miniratnas 
In 1997, the government took the initiative of giving autonomy to 
select profit making Public Sector Enterprises. These units are called 
Navratnas and Miniratnas, depending on the degree of autonomy 
granted. The navratnas, subject to certain guidelines, enjoy full freedom 
to make capital expenditure decisions about joint ventures and setting 
up subsidiary offices abroad for technological and strategic alliance. The 
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eleven Public Sector Enterprises selected as navratnas up to 1998-99 
were: 
1. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) 
2. Indian Petrochemical Corporation Ltd. (IPCL) 
3. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) 
4. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) 
5. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) 
6. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC) 
7. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) 
8. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) 
9. Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. (BHEL) 
10. Gas Authority of hidia Ltd. (GAIL) 
11. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL) 
Enhanced financial, managerial and operational autonomy has 
been granted to some other profit making PSEs which have been 
categorized as Miniratnas. 
2.8. Role of Public Sector Diluted 
Since 1956, the number of industries reserved for the public sector 
was 17 which were reduced to 8 in 1991. In 1993 these areas were 
reduced to six. By 1999-2000, only four sectors remained on the list 
reserved for the public sector. 
(i) Arms and ammunition and allied items of defence equipment, 
defence aircraft and warships. 
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(ii) Atomic energy. 
(iii) The substances specified in the schedule to the notification of 
the government of India in the department of Atomic Energy 
number S. 0212(E) dated March 15,1995. 
(iv) Railway Transport 
By May 2001, defense production was opened to the private 
sector under license and FDI limit of 26% if so desired. Thus, only three 
sectors now remain in the public sector exclusively. Even in these areas 
private sector participation is possible on a discretionary basis.l'^ 
2.9. Effects of Public Sector Enterprises Sickness on Indian 
Economy 
1. The budgetary deficits in India are increasing which result in 
rising prices and are becoming impediments to development. 
2. The non-development, non-plan government expenditure is 
increasing. As a result, scarce and valuable resources have to 
be diverted for financing the ever growing corisumption 
expenditure of the government. 
3. The incremental capital output ratio for the economy has been 
increasing plan after plan and has been estimated to be close 
to 4 in the seventh plan as against 3.53 in the first five year 
plan. This ratio for the public sector is even higher and 
exhibits a tendency of further increase. 
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The future of India is at stake. 
India's balance sheet is in a mess. It is obvious that over the 
last 50 years huge amovints of public money have been 
invested into the public sector. Hundreds and thousands of 
crores of public money has been invested into various public 
sector units. However, these investments have not resulted in 
creation of value on the balance sheet. All investments have 
yielded very little or no return on investments, but creating a 
huge hole in the balance sheet. This huge hole in the balance 
sheet is being further exasperated through the excessive 
borrowings every year and the resultant interest burden. 
India's revenue, profit and loss statements are also in a mess. 
If one adds up four items of current revenue expenditure like 
interest, payment, defence expenditure, wages and salaries of 
government employees and compares this figure with total 
current revenues, there already is a deficit. That means that 
even if the government stops functioning and ceases to do 
anything else, there will be a deficit. 
The government should have a surplus on the revenues 
account to finance a deficit expenditure is what the 
government is doing. But, there is no money for this. 
Government should be spending on primary education and 
rural health care but there is hardly any money for this. 
This situation is worse. A deficit can only be financed through 
borrowing which pushes up interest rates and crowds out 
necessary private sector investments, or through the 
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monetization of the deficit and the resultant inflation. Inflation 
is the most regressive form of taxation. It hurts the poor more 
than the rich; the poor don't have inflation indexed incomes. 
The poor will pay through higher interest rates or higher 
inflation. 
9. Inefficient Public Sector units are largely resporisible for the 
macro-economic crisis India faced in 1980's, a phenomenon 
that spilled over in to a balance of payments (BOP) crisis in 
1990-91. 
10. Some of these public sector units should not have existed as 
they are sick private sector tinits that should have been closed 
down. Instead, to protect a few existing jobs. They were 
absorbed into the public sector.^^ 
2.10. The need for suggesting Disinvestments 
(a) It was realized that the state could no longer meet the growing 
demands of the economy and the state shareholding had to 
come down. 
(b) Another reason for adoption of disinvestment policies arotmd 
the globe has been the inability of the government to raise 
high taxes, pursue deficit/inflationary financing and the 
development of money markets and private entrepreneurship. 
(c) Technology and WTO commitments have made the world a 
global village and unless industries, including public 
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industries do not quickly restructure, they would not be able 
to survive. Public enterprises because of t he nature of their 
ownership, can restructure slowly and hence the logic of 
disinvestments get stronger. Besides, techniques are now 
available to control public monopolies like power and telecom 
where consumer interest can be better protected by regulation. 
(d) It was held that the public sector performed well only when 
protected through state monopolies, entry reservations, high 
tariffs and quotas etc. since quite a large numbers of public 
enterprises incurred losses year after year. It was argued that 
the state should not be called upon to meet the losses of these 
enterprises out of tax payers' money. Since in our country, the 
public sector had entered into too many areas, the question of 
withdrawing from these areas was also raised. Consequently, 
the question of privatization of the public sector was debated. 
Disinvestments is the process through which privatization 
could take place. 
(e) To improve the level of economic performance of enterprises, 
both on production and distribution fronts. 
(f) For generating fiscal incomes through the sale of assets. 
(g) For democratization of ownership through stock 
dissemination. 
(h) For finding solutions for the difficulties involved in the 
relationship between the agencies of the central government 
and the PEs. 
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(i) For reducing the power of various groups on the PEs 
(bureaucrats, politicians, trade unions) A^ 
2.11. Benefits likely to be derived From Disinvestments 
(1) Disinvestment would expose the privatized companies to 
market discipline, thereby forcing them to become more 
efficient and survive on their own financial and economic 
strength or cease. They would be able to respond to the 
market forces much faster and cater to their business needs in 
a more professional manner. It would also facilitate in freeing 
the PSEs from Government control and introduction of 
corporate governance in the privatized companies. 
(2) Disinvestment would result in wider distribution of wealth 
through offering of shares of privatized companies to small 
investors and employees. 
(3) Disinvestment would have a beneficial effect on the capital 
market, the increase in floating stock would give the market 
more depth and liquidity, give investors easier exit options, 
help in establishing more accurate benchmarks for valuation 
and pricing and facilitate raising of funds by the privatized 
companies for their projects or expansion, in future. 
(4) Opening up the public sector to appropriate private 
investment would increase economic activity and have an 
overall beneficial effect on the economy, employment and tax 
revenues in the medium to long term. 
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(5) In many areas eg. Telecom sector, the end of public sector 
monopoly would bring relief to consumer by way of more choice 
and cheaper and better quality of products and services.^^ 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, the researcher observes that 
while 'Public Sector Enterprises' contribution to National development 
is widely acknowledged, but their poor financial return has been a 
matter of deep and enduring concern, especially since the Mid-1980's 
when, for the first time, the central government's current revenues were 
foim,d inadequate to meet its current expenditure. 
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DISINVESTMENT PROGRAMME IN INDIA: 
A PERSPECTIVE 
There has been a remarkable change in the role of public sector in 
the Indian economy since 1991. Some economists argued that the fiscal 
crisis of 1991 was a result of the public sector's mobility to generate 
adequate returns on investment. The government attitude also changed 
as is clearly demonstrated in the following statement made in the new 
Industrial policy 1991. "After the irutial exuberance of the public sector 
entering new areas of Industrial and technical competence, a number of 
problems have begun to manifest themselves in many of the public 
enterprises. Serious problems are observed in the insufficient growth in 
productivity, poor project management, over manning, lack of 
continuous technological upgradation and inadequate attention to R&D 
(Research & Development) and Human Resource Development. In 
addition, public enterprises have shown a very low rate of return on the 
capital investment. This has inhibited their ability to re-generate 
themselves in terms of new investment as well as in technology 
development. The result is that many of the public enterprises have 
become a burden rather than being an asset to the Government". 
Consequently, the new industrial policy 1991, advocated privatization 
of public sector enterprises. For purposes of privatization, the 
government has adopted the route of disinvestment which involves the 
sale of the public sector equity to the private sector and the public at 
large. The main approach of the government in this regard is to bring 
down its equity in all non strategic public sector undertakings to 26 
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percent (or lower) and close down those public sector undertakings 
which carmot be revived. The disinvestment programme began in 1991-
92 and government stakes in 48 companies have been sold in varying 
degrees by 2006-07. Till 1998-99 the government used to sell minority 
stakes through domestic or international issue of shares in small 
tranches every year. Post 1999-2000, there has been a greater stress on 
strategic sale - involving an effective trarisfer of control and 
management to a private entity, the argument being that the 
government would get a better price from the private sector if it is 
ceding actual control. The prominent companies that have witnessed 
strategic sale in the recent past include Modem foods, BALCO, CMC, 
VSNL, IBP, ITDC Hotels, Maruti Udyog Ltd and HZL.i 
3.1. Meaning of Disinvestment 
In order to raise resources and encourage wide public 
participation, a part of the governments share holding in the public 
sector would be offered to Mutual funds, financial institutions, general 
public and workers. In other words this is known as disinvestment. 
Thus, the concept of disinvestment implies ploughing back the 
resources from the invested units by way of selling the holdings. 
There are two approaches to disinvestment programme. 
According to first approach whenever. 
(i) Government sells its equity holding in PEs to public or private 
parties, financial institutions and mutual funds etc. it is called 
as disinvestment. 
According to second approach. 
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(ii) When PEs are generally directed by the government to issue 
their equity shares to the public, private parties, financial 
institutions and mutual fxmds with a view to reduce its 
control, that is also known as disinvestment. 
So the term disinvestment can be used in many different ways 
ranging from 'transition to private legal firms' to partial or complete 
denationalization of assets or anywhere in this direction. In India, 
disinvestment means the sale of public sector equity to the private 
sector and the public at large. In recent years, the issue of disinvestment 
has been brought to the forefront due to the large scale fiscal deficits 
that the government has been facing. 
Massive fiscal imbalance and the serious balance of payments 
crisis that gripped the cotmtry's economy during 1990-91 forced India 
to approach the IMF for substantial repurchase facilities and the World 
Bank for structural adjustment loans. 
The provision of assistance by the IMF and the World Bank was 
linked to 'conditionalities' embracing many sectors of the Indian 
economy. Infact, the new industrial policy announced on July 24,1991 
was an objectified attempt to meet conditionalities. An important thrust 
in the new policy was on increasing the role and importance of the 
private sector in industrial economy of the country and various 
measures were announced to achieve this purpose. 
The economists and the policy-makers who support the step of 
privatization/disinvestment argue that all problems confronting the 
public sector can be tackled effectively if the public sector units are 
handed over to the private sector. According to them such transfer will 
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(i) Promote competitive efficiency, 
(ii) Reduce political interference, 
(iii) Produce higher quality products, 
(iv) Provide better quality services. 
(v) And reduce wastages and optimize resources.^ 
3.2. Objectives of Disinvestment 
The current direction of privatization policy is summarized in a 
Suo-Motu statement laid in both the houses of parliament. On 
December 9, 2002 government has announced its policy that the main 
objective of disinvestment is to put national resources and assets to 
optimal use and in particular to imleash the productive potential 
inherent in our public sector enterprises. The policy of disinvestment 
specifically aimed at: 
(i) Modernization and upgradation of public sector enterprises. 
(ii) Creation of new assets. 
(iii) Generation of employment. 
(iv) Retiring of public debt. 
(v) To erisure that disinvestment does not result in alienation of 
national assets, which through the process of disinvestment, 
remain where they are. It will also ensure that disinvestment 
does not result in private monopolies. 
(vi) Setting up a disinvestment proceeds funds. 
(vii) Formulating the guidelines for the disinvestment of natural 
asset companies. 
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(viii) Preparing a paper on the feasibility and modalities of setting 
up asset Management Company to hold, manage and dispose 
the residual holding of the government in the companies in 
which government equity has been disinvested to a strategic 
partner. 
(ix) Government is taking the following specific decisions: 
a. To disinvest through sale of shares to the public in Bharat 
Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL). 
b. To disinvest in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Liiiuted 
(HPCL) through strategic sale. 
c. To allot, in both cases of BPCL and HPCL, a specific 
percentage of shares to the employees of the two 
companies at a concessional price.3 
Whereas, the mirustry of Disinvestment has outlined the 
following as primary objectives: 
1. Releasing the large amount of public resources locked up in 
non-strategic public sector enterprises, for redeployment in 
areas that are much higher on the social priority, such as basic 
health, family welfare, primary education and social and 
economic infrastructure. 
2. Stemming further outflow of these scarce public resources for 
sustaining the unviable non-strategic PSE's. 
3. Reducing the public debt that is threatening to assume 
unmanageable proportions. 
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4. Transferring the commercial risk to the private sector 
whenever the private sector is willing and able to step in: and 
5. Releasing other tangible and intangible resources, such as, 
large manpower currently locked in managing public sector 
enterprises and their time and energy, for redeployment in 
high priority social sectors that are short of such resources.^ 
3.3. Emergence of the Disinvestment Policy 
The policy of the government of India on disinvestment has 
evolved over a period and it can be briefly stated in the form of 
following policy statements made in chronological order. 
(i) Industrial policy statement of 24* July 1991: 
The industrial policy statement of 24* July 1991 stated that the 
Government would divest part of its holdings in selected PSEs, but did 
not place any cap on the extent of disinvestment. Nor did it restrict 
disinvestment in favour of any particular class of investors. The 
objective for disinvestment was stated to be to provide further market 
discipline to the performance of Public Enterprises.^ 
(ii) Report of the Rangarajan Committee on the disinvestment 
of shares in PSEs 1992-93: 
The erstwhile Krishnamurthy panel on disinvestment of PSU 
shares was reconstituted in November 1992 with C. Rangarajan as its 
chairman and the following terms of reference: 
> To devise criteria for selection of Public Sector Units for 
disinvestment during 1992-93. 
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> To advise on limits on the percentage of equity to be sold in 
respect of each unit. 
> To suggest the large clientele for sale. 
> To indicate Modus Operandi of disinvestment. 
> To lay down criteria for valuation of equity shares of PSU 
and make other recommendations related to disinvestment. 
The summary of the Rangarajan committee's report was released 
to the public on June 26,1993. 
The committee recommended that the target levels of 
disinvestment for the medium term should be consistent with the 
industrial policy. The target level of the govenunent ownership at 51% 
in respect of all units reserved for the public sector will enable control 
over the management. A target level of 26% of public ownership could 
be considered in exceptional cases. 
There should be a set of specific reasons for continued 
government ownership of enterprises except those reserved for the 
public sector. In such cases, the government should justify its continued 
holding of equity on considerations as an investor. There could be more 
than 26% ownership in PSEs with outstanding prospects where there is 
scope for larger realization from disinvestment at a later date. 
The committee expressed the view that in the case of public sector 
enterprises for which the first sale is yet to be made or where the track 
record is yet to be established the method of sale through auction 
amongst a pre-determined clientele would be more advantageous. Once 
a reasonable market price is established in a normal trading atmosphere 
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over a reasonable period of time, the fixed price method would be 
appropriate. In all other cases, the auction method with wide 
participation may be adopted. 
(a) On disinvestment process 
While making these recommendations, the committee identified 
offering shares to the public at a fixed price and sale through auction 
amongst a pre-determined clientele as two acceptable and transparent 
processes for divestiture. In addition, it also identified a third method of 
transfer of controlling interest in an enterprise to a specific firm or 
person. It noted that all these methods have their own merits and 
demerits. In case of the first method, it is difficult to fix the price. A pre-
requisite of this method is that the shares should have an established 
track record of trading. 
(b) On preparatory steps 
The preparatory steps for disinvestment recommended by the 
committee include conversion into company form whenever necessary, 
deciding the desirable level of equity and restructuring the finance with 
a proper debt or equity gearing, assessing the ongoing investment plans 
of Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) and examining the scope of issuing 
convertible bonds as a measure of resource mobilization for PSEs. It is 
also desirable to establish an independent regulatory commission for 
the sector concerned if necessary, the committee said. 
(c) Assessing Equity Value 
As regards valuing PSE equity, the committee said that there are 
three common methods in vogue based on net asset value, profit 
earning capacity and discounted cash flow. The choice of method 
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however needs to take in to account special circumstances affecting 
PSEs operations such as past focus of public sector enterprises on social 
responsibilities rather than pure commercial considerations, financial 
performance being conditioned by a regime of administered prices, and 
so on. The debt/equity structure of most PSEs has also not followed the 
commercial norms. 
While the discounted cash flow approach in valuation has merit, 
it is the most difficult. Since this method involves estimating the future 
cash flow and there are a number of uncertainties in realizing income 
projections in a liberalized regime, there is need to pursue valuation 
with considerable circumspection. 
(d) Share Offers 
The committee suggested adoption of a scheme of preferential 
offer of shares to workers and employees in PSEs with an individual 
ceiling of 200 shares. Making up a total reservation of five percent of 
equity. In the case of PSEs engaged in certain non-manufacturing and 
skill based sectors like consultancy services, the ceiling could go up to 
20 percent. 
While non-resident Indians and foreign investors could be 
offered equity, it should be on par with general principles governing 
their participation in the Indian equity market with no reservation or 
concession, the committee recommended. 
(e) Swapping Debt for Equity 
The report said that some countries have tailored disinvestment 
to an informed process of managing the external debt by allowing PSEs 
to swap a portion of their debt for equity. While this might help reduce 
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the debt service burden and achieve a better debt gearing for the PSE, it 
is not relevant for India since there is no comparable debt problem for 
the country. 
However, where a PSE finds tmique advantages in adopting this 
approach, it may be enabled to do so. 
(f) Standing Committee 
In the light of the international experience, the committee 
suggested that the government may consider creation of a standing 
committee on public enterprise disinvestment with full-time and part-
time members drawn from the government, PSEs financial sector and 
academia. Such a conmuttee could recommend enterprise - specific 
action for reform, restructuring and disinvestment as well as 
monitoring and evaluating the process of implementation. 
(g) PSE Reform 
As follow-up action, the committee recommended that PSEs 
Boards of Directors should be reconstitute with suitable non-
goverrmient representation. Every Public Sector Enterprise (PSE) should 
be encouraged to commence work on drawing corporate strategies and 
plans in alignment with ongoing economic reforms and build an 
investor friendly image in the market. There has to be a sustained effort 
to mobilize the thinking of PSE personnel in the new direction by way 
of seminars and workshops involving the standing conference of public 
enterprises. 
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(h) International Experience \ . V^  j'^^jf 
Internationally, the committee observed, PSEs haveJbe^R'd^ested 
either by offer through a general prospectus or auction of shares 
amongst pre-determined clientele. Some countries have transferred 
controlling interest to specifications or group of persons based on 
negotiated terms. 
Separated apex agencies have been created under legal authority 
in some countries to design and implement disinvestment. The 
excercise is generally foimd to be spread over a period and where 
carried out in a hurry, these have been undesirable consequences like 
cornering of shares by a few parties or loss of revenue to the exchequer. 
The committee said that there has also been widespread criticism 
of under pricing of shares following disinvestment in many countries. 
In some cases, floatation costs or fees earned by market intermediaries 
have been found to be excessive. Concern with equity considerations 
has been an important issue in many countries in striking a balance 
between fiscal needs, consumer's interests and workers welfare, but 
often special arrangements to protect the income flows to workers, 
rather than job per-se, were put in place." 
(iii) The Common Minimum Programme of the United Front 
Government 1996 
The highlights of the policy formulated by the united front 
government were as follows: 
"The question of withdrawing the public sector from non-core 
strategic areas will be carefully examined however to assure the 
workers and employees of job security or the alternative opportunities 
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for retraining and redeployment. The united front government will 
establish a disinvestment commission, to advise the government on 
these steps. Any decision to disinvestment will be taken and 
implemented in a transparent manner". 
(iv) Disinvestment Commission Recommendations February 1997 
October 1999 
Pursuant to the above policy of the imited front government, a 
disinvestment commission was setup in 1996. By August 1999, it made 
reconmiendations on 58 PSEs. The recommendations indicated a shift 
from public offerings to strategic sales with transfer of management in 
case of 41 PSUs referred to it and only in 5 PSUs by public offering 
route. The commission had wide ranging terms of reference and was 
asked to determine the extent of disinvestment in each PSU, the 
modalities of disinvestment and the order in which the process was to 
be undertaken. 
The long-term strategy of the disinvestment commission had four 
objectives: 
a) Strengthen PSUs where appropriate, order to facilitate 
disinvestment. 
b) Protect employee's interest. 
c) Broad-base ownership 
d) Augment receipts for the government. 
The commission supported prior restructuring of the public 
sector undertakings before disinvestment, base on global experience 
that restructuring before disinvestment enhances share value and 
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maximizes sales proceeds. The three broad areas of restructuring in 
Indian context would be corporate governance, financial restructuring 
business and technological restructuring. Where restructuring involves 
administrative action without significant outlays and enhances share 
value, it could precede disinvestment. Financial restructuring is 
required not oivly for loss making public enterprises but may be needed 
for other public sector enterprises as well where the capital structure 
may be skewed in favour of either debt or equity. Business 
restructuring involve selling those businesses which are no longer 
attractive from the point of view of returns. Technological restructuring 
may be required to sustain or improve the competitive position of 
technology driven public sector enterprises. 
The Disinvestment Commission expressed itself in favour of 
adopting a uiut specific disinvestment strategy after taking into account 
various aspects of the units, eg. Industry category, competitive position 
and profitability. Accordingly, the commission broadly classified the 
public sector undertakings in to two categories for disinvestment, the 
core group and the non-core group. The public sector undertakings in 
the core group are defined as having a considerable market presence. In 
these public sector imdertakings, as the private sector is yet to mature 
fully, the public sector disinvestment would be limited to a maximum 
of 49 percent for time being. The non-core group industries are defined 
as the units where private sector players have already made huge 
investments, with the aim of enhancing the intrinsic value of public 
sector undertakings shares, the disinvestment commission 
recommended that the core as well as non-core public sector 
undertakings should be restructured prior to disinvestment. 
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The government reconstituted the disinvestment commission in 
July 2001 with R.H. Patil as chairman. The government has decided to 
refer "non-strategic" public sector imdertakings, excluding 
IOC/ONGC/GAIL to the disinvestment commission for their 
professional advice. The process of disinvestment is being looked after 
by the departments of disinvestment setup in 1999. 
(v) Budget Speech 1999 
In its first budgetary pronouncement, the BJP led government 
decided to bring down government shareholding in the PSUs to 26%. It 
however, stated that the government would retain majority holdings; in 
PSEs involving strategic considerations and that the interest of the 
workers would be protected in all cases. 
(vi) Strategic & Non-Strategic Classification 
On IS"' March 1999, the government classified the public sector 
enterprises into strategic and non-strategic areas for the purpose of 
disinvestment. It was decided that the strategic public sector enterprises 
would be those in the areas of 
• Arms and ammimitions and allied items of defence equipment, 
defence air crafts and warships. 
• Atomic energy. 
• Railway Transport, 
All other public sector enterprises were to be considered non-
strategic. For the non-strategic public sector enterprises. It was decided 
that the reduction of government stake to 26% would not be automatic 
and the manner and pace of doing so would be worked out on a case to 
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case basis i.e. government stake going down to less than 51% or to 26% 
would be taken on the following considerations. 
• Whether the industrial sector requires the presence of the public 
sector as a countervailing force to prevent concentration of power 
in private hands. 
• Whether the industrial sector requires a proper regulatory 
mechanism to protect the consumer interest before public sector 
enterprises are privatized.'^ 
(vii) Budget Speech 2000-01 
The highlights of the policy for the year 2000-01 were that for the 
first time the government made the statement that it was prepared to 
reduce its stake in the non-strategic PSEs even below 26% if necessary, 
that there would be increasing emphasis on strategic sales and that the 
entire proceeds from disinvestment would be deployed in social sector, 
restructuring of PSEs and retirement of public debt. The main elements 
of the policy are reiterated as follows: 
• To restructure and revive potentially viable PSEs. 
• To close down PSE which cannot be revived. 
• To bring down government equity in all non-strategic PSEs to 
26% or lower if necessary. 
• To fully protect the interest of workers. 
• To put in place mechanisms to raise resources from the market 
against the security of PSEs assets for providing an adequate 
safety net to workers and employees. 
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• To establish a systematic policy approach to disinvestment and to 
give a fresh impetus to this programme by setting up a new 
department of disinvestment. 
• Emphasize increasingly on strategic sales of identified PSEs. 
• To use the entire receipt from disinvestment for meeting 
expenditure in social sectors, restructuring of PSEs and retiring 
public debt. 
There are many PSUs which are sick and not capable of being 
revived. The only remaining option is to close down these undertakings 
after providing an acceptable safety net for the employees and workers. 
Resources under the National Renewal fund have not been 
sufficient to meet the cost of Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) for 
such PSUs. At the same time, these PSUs have assets, which if 
unbundled and realized, can be used for fimding VSS. Government will 
put in place mechanisms to raise resources from the market against the 
security of these assets and use these funds to provide an adequate 
safety net to workers and employees. Government have recently 
established a new department of disinvestment to establish a systematic 
policy approach to disinvestment. 
(viii) Budget Speech for 2002-03 
With the streamlined procedure for disinvestment and 
privatization, I am happy to report that the government has now 
completed strategic sales in 7 public sector companies and some hotels 
3/4 properties of the Hotel Corporation of India (HCI) and the India 
Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC). The change in approach 
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from the disinvestment of small lots of shares to strategic sales of blocks 
of shares to the strategic investors has improved the price earning 
ratio's obtained. We expect to complete the disinvestment in another 6 
companies and the remaining hotels in HCI and ITDC this year. 
Other than modem food industries (India) limited, only minority 
stakes in different PSEs were sold before the year 2000. The government 
has since modified its policy to emphasis on strategic sale. The 
disadvantages of sale of minority stake by the government have been 
found as follow: 
• Lower realizations because the management control is not 
transferred. Moreover, it signals lack of commitment to efficient 
governance of PSEs. 
• With the limited holding remaining with the government after 
minority sales. Only small stakes can be offered to the strategic 
partner, if it is decided to go for a strategic sale subsequently. 
This depresses the possibility of higher realizations from the 
strategic partner. Especially since the latter has to offer the same 
price to other shareholders also through an open offer. 
• The minority sales also give the impressions that the main 
objective of the government is to obtain funds for reducing its 
fiscal deficit and not to improve performance of government 
owned public sector enterprises (PSE).° 
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Table-8 
Disinvestment of Equity in Public Sector Enterprises 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Target 
2500 
2500 
3500 
4000 
7000 
5000 
4800 
5000 
10000 
10000 
12000 
12000 
14500 
4000 
N o target fixed 
N o target fixed 
N o target fixed 
Realization 
3038 
1913 
0 
4843 
168 
380 
910 
5370 
1829 
1869 
5632 
3342 
15547.41 
2764.87 
1569.68 
0 
2366.94 
Cumulative 
3038 
4951 
4951 
9794 
9962 
10342 
11252 
16623 
18452 
20321 
25953 
29295 
44842.41 
47607.28 
49176.96 
49176.96 
51543.90 
Source;- (i) Economic Survey (2002-03) 
(ii) Department of disinvestment report 1991-92 to May 2007. 
The disinvestment programme started in 1991-92 when the 
government annoimced its new economic policy. The total realization to 
the government from various rounds of disinvestment till 2007-08 is Rs. 
51,543.90 crore. 
As it is clear from this table, the actual realization from the 
disinvestment programme has been less than the target most of the time 
eg. As against a target of Rs. 7000 crore in 1995-96, the government 
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could raise only Rs. 168 crore worth of resources through 
dismvestmerit. 
Ir\ many other years also, a very limited success on the 
disinvestment front could be achieved. In 2002-03, the government had 
kept a target of Rs. 12,000 crore for its disinvestment programme while 
it could raise only Rs. 3342 crore worth of resources. In 2004-05 the 
target was Rs. 4000 crore while achievement was only Rs. 2764.87 
crore." 
3.4. Procedure Followed for Disinvestment In India 
The Government of India is carrying out disinvestment in 
accordance with the prescribed procedure that ensures complete 
transparency. The procedure is reviewed from time to time and 
modified with a view to accelerating the process further. At present it is 
as follows: 
1. Proposals for disinvestment in any public sector undertaking 
(PSU), based on the recommendations of the disinvestment 
commission or in accordance with the declared disinvestment 
policy of the Government are placed for consideration of the 
cabinet committee on disinvestment (CCD). 
2. After CCD clears the disinvestment proposals, the selection of 
advisor is done through a competitive bidding process. 
3. The advisor assists the government in preparation and issue of 
advertisement in leading newspapers inviting Expressions of 
Interest (EOI) from interested parties. 
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4. After receipt of the EOI, prospective bidders are short Usted 
based on pre-determined objective screenirig 
criteria/ requirements. 
5. The advisor, after diligence of the PSU, prepares the 
information memorandum in consultation with the concerned 
PSU. This is given to the short listed prospective bidders who 
have entered into a confidently agreements. 
6. The draft share purchase agreement and shareholder's 
agreement are also prepared by the advisors with the help of a 
legal advisor. 
7. The prospective bidders undertake due diligence of the PSU is 
undertaken in accordance with the advisors / the government 
/ the representatives of the PSU for any clarifications. 
8. concurrently, the task of valuation of the PSU is undertaken in 
accordance with the standard national and international 
practices. 
9. Based on the reactions received from the prospective bidders, 
the share purchase agreement and shareholder's agreement 
are finalized. These are then vetted by the miiustry of Law and 
are approved by the government. Thereafter, these are sent to 
the prospective bidders for inviting the final binding bids 
(technical and financial). 
10. The bids received, as above are examined, analysed and 
evaluate by the Inter Ministerial Group (IMG) and their 
(IMG's) recommendations are placed before the CCD for the 
final approval of the bids, the strategic partner, share purchase 
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agreement and shareholder's agreement and other ancillary 
issues. 
11. In the disinvestment process mentioned above, the 
department of disinvestment is assisted at each stage by an 
inter ministerial group (IMG), comprising officers from the 
ministry of finance, department of public enterprises, the 
administrative ministry / department controlling the PSU, 
apart from the officers of the department of disinvestment and 
the advisors. 
12. After the transaction is completed, all papers and documents 
relating to it are to be turned over to the Controller and 
Auditor General of India (GAG), to enable the GAG to 
undertake an evaluation of the disinvestment, for placing it in 
parliament and releasing it to the public. 
The main recommendations of the Rangarajan Gommittee are 
also followed: 
(i) Limit of equity to be disinvested: The percentage of equity to 
be disinvested should be under 49% in industries reserved for 
public sector and over 74% in other cases. 
(II) Criteria for valuation of Share: The disinvestment cash flow 
method is preferred. 
(III) Modus Operandi of Disinvestment: Once a responsible 
market price is established in a normal trading atmosphere 
over a reasonable period of time, the fixed price method 
would be appropriate. 
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(iv) Standing Committee on PSEs disinvestment: Creation of the 
standing committee to recommend enterprise specification for 
reforms, restructuring and disinvestment as well as 
monitoring and evaluating the process of implementation. ^ 0 
Figure - 3 
Procedure for Disinvestment - Flow Diagram 
Admin. Ministry input 
through Disinvestment 
Ministry 
Core Group of 
Secretarial ^ 
disinvestment 
Commission £1 Ministry of Finance /PEA does Analysis 
^ 
i L i L 
Sends recommendations Inputs from Admin. 
Ministry & Dept. of 
Disinvestment 
Cabinet Committee on 
Disinvestment (CCD) 
Core Groups of 
secretaries (GD) 
Does monitoring 
IMG constituted 
for implementation 
IMG Reports to Core Groups 
3.5. Methods of Disinvestment 
1. Capital Markets: Public offer of shares of companies to be 
privatized can take many forms considered below: 
a. Offer to Public At A Fixed Price: Here the price is decided 
before the transaction. The government eg. disinvested one 
million shares of VSNL in 1998-99 @ Rs. 750 per share, through 
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an offer document. This method is transparent, relatively 
quiclcand carv ensure widesprea'd shareholding. The method is 
suitable for profit-making companies with good prospects. 
The cost range is 4.5% depending on the issue size and 
whether the issue has to be under written. The goveniment 
has also to comply with the SEBI guidelines and stock 
exchange requirements. The limitation here is dependence 
upon capital market conditions and also that the price has to 
be at a discoimt to market price to ensure good response. This 
was the chosen method of privatization in UK. 
b. Offer to the Public Through Book-Building Process: Here the 
offer document invites bids from interested parties, which are 
arranged from the highest to the lowest and allocations are 
made at a cut off price. The bidders can acquire up to 85% of 
the shares offered, the balance of 15% are offered to retail 
investors at the cut-off price. The method is suitable for profit-
making companies with good intristic value and future 
prospects, in which institutional interest is expected to be 
substantial. This method is also transparent, relatively quick 
though expensive with cost of 5.6%. There is no precedent of 
this method in the Indian public sector. In the private sector, 
Hughes software ltd. And HCL technologies ltd are examples 
of use of this method. 
c. Secondary Market Operation: Here, the government can 
dispose of its holdings of the companies whose shares are 
traded at the market price. The disinvestment has to be 
essentially on a wholesale basis, though retail investors can 
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also purchase the shares. The sale price iri this case would 
depend upon day-to-day market conditior\s and there is 
possibility of price rigging. The advantages of this method are 
quickness with which the shares can be disposed of and its 
low cost as only the brokerage has to be paid. In case the 
amount of shares to be sold is large, the secondary market 
sales may lead to a crash in price and loss to the government. 
Unless a large investor is having an eye on the company for 
acquiring the controlling interest and is ready to pay a good 
price. It may be noted that SEBI and stock exchange 
requirements for acquiring more than 20%. Equity in a 
company would have to be met by the investor where the 
sales involve only a limited amount, this can be a quick 
method for effecting disinvestment.-'^ •'^  
International Offering: This is sale of depository receipts to 
international investors, essentially institutions, through a 
comprehensive offer document containing disclosures as per 
international standards. The published accounts have to be 
drawn in accordance with us Generally Accepted Accoiinting 
Practices (GAAP) and as per listing requirements of the 
concerned stock exchange. The minimum sale price may be 
fixed by the disinvestors but the final pricing is obtained 
through bids from the investors. Allocations are made to 
various bidders at the cut off price or at their bid prices. Only 
companies of international repute with good intrinsic value, 
good prospects and with actively traded share in the market 
go for this method of sale, which has been used in case of 
VSNL, MTNL and GAIL and a few other PEs, only for partial 
disinvestment, not leading to privatization. The transaction 
cost here is in the range of 4-5% depending on the issue size 
and the time involved 3-4 months. Such issues add to the 
prestige and visibility of the companies. 
GDRs are issued by private companies to meet their financial 
requirements. But in case of PEs, they have mostly been used 
to disinvest the existing government equity in the company. 
For example, in 1996-97,39 lakh shares of Rs. 10 each in VSNL, 
out of the govenunents holding in the company were sold 
through GDRs for Rs. 3.7 crore. The government got this 
amount and reduced its stake in the equity of VSNL to the 
extent of Rs. 3.9 crore. 
e. Private Placement: Here the government disinvests a part of 
its holding in the domestic market to a set of institutional 
investors at a negotiable price arrived at through valuation or 
price discovery through the book building process. An 
information memorandum is circulated among institutional 
investors, who may carry out due diligence, that is, going into 
details of the working of the company for which full facility is 
provided to them. This method was used by the government 
in 1998-99 to sell Rs. 9 crore of its equity holding in the 
container corporation of India. The disinvestment gave the 
government Rs. 221 crore for equity with a face value of 9 
crore. This method of disinvestment has to follow the 
conditions of sale of equity as laid down by SEBI and the stock 
exchange. It is suitable for listed companies with good 
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intrinsic value and good prospects, but having low floating 
stocks and low volumes of business at the stock exchange. The 
transaction cost in this method is low and it is less time 
consuming. But it leads to concentration of equity in a few 
select hands and may also not be considered transparent. 
f. Auction: This is of two types : In Dutch auction, allotments are 
made at a single price and in French auction at the bid price. 
The auction involves a set of institutional investors. The price 
is discovered through a bidding process. Allocations are made 
to all investors which are above the cut off price in case it is a 
Dutch auction and at the bid price in case of French auction. 
The method is suitable for unlisted companies with good 
intrinsic value. It provides a traiisparent mechanism, is less 
time consuming and has low trarisaction cost. Its main 
disadvantage is that it does not ensure wide spread 
shareholding. This method was used in the first nine rounds of 
disinvestment. The first few rounds of disinvestment were not 
for the public at large. For example, the notice inviting bids for 
the sale of 825 bundles of shares in 31 PEs in the first round 
was issued only to ten financial institutions and mutual funds. 
The offer from the highest bidder of each of the bundles was 
to be accepted. The bids were opened in the presence of the 
authorized representatives of the bidders and after evaluation, 
bids for 406 bundles for a total value of Rs. 1,427 crore were 
accepted.12 
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2. Strategic Sale 
Here the Government receives bids from the prospective buyers 
through ads in newspapers/magazines and also with the help of a 
global advisor appointed for the purpose. Generally the bids are invited 
for the sale of 51% or more to equity, providing the buyer the right to 
manage. This method involves decisions on pre-qualification criteria, 
bid evaluation criteria, the bidding process and preparation of 
information memorandum to be made available to pre-qualified buyers, 
based on which they carry out due diligence and make their bids. The 
bids are evaluated, negotiations take place with the bidders, loading to 
singing of the sale agreement. The method results in obtaining a better 
sale price as the purchaser pays a premium for his right to control the 
privatized firm. It also helps in getting the technical, marketing, 
financial and managerial expertise of the buyer and thus increases the 
value of the residual share holding of the Government. Its costs are low. 
The method is not expected to take more than 6-10 months, but in 
practice could involve a longer time as happened in the sale of BALCO 
and Modem Food industries. 
3. Ware Housing 
It has been suggested that the government could transfer a part of 
its equity holdings of listed PEs to financial institutions (FIs), to be 
warehoused by them, till sold. The FIs who are constantly on the look 
for good investment would pay the government the price of the equity 
transferred at the agreed rates with reference to their market prices. 
After deducting the warehousing charges. The agreement with FIs 
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would provide for profit sharing ori the sale of equity by them withiri a 
time frame. The great advantage of this method is that once the majority 
ownership by the state gets diluted through transfer of equity to FIs, the 
concerned PEs will no longer remain government entities, securing the 
much valuable freedom from the executive, legislative and judicial 
wings of the state with their high level of professional management, 
these PEs will then operate as Board-managed companies and compete 
with other private enterprises. This is a quick method of privatization, 
with little transaction cost and can help the government to meet its 
targets of funds to be secured through disinvestment.^^ 
4. Reduction in Equity 
(a) Buy back of shares: Cash rich PEs can privatize themselves 
if the government agrees to sell its equity holding beyond 
49% to them. They buy back can be at an agreed price 
between the Public Enterprise (PE) and the government. 
This method improves earning per share of the company, it 
is low cost and relatively quick. Regulatory requirements 
however need to be met eg., the maximum amount to be 
used for buy back cannot exceed 25% of the company's 
paid up capital plus free reserves. 
(b) Conversion of Equity into another instrument: Here the 
government can be issued bonds or preference shares in place of 
its equity holding. The main difference as compared to above 
method is that it does not involve any outgo of funds for the 
company. This method also has the same benefits as the above 
method has except that the majority equity continues with the 
government eg., in 1998-99 the National Aluminum Co. Ltd. was 
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permitted to convert more than Rs. 600 crore of its equity into 
secured debentures, thus improving its earning per share. It 
may be noted that servicing the equity is costlier than loans 
where the outgo as interest is deductible as an expense for tax 
purposes. The exercise did not result in any reduction in the 
percentage of equity held by the government, but it did 
increases the market value of the company's share, resulting in a 
better image of the company and more sale value for the equity 
holdings of the government on privatization. 
5. Trade sale 
It is a 100% sale of a business by inviting bids. Here the 
government is not only interested in obtaining the maximum amount as 
sale proceeds but also in ensuring that the buyer does not strip the 
assets, close down the business and dismiss the employees. The 
agreement writh the buyer would have clauses for this purpose. While 
effecting a trade sale, the financial strength, the credentials and 
capabilities of the buyer are important considerations for the central 
electronics ltd., the disinvestment commission recommended a trade 
sale after hiving off defence related operations. 
6. Asset Sale and Winding Up 
This is normally done for companies which are either sick or 
facing closure. The asset sale is normally done by open auction or by 
tender method. For the rehabilitation industries corporation ltd., the 
disinvestment commission recommended discontinuance of all 
operations and sale of assets. For a company like Hindustan Vegetable 
Oil Corporation Ltd., where services of all employees were terminated 
after due compensation, sale of assets becomes less difficult. Sick 
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companies under SICA are wound up by BIFR and handed over to the 
official liquidator for realization of dues and sale of assets. 
7. ManagemenVEmployee Buyout 
For smaller companies, particularly those that are highly 
dependent on their personnel, management /employee buyout can be a 
successful method of privatization. Although most buyouts are led by 
the management, active participation by the workforce is a pre-requisite 
for success. Even where the employees come forward to take over a 
imit, the importance of the management function does not get reduced. 
The management personnel for running the company could be from 
within or, if necessary, hired from outside. The employees as 
shareholders have a right to elect directors under the companies act. A 
company like Engineers India Ltd., where most employees are workers 
and which is a highly successful consultancy organization, is a good 
case for employee buyout to the extent of 51%.14 
8. Cross Sales 
Here the government permits the purchase of equity of a PE by 
another related enterprise. For example, as a part of the government 
policies, stand alone refineries were purchased by public sector oil 
majors in 2001 : IOC bought the government's stake in Chennai 
Petroleum Corporation and Bongaigaon Refinery and Bharat 
Petroleum, the Government's stake in Kochi Refineries. A small part of 
the equity can also be sold through cross sales as happened in case of 
IOC, ONGC and GAIL. 
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9. Demergers and Spinning Off 
The basic concept here is to transfer a part of an existing PE into a 
new separate government company for the purpose of privatizing that 
particular unit. For example, for the hotels owned by Indian Tourism 
Development Corporation, disinvestment commission recommended 
that the hotels at prime locations like Delhi and Bangalore be leased out 
to an established chain of hotels through a competitive bidding process, 
to take care of the problem of transfer of property in case of leasehold 
lands. On which these hotels are located, and other hotels of the 
company be demerged into separate corporate identities and then sold. 
The spirming off delinks the unit to be sold from a larger entity making 
the sale process easier -A^ 
3.6. Methods of Disinvestment Adopted by India During the 
Recent Years: 
There are mainly four methods of disinvestment, which has been 
widely practised in India. They are the following: 
(a) American Depository Receipt /Global Depository Receipt: 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) or Global Depository Receipt 
(GDR) means any instrument in the form of a depository receipt or 
certificate, created by Overseas Depository Bank (ODB) out side 
India and issue to non-resident investors against the issue of 
ordinary shares of issuing company. The issuing company is one in 
which disinvestment is taking place. The ADR/GDR are negotiable 
instruments denominated in US$ (dollar) representing a non-US 
company's publicly traded local currency equity shares. The issue 
of such instruments involves the delivery of ordinary shares of an 
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Indian company to a domestic custodian bank in India, which in 
turn instructs an overseas depository bank to issue ADR/GDR on a 
pre-determined ratio. The ADR/GDR can be sold out-side India in 
their existing form. The ADRs are listed on the US stock exchanges 
and GDRs are usually listed on European stock exchange. 
(b) Public Offers of Shares: In this method of disinvestment the PSUs 
equity is offered by tender (Public Auction to Highest Bidder) or 
shares of the PSU's are offered to the Public at a fixed price per 
share. The following PSU's have been disinvested through the 
public offer of shares. GAIL, CONCUR, MTNL and NALCO. 
(c) Trade Sale: Trade sale or transfer of ownership involves dilution of 
equities of the recommended PSUs to the non-Governmental 
agencies, general public, the employees of the company and certain 
identified categories. This mode of transfer can infact be termed as 
peoplization. The following PSUs have disinvested after selection 
of global advisors, through trade sale Indian Tourism Development 
Corporation (ITDC), Modem Food Industries Ltd. (MFIL), Pawan 
Hans Helicopters Ltd. (PHL), Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. 
(HCIL), Ranchi Ashok Bihar Hotel Corporation (R-Ashok), Utkal 
Ashok Hotel Corporation (U-Ashok). 
(d) Strategic Sale: The concept of strategic sale was brought by the 
proposal of the disinvestment commission, which was set up 
during the year 1996. The concept of the strategic sale developed 
because disinvestment of the government equity in public sector 
was not making much success as it was not possible to realize 
optimum value for the shares offered for sale in a depressed Indian 
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stock market. Hence, the proposal for the strategic sale of PSUs 
gained ground. Strategic sale is done sometimes at competitive 
prices and sometimes at negotiated prices depending on the case to 
case of the PSUs. The following PSUs have been recommended for 
Strategic sale. 
i. Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. (HTL) 
ii. India Telephone Industries Ltd. (ITIL) 
iii. Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. (BALCO) 
iv. Bongaigaon Refineries and Petrochemicals Ltd. (BRPL) 
V. Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd. (KIOCL) 
vi. Madras Fertilizers Ltd. (MFL) 
vii. Engineers India Ltd. (EIL) 
viii. Hindustan Prefab Ltd. (HPL) 
ix. Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Ltd. (IBP) 
X. NEPA (Formerly The National Newsprint and Paper 
Mills Ltd.) 
xi. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (HZL) 
xii.Pyrites Phosphates and Chemicals Ltd. 
xiii. National Fertilizers Ltd. (NFL) 
xiv. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (FACT) 
XV. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. (IPCL) 
xvi. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCL) 
xvii. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI) 
of the above KIOCL and BALCO have been already disinvested 
as strategic sale.^^ 
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3.7. Proceeds From Disinvestment and Methodologies Adopted 
As stated earlier, four methods of disinvestment were mainly 
practiced in India during the recent years but the government of India 
laid much emphasis on the two methods of disinvestment over the 
period 1991-92 to 2002-07 (i) selling of shares in select PSUs and (ii) 
strategic sale of a PSU to a private sector company. The former method 
was used over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99 and since 1999-2007 the 
emphasis shifted to the latter method. As far as the sale of shares is 
concerned, the government experimented with various variants as it is 
clear from the table given below. This table also gives the targets and 
achievements of disinvestment in different years. 
Table-9 
Disinvestment in PSUs and Methodologies Adopted 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
No. of 
Companies 
in which 
equity sold 
47 
(31 in one 
tranche and 
16 in other) 
35 
(in 3 
tranches) 
-
13 
5 
1 
1 
5 
Target 
receipt for 
the year 
(Rs. In 
Cr.) 
2500 
2500 
3500 
4000 
7000 
5000 
4800 
5000 
Actual 
Receipt (Rs. 
InQ.) 
3038 
1913 
Nil 
4843 
362 
380 
902 
5371 
Methodology 
Minority shares sold by auction method in 
bundles of 'very good', 'good' and 
'average' companies. 
Building of shares abandoned, shares sold 
separately for each company by auction 
method. 
Equity of 7 companies sold by open 
auction but proceeds received in 94-95. 
Sale through auction method, in which 
NRI's and other persons legally permitted 
to buy, hold or sell equity allowed to 
participate. 
Equities of 4 companies auctioned and 
government rode piggy back in the IDBI 
fixed price offering for the fifth company. 
GDR (VSNL) in international market. 
GDR (MTNL) in international meirket. 
GDR (VSNL) domestic offerings with the 
participation of FIIS (CONCOR, GAIL). 
Cross purchase by 3 oil sector companies 
i.e. GAIL, ONGC and Indian Oil 
Corporation. 
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1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
TOTAL 
2 
4 
10 
6 
10 
2 
1 
-
1 
62» 
10,000 
10,000 
12,000 
12,000 
14,500 
4000 
No target 
fixed 
No target 
fix 
No target 
fixed 
96^00 
1829 
1869 
5,632** 
3,342@ 
15,547.41 
2,764.87 
1569.68 
-
2,366.94 
51,729.0»» 
GDR (GAIL), domestic issue (VSNL), 
restructuring (BALCO), MFIL's strategic 
sale ar\d others. 
Strategic sale of BALCO, LJMC, Takeover 
KRL, (CRL), BRPL, CPCL, (MRL). 
Strategic sale of CMC (51%) HIL (74%) 
VSNL (25%), IBP (33.58%), PPL (74%) and 
sale by other modes (TTDC & HCJ), 
surplus reserves STC and MMTC. 
Strategic sale of JESSOP (72%), HZL (26%), 
IPCL (25%) and other modes (HCI, Maruti) 
26% 
Strategic sale of ICL, call option of HZL, 
offer for sale of MUL, IBP, IPCL, CMC, 
DCI, GAIL and ONGQ sale of shares of 
ICI Ltd. 
Offer for sale of NTPC, sale of shares to 
IPCL employees. 
Sale of MUL shares to Indian public sector 
financial institutions & banks and 
employees. 
-
Sale of MUL shares to public sector 
financial institutions, public sector banks 
and Indian Mutual Funds. 
* Total number of companies in which disinvestment has taken so far. 
** Figures inclusive of amount expected to be realized, control premium, dividend/dividend 
tax and transfer of surplus cash reserves prior to disinvestment etc. 
©Till January 31, 2003 
Source;- (i) Tite Economic Times, disinvestment survey : "One thousand ways to lose control in 
the economic times, March 21, 2003 and 
(ii) Government of India Economic Survey, 2002-03 (Delhi 2003) Table 7.22, p. 149. 
(Hi) Department of disinvestment Report 1991-92 to May 2007. 
Initially in 1991-92, the government offered shares for sale in 
'bundles' involving a combination of equity from poor and good 
performers. In practice rather than help the government divest shares in 
loss-making PSUs at reasonable prices, bimdling resulted in the 
government obtaining a very low^ average price for each bundle, 
implying that prime shares were handed over at rock-bottom prices. In 
1992-93, the government abandoned the bundling of shares and sold 
shares of each company, NRI and other persons were allowed to 
participate in the auction. In 1996-97 and 1997-98, GDRs (Global 
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Depository Receipts) of VSNL and MTNL in international markets 
fetched Rs. 380 crore and Rs. 980 crore respectively. In 1998-99, along 
with GDR and domestic offerings with the participation of foreign 
institutional investors, each rich PSUs (like ONGC, GAIL and IOC) 
were forced to "cross hold" shares in related PSUs by buying them from 
the government. Since 1999-2000, as stated PSUs by buying focus of the 
government shifted to the second method of disinvestment - The 
strategic sale of a PSU to a private sector company. As it is clear from 
the above table, the government resorted to strategic sale of a number of 
companies - (MFIL) (Modem Foods India Ltd.), Videsh Sanchar Nigam 
Ltd. (VSNL), Indian Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO), CMC Ltd., 
HTL Ltd., IBP, Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) (13 
hotels). Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. (HCI), Pradeep Phosphate Ltd. 
(PPL), Hindustan Zinc Ltd., etc. Some details of these strategic sales are 
as follows: 
100 percent stake in MFIL sold to Hindustan lever for Rs. 105.45 
crore 51 percent stake in BALCO sold to sterlite group for Rs. 550 crore, 
51 percent stake in CMC Ltd. Sold to tata sons for Rs. 152 crore, 35.58 
percent stake in IBP sold to IOC (Indian Oil Corporation) for Rs. 
1,153.68 crore, 74 percent stake in HZL sold to sterlite group for Rs. 445 
crore, 26 percent stake in IPCL sold to Reliance group for Rs. 1,481 
crore, 25% stake in VSNL sold to Tata group for Rs. 1,439 crore, 74% 
stake in pradeep Phosphates sold to Zuari Marco Phosphates for Rs. 
151.70 crore, 50 percent stake in Maruti Udyog Ltd. sold to Suzuki 
Motor Corporation for Rs. 2,424 crore etc. In addition, 100 percent 
equity in a number of hotels belonging to ITDC and Hotel Corporation 
of India has been sold. 
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Disinvestment in 1991-92 
(a) First Tranche of Disinvestment (December 1991) 
A list of 31 Public Sector Enterprises was drawn up in December 
1991. Out of 31 PSEs, eight were categorized as 'very good', 12 as 'good' 
and 11 as 'average'. The categorization was made on the basis of net asset 
value (NAV) per share. The PSEs whose (NAV) was categorized as 'very 
whose NAV was between Rs. 20 to Rs, 49 per share as 'good' and 
between 10 to Rs. 19 as 'average'. Thereafter, baskets consisting of 
different combination of nine PSEs, three Public sector enterprises from 
each category with 'very good', 'good' and average ratings were made. 
The total value of the equity in each basket was to be about Rs. 5 crore. 
Bids were invited from 10 financial institutions for these PSEs shares 
which were grouped in 825 bundles each consisting of nine PSEs in 
certain proportions determined by the department of public enterprises. 
A total of 710 bids for 533 bundles were received from nine mutual funds 
and 406 bundles for a total value of Rs. 1427 crore were sold. Unit Trust 
of India was the major purchaser (225 bundles) accounting of the sale. 
(b) Second Tranche of Disinvestment 
For the second tranche of Disinvestment the department of public 
enterprises (DPE) asked the Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation of India Ltd. (ICICI), to evaluate and advise reasonable 
issue price for equity of selected PSEs. Based on its recommendations, a 
list of 16 PSEs for disinvestment was prepared by the DPE and shares 
were grouped in 120 bimdles according to the same categorization as 
adopted earlier, their reserve prices were uniformly fixed at Rs. 10.08 
crore per bimdle. Bids were invited from 36 institution and banks. In all 
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273 bids were received from 19 institutioris for all the 120 bundles and 
Rs. 1611 crore (16.1 billion) was realized from this sale and again the 
major purchaser was imit trust of India.l'^ 
Disinvestment in 1992-93 
a) First Tranche of disinvestment (October 1992): In October 
1992, tenders were invited for purchase of shares of eight 
PSEs. In this round, instead of bundling approach auctioning 
of shares was done on individual enterprise basis. The 
minimum bid limit was fixed at Rs. 2.50 crore (25 billion). A 
total of 286 bids were received from eligible bidders including 
financial institutions, mutual funds and individuals. A 
minimum reserve price was fixed on the basis of 
recommendations of three mechant barikers : (a) ICICI (b) IDBI 
(c) State Bank of Capital Market. The average of the price 
recommended by the three merchant banks was decided as the 
'upset' price. Having this criterion, the bids eligible for 
acceptance amounted to a total sale value of Rs. 681.95 crore 
for 12,87 crore shares in the eight companies. 
Table-10 
PSEs Disinvested in Octo 
Name of the Enterprise 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan Zinc Limited 
Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. 
National Aluminum Co. Ltd. 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. 
Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Source :-Public enterprises survey, '. 
No. of Shares 
Sold (in 
crore) 
0.2500 
0.3192 
1.0416 
0.3928 
6.4431 
1.4969 
0.8685 
2.0567 
12.8688 
1995-96, Vol. 
ber 1992 
% of total 
No. of shares 
ofthePSE 
5.00 
5.00 
2.58 
5.00 
5.00 
1.04 
1.57 
0.52 
-
I. 
Amount of 
Sale (in Rs. 
Crore) 
169.53 
178.10 
44.33 
21.98 
124.13 
35.03 
26.36 
82.49 
681.95 
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b) Second Tranche of Disinvestment (December 1992) : In 
November 1992, the government invited bids for the purchase 
of 46.27 crore shares of the 14 central public sector enterprises. 
In this round, minimum bid limit was reduced from Rs. 2.5 
crore to Rs. 1 crore. A total of 225 bids were received. The 
criteria for fixing minimum price was the same as was 
adopted during the first tranche of disinvestment of 1992-93 
bids were accepted for sale amounting to Rs. 1183.83 crore for 
31.06 crore shares in 12 PSEs. 
Table-11 
PSEs Disinvested in December 1992. 
Name of the Enterprise 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
Bongaigon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. 
Fertilizers and Chemicals (Travancore) Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 
Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. 
National Aluminum Company Ltd. 
National Fertilizers Ltd. 
Neyveli Ligiute Corporation Ltd. 
Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. 
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
TOTAL 
Source :-Public enterprise survey, 1995-9 
No. of 
Shares Sold 
(in crore) 
0.25 
1.00 
0.05 
0.32 
1.03 
0.10 
6.44 
0.03 
1.73 
0.15 
0.03 
19.93 
31.06 
6, Vol. I. 
% of total 
No. of 
shares of 
thePSE 
5.00 
5.00 
0.15 
5.00 
2.54 
1.14 
5.00 
0.06 
1.20 
0.28 
0.10 
5.00 
-
Amount of 
Sale (in Rs. 
Crore) 
161.65 
42.18 
1.30 
153.75 
36.47 
10.78 
118.19 
0.72 
34.94 
4.00 
2.25 
617.60 
1183.83 
c) Third Tranche of Disinvestment (March 1993) : In third 
Tranche shares of 15 Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) were 
offered for sale through auction. Out of the 192 bids which 
were received, 57 bids emerged successful on the basis of the 
reserve prices fixed by the core group based on the 
recommendations of the merchant bankers. A total amount of 
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Rs. 46.73 crore was realized by sale of 1.0096 crore shares of 
nine public sector enterprises. 
Table-12 
PSEs Disinvested in March 1993. 
Name of the Enterprise 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. 
Hindustan Copper Ltd. 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 
Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. 
Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. 
National Aluminum Company Ltd. 
National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. 
TOTAL 
No. of 
Shares 
Sold (in 
crore) 
0.1117 
0.0800 
0.3411 
0.0300 
0.0300 
0.0700 
0.1023 
0.2140 
0.0305 
% of total 
No. of 
shares of 
the PSE 
0.45 
0.40 
1.12 
0.07 
0.34 
0.79 
0.08 
1.59 
0.02 
Amount of 
Sale (in Rs. 
Crore) 
8.21 
3.22 
8.07 
0.75 
1.41 
4.85 
1.88 
17.88 
0.46 
Source :- Enterprise-wise details regarding number of shares and amount realized obtained by 
author from department of public enterprises. Percentage of equity disinvested worked out by 
author based on paid up equity. 
Disinvestment in 1993-94 
Although no disinvestment of PSE shares could take place during 
1993-94 due to adverse market conditions. 
a) First Tranche of Disinvestment (MarcVApril 1994): After 
considering the stock market conditions, the government 
decided to off-load shares of seven PSEs in March 1994. A 
minimum price was fixed on the basis of recommendations of 
two merchant bankers ICICI and IDBI. The government used 
its own pre-determined formula and the average of the price 
recommended by the two merchant bankers to arrive at the 
base prices in respect of shares of each of the enterprises. Bids 
were accepted for sale amounting to around Rs. 2282 crore 
(22,82 billion) for 11.317 crore (113.1 million) shares in six 
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companies. Besides Indian financial institutions/mutual 
funds/corporate bodies and individuals, some of the major 
foreign institutional investors were also amongst the 
successful bidders. No share of Bongaigaon Refinery and 
Petrochemicals Ltd. (BRPL) could be sold as no bid was 
received quoting at or above the reserve price fixed by the 
Government. 
The details of the Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) disinvested 
are given below: 
Table-13 
PSEs Disinvested in March/April 1994 
Name of the Enterprise No. of Shares 
Sold (in crore) 
% of total 
No. of shares 
of the PSE 
Amount of 
Sale (in Rs. 
Crore) 
Bharat Electronics Ltd. 0.331 4.14 47.17 
Bharat Earth Movers 0.150 4.07 48.27 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 2.692 11.74 301.34 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 0.447 7.00 563.11 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 7.694 12.82 1322.17 
National Aluminum Company Ltd. 0.003 0.04 0.096 
TOTAL 11.317 2282.156 
Source:- Details of total number of shares sold and amount realized as per public enterprises survey, 
1995-96, Vol. I. Percentage of equity disinvested worked out by autlior based on paid up equity. 
b) Second Tranche of Disinvestment (October 1994): The union 
budget for 1994-95 targeted to mobilize Rs. 4000 crore (40 
billion) from disinvestment of PSE shares. Notice inviting 
tender was issued in October 1994 for sale of shares in seven 
PSEs. However, sale was effected in six PSEs as no share could 
be sold of MTNL. For the October 1994 round of 
disinvestment another important change was made in 
procedure. Non-resident Indians (NRIs) and Overseas 
Corporate Bodies (OCBs) were permitted for the first time to 
bid for share of PSEs. 
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Table-14 
PSEs Disinvested in October 1994 
Name of the Enterprise 
Container Corporation of India 
Indian Oil Corporation 
National Fertilizers Ltd. 
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. 
TOTAL 
No. of Shares 
Sold (in 
crore) 
1.299 
1.443 
0.007 
0.686 
0.372 
0.387 
4.194 
% of total 
No. of shares 
ofthePSE 
20.00 
3.77 
0.01 
2.00 
0.41 
1.37 
-
Amount of 
Sale (in Rs. 
Crore) 
99.71 
1028.11 
0.28 
1051.52 
22.66 
28.08 
2230.36 
Source:- Details of total number of shares sold and amount realized as per public enterprises 
survey, 1995-96, Vol. I. Percentage of equity disinvested worked out by author based on paid 
up equity. 
c) Third Tranche of Disinvestment (January 1995): In January 
1995, shares of six PSEs were offered for sale. Out of 556 bids 
received, 209 bids in respect of only five PSEs were accepted, 
amounting to Rs. 330.568 crore (33.05 billion). Government 
decided not to sell shares in VSNL. Details of sales are given 
below: 
Table-15 
PSEs Disinvested in January 1995 
Name of the Enterprise 
Engineers India Ltd. 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. 
ITDC 
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 
Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd. 
TOTAL 
No. of Shares 
Sold (in crore) 
0.108 
2.853 
0.675 
0.008 
0.616 
4.260 
% of total 
No. of shares 
ofthePSE 
5.99 
3.37 
10.00 
0.03 
0.97 
-
Amount of Sale 
(in Rs. Crore) 
67.526 
194.120 
51.985 
5,538 
11.399 
330.568 
Source:- Details of total number of shares sold and amount realized as per public enterprises 
survey, 1995-96, Vol. 1. Percentage of equity disinvested worked out by author based on paid 
up equity. 
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Disinvestment in 1995-96 
Against a target of Rs. 7000 crore (70 billion) shares of four PSEs, 
viz MTNL, SAIL, CONCOR and ONGC were offered in October 1995. 
In all 927 bids for purchase of 7080 crore (78 million) shares were 
received. Based on reserve price determined on the basis of 1992-93 
criteria, a total of 1.53 crore (15.3 million) shares of four PSEs were 
disinvested for Rs. 168.48 crore (1.68 billion). Details are given below: 
Table-16 
PSES disinvested in 1995-96 
Name of the enterprise 
Mahanager Telephone Nigam ltd (MTNL) 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) 
Container corporation of India Ltd (CONCOR) 
Oil and natural gas Corporation Ltd (ONGC) 
Total 
No of shares sold (in 
crore) 
0.87 
0.44 
0.20 
0.02 
1.53 
Amount Realized (in 
crore) 
135.90 
13.30 
14.12 
5.16 
168.48 
Note; all these PSEs were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source:: public enterprises survey 1995-96, Vol. I. 
Disinvestment in 1996-97 
In the budget speech for 1996-97 a target of Rs. 5000 crore (50 
billion) was fixed for mobilization of resources through disinvestment 
of PSE shares. The government decided to take up two PSEs (IOC & 
VSNL) initially for the first two tranches, while Indian Oil Corporation 
(IOC) and Videsh Snachar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) were earmarked and 
preparatory work had also been initiated for the GDR issue. Only VSNL 
could be taken up for disinvestment (in GDR) during the said period 
and IOC GDR could not be laimched due to unfavourable market 
conditions. In the GDR, 39 lakh shares of VSNL could be disinvested 
resulting in realization of Rs. 380 crore (3.8 billion). 
110 
Disinvestment in 1997-98 
The budget for 1997-98 had taken a credit for an amount of Rs. 
4800 crore (48 billion) to be realized from disinvestment of government 
held equity in public sector companies. This was proposed to be 
achieved by disinvestment in MTNL, GAIL, CONCOR and IOC. A GDR 
issue of 40 million shares held by the government in MTNL was offered 
in the international market in the month of November 1997. The issue 
was a success and an amoiint of Rs. 902 crore was realized. However, 
due to extermely unfavourable conditions in the international market it 
was decided to defer the issues of GAIL, CONCOR and IOC. 
Disinvestment in 1998-99 
The budget for 1998-99 had taken a credit for an amount of Rs. 
5000 crore to be realized from disinvestment of government held equity 
in public sector enterprises. This was proposed to be achieved by 
disinvestment through offer of shares in GAIL, VSNL, CONCOR, IOC 
and ONGC. The government disinvested 0.90 crore shares of its equity 
in CONCOR in the domestic market in November 1998 and realized Rs. 
221.65 crore. VSNL GDR cum domestic offering of 1 crore share was 
completed in February 1999 and an amount of Rs. 783.68 crore was 
realized. Government also offloaded 30 million of GAIL in the domestic 
market in February 1999, and realized Rs. 181.78 crore. These 
disinvestment amounted to Rs. 1187.11 crore. In addition, a tmique 
modality of disinvestment was also adopted i.e. cross holding amongst 
the oil enterprises under which government disinvested part of its 
equity holding amongst the enterprises inter-se namely ONGC, IOC 
and GAIL. 
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Table-17 
PSEs Disinvested in 1998-99 
Name of the 
Enterprise 
CONCOR 
GAIL 
IOC 
ONGC 
VSNL 
TOTAL 
Mode of Disinvestment 
Domestic issue 
(i) Divested/sold to institutional 
investors 
(ii) Cross holding by ONGC 
(iii) Cross holding by IOC 
Cross holding by ONGC 
(i) Cross holding by IOC 
(ii) Cross holding by GAIL 
GDR issue 
No. of Shares Sold 
(in crore) 
0.9000 
3.0610 
4.0840 
4.0840 
3.1272 
12.5349 
2.7719 
1.0000 
31.5630 
Receipts (in Rs. 
crore) 
221.65 
181.78 
245.04 
245.04 
1208.96 
2034.96 
450.00 
783.68 
5371.11 
Note: all these PSEs were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source:: public enterprises survey 1998-99, Vol. I. gives total amount realized as Rs. 
5371 crore. Enterprise-wise details obtained by author from ministry of 
Disinvestment. 
Disinvestment in 1999-2000 
The budget for 1999-2000 had taken a credit of Rs. 10,000 crore 
from disinvestment. In January 2000, strategic sale of Modem Foods 
India Ltd. (MFIL) to the extent of 74% of its equity was done in favour 
of Hindustan Lever Ltd. (HLL) to realize Rs. 105.45 crore. Thus, net 
realization was Rs. 94.51 crore for 74% equity in MFIL. This was for the 
first time that more than 50% shares of a PSE were sold to a strategic 
partner and the management of the company transferred to the private 
sector. Details of PSEs Disinvested during 1999-2000 are given below: 
Table-18 
Name of the Enterprise 
GAIL 
IOC 
ONGC 
VSNL 
MFIL 
TOTAL 
'SEs Disinvested in'. 
Mode of Disinvestment 
GDR issue 
Cross holding by ONGC 
(i) Cross holding by IOC 
(ii) Cross holding by 
GAIL 
Domestic Market 
Strategic sale of 
74% equity 
L999-2000 
No. of Shares 
Sold (in crore) 
13.5000 
0.4212 
1.1718 
0.6548 
0.1000 
0.0920 
(Face value) 
Rs. 1000 
15.9398 
Receipts (in Rs. 
crore) 
945.00 
162.79 
190.19 
106.29 
75.00 
94.51 
(After 
adjustment) 
1573.78 
Note: Other than MFIL, all other enterprises were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source: Enterprise-unse details obtained by author from ministry of Disinvestment. 
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Disinvestment in 2000-01 
Against a target of Rs. 10,000 crore government could realize Rs. 
1868.73 crore during the year. Rupees 55.50 crore was realized by 
strategic sale of 51% of BALCO equity to sterlite industries. The balance 
of Rs. 1317.23 crore was obtained through taking over of BRPL and 
Chennai Refineries by IOC and Kochi Refinery by BPCL. The details are 
given below: 
Table-19 
Disinvestment in 2000-01 
Name of the enterprise 
BALCO 
BRPL and Oiennai Refineries 
Kochi Refinery 
TOTAL 
Mode of Disinvestment 
Strategic sale of 51% 
Taken over by IOC 
Taken over by BPCL 
Receipt (in Rs. 
551.50 
658.13 
659.10 
1868.73 
Crore) 
Note:- Other than BALCO, all other PSEs were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source:- Ministry of Disinvestment. 
Disinvestment in 2001-02 
Against a target of Rs. 12000 crore, the government realized Rs. 
3130.94 crore during the year. The highlight of these disinvestment was 
that strategic sales were effected in CMC, HTL, IBP, VSNL and PPL. In 
CMC Ltd. 51 percent of equity was sold to Tata Sons Ltd. for Rs. 152 
crore, 74 percent of equity of HTL was sold to Himachal Futuristic 
Communications Ltd. (HFCL) for Rs. 55 crore. In IBP 33.58%. Out of 
government holding of 59.58 percent was sold to IOC for Rs. 1153.68 
crore. In VSNL 25% equity out of government holding of 52.97 percent 
was sold to panatone, a Tata Group Company for Rs. 1439 crore. 
Further, 10.97 percent of VSNL equity has been given to employees at a 
concessional rate. Besides the bid price of Rs. 1439 crore in VSNL, the 
government had received Rs. 1,887 crore as dividend and Rs. 363 crore 
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as dividend tax from the company. Thus, there was a realization of Rs. 
3689 crore from VSNL. Details of these transactions are given belov^: 
Table-20 
Disinvestment in 2001-02 
Name of the 
enterprise 
CMC 
HTL 
IBP 
VSNL 
PPL 
ITDC 
TOTAL 
Mode of Disinvestment 
Strategic sale of 51% 
Strategic sale of 74% 
Strategic sale of 33.58% 
Strategic sale of 25% 
Strategic sale of 74% 
Sale of eight hotels and long term lease of one hotel 
Receipt (in Rs. 
Crore) 
152.00 
55.00 
1153.68 
1439.00 
151.70 
179.56 
Note:- Out of these six PSEs, there CMC, VSNL and ITDC were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source:- Ministry of Disinvestment website. 
Disinvestment in 2002-03 
The target for disinvestment proceeds for 2002-03 has been kept 
as Rs. 12,000 crore. In March 2002, the government had approved 
disinvestment of 26% equity in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. in favour of sterlite 
opportunities and venture Ltd., a special purpose vehicle promoted by 
sterlite industries Ltd. and sterlite optical technologies Ltd. The 
proceeds of this transaction amounting to Rs. 445 crore was realized in 
April 2002. 
In May 2002, a two stage sell off began in Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
(MUL) with a Rs. 400 crore right issue at a price of Rs. 3280 per share of 
Rs. 100 each in which the government renounced whole of its rights 
share of Suzuki, for a control premium of Rs. 1000 crore. In the second 
stage the government is to off load its holding in two tranches. In the 
first tranche, the government sold 27.5 percent of its equity through 
Initial Public Offer (IPO) in June 2003. The cut off price was declared by 
the government at Rs. 125 per share of Rs. 5 face value. This was nine 
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times more than the price at which the government had sold a part of its 
share in Maruti to the Japanese joint venture partner Suzuki Motor 
Corporation in 1992. Keeping in view, the over whelming response in 
Maruti Case. The government has decided to sell its remaining shares to 
the Public in the five national companies - Tata controlled VSNL and 
CMC, Reliance Managed IPCL, Sterlite Controlled BALCO and Indian 
Oil Managed IBP through IPO (Initial Public Offer) route. 
Table-21 
Disinvestment in 2002-03 
Name of the enterprise 
HZL 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
IPCL 
ITDC 
MFIL 
CMC 
TOTAL 
Mode of Disinvestment 
(a) Strategic sale of 26% 
(b) 1.46% equity 
disinvested in Four of 
employees 
Control premium for sell 
off Suzuki 
Strategic sale of 26% 
Sale of 10 Properties 
Residual Sale of 26% equity 
6.06% equity disinvested in 
favour of employees 
Receipt (in Rs. Crore) 
(a) 445.00 
(b) 6.18 
1000 
1491.00 
272.81 
44.08 
6.07 
3265.17 
Note:- Other than Maruti Udyog Ltd., other PSEs were partially disinvested earlier also. 
Source:- Ministiy of Disinvestment reply to Lok Sabha. Unstarred question No. 1351 answered on 26 
February 2003. 
Disinvestment in 2003-04 
In 2003-04, there were 13 PSUs both listed and unlisted in which 
disinvestment through strategic sale was at various stages of the 
process. Out of these, 19 companies were loss-making and 15 were 
profit making. In the case of ITDC, strategic sale in 5 hotel units and 7 
joint venture hotels and in the case of Hotel corporation of India, 
strategic sale in 2 hotel units were in hand in 2003-04. In addition, the 
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process for offer of sale of Residual shares to public in BALCO and 
VSNL had been under negotiation with the strategic partner. 
Disinvestment in 2004-05 
During the year 2004-05, the goverrunent realized a sum of Rs. 
2,765 crore out of which the major receipt of Rs. 2,684 crore was from 
the sale of 43.29 crore equity shares of Rs. 10 each of National Thermal 
Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC) out of government of India holding. A 
sum of Rs. 64.81 crore was realized from the sale of shares to employees 
oflPCL. 
Disinvestment in 2005-06 
During the year 2005-06, government realized Rs. 1,569.68 crore 
from the sale of MUL shares to Indian Public Sector financial 
institutions and banks and employees. 
Disinvestment in 2006-07 
Nil, No disinvestment carried out during this period. 
Disinvestment in 2007-08 
New Delhi May 9, 36 bids were received for goveniment STAKE 
IN Maruti, including the ones from large state owned financial 
institutions, and banks and private sector banks and mutual funds. 
The bidders include life insurance corporation, corporation Bank, 
State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and Union Bank of India. 
While corporation bank has made the highest bid at Rs. 850 per 
share (for 1 lakh shares). Life Insurance Corporation has bid for 1 crore 
shares at Rs. 800 per share. LIC currently holds 8-10 percent stake in 
MUL. The allottees would be decided imder a French auction method. 
Wherein the highest bidder (in terms of price) would get priority on the 
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number of shares to be acquired followed by others as per the order of 
their bid price. 
Even if one were to go by the floor price of Rs. 760 per share, the 
government is expected to realize at least Rs. 2250 crore from the stake 
sale.lS 
Source:- Department of disinvestment, Annual Report for the year 2m3-04, 2004-05,2005-06, 2007-08. 
Table-22 
Realization from sale of all or part of the Residual Equity 
Disinveste< 
Bid Opening Date 
Bid Closing Date 
Floor price per share 
(inRs.) 
Price Cap per share (in 
Rs.) 
% of government 
equity prior to the offer 
% of government 
equity offered for sale 
Shares offered for sale 
(Crore Nos.) 
Ratio of bids received 
to shares offered (No. 
of times) 
No. of bidders 
allocated shcu-es 
Final price per share (in 
Rs.) 
Discount for Retail 
bidders 
Effective price for retail 
bidders 
Total Amount realized 
(Rs. Crore) 
Cumulative amount 
realized (Rs. Crore) 
i CPSEs 
MUL 
IPO 
2003-^ 
12.6.2003 
19.6.2003 
*115 
-
45.79 
27.51 
7.947 
8.92 
2.48 lakh 
125 
-
125 
993.34 
• 
companies during 
IPCL 
offer for 
sale 
20.2.2004 
27.2.2004 
170 
-
33.95 
29.95 
7.185 
4.9 
1.95 lakh 
170 
5% 
161.5 
1202.85 
-
CMC 
offer for 
sale 
23.2.2004 
282.2004 
475 
-
26.25 
26.25 
0.397 
11.30 
1.28 lakh 
485 
5% 
460.75 
190.44 
-
' 2003-04 \ 
ICI 
-
27.10.2003 
-
-
9.20 
9.20 
0.3761 
AJ 
205 
-
-
-
-
to May 20( 
MUL 
Private 
Placement 
Tranche-I 
2005-06 
5.1.2006 
11.1.2006 
620 
-
18.28 
8.00 
2.31 
1.78 
8 
**678.24 
-
-
-
-
37. 
Tranche-II 
2006-07 
27.4.2007 
8.5.2007 
760 
-
10.27 
10.27 
2.% 
1.12 
32 
**797.49 
-
-
-
6398.27 
* Face value was Rs. 5 per share. Face value of shares of other companies was Rs. 10 
** The average per share 
'^ Sold to Asian Paints India Ltd. 
Source:- Department of Disinvestment Report from 2003-04 to May 2007. 
each. 
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Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, the researcher observes that the 
disinvestment of Government Equity in Central Public Sector 
Enterprises began in 1991-92. Till 1999-2000, it was through sale of 
minority shares in small lots. From 1999-2000 till 2003-04, the emphasis 
of disinvestment changed in favour of strategic sale i.e. sale of a large 
block of shares along with transfer of management control to a strategic 
partner identified through a process of competitive bidding. After 2004-
2005, disinvestment realizations have been through sale of small 
portions of equity. Thus, the total proceeds from disinvestment between 
1991-1992 and 2006-2007 amounted to Rs. 6398.27 crore. 
' Sundaram, K.P.M, 'Indian Economy', pp. 518, S.Chand & company Ltd. 
2 Indian Journal of Commerce, Vol. LNo-191, June 1997. 
^ Pratiyogita Darpan 'Indian Economy 2003', Edition, pp. 81. 
^ Narain, Laxmi, 'Public Enterprise Management and privatization', pp-323. 
^ Misra & Puri, 'Disinvestment of Public enterprises', Indian Economy, pp- 205. 
^ Rajaram, kalpana, Spectrums Handbook of General Studies, Revised fourteenth edition 
2004, pp. 136, spectrum books[p] ltd. 
7 Misra& Puri, Op. Cit., pp. 205. 
8 Ibid., pp- 206. 
9 (i) Economic Survey (2002-03) 
(ii) Department of disinvestment report 1991-92 toMay 2007. 
'^ Economic Survey, Government of India, 1996-97, pp. 121. 
' ' Narain,Laxmi, 'Public Enterprise Management and Privatisation',s.chand co.ltd, pp. 300. 
12 Ibid, pp. 301. 
13 Ibid, pp. 302. 
14 Ibid., pp. 303. 
15 Ibid., pp. 304. 
1" Nanjandappa,D.M 'Disinvestment: Dimensions and Policy Imperatives', yojna December 
1998,Min.ofI&B. 
1' (i) The Economic Times Disinvestment Survey : 'One thousand ways to lose control in the 
economic times, March 21,2003 and 
(ii) Government of India economic survey, 2002-03, (Delhi 2003) Table 7.22, p. 149. 
(iii) Department of Disinvestment Report 1991-92 to May 2007. 
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POLICY IMPLICATION IN POST 
LIBERALIZED ERA 
A. POLICY IMPLICATION OF DISINVESTMENT IN 
POST LIBERALIZED ERA 
4.1a. DISINVESTMENT POLICY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
The whole policy of disinvestments has undergone a drastic 
change. Initially, it was one of offering a part of the equity to various 
private sector players both domestic and foreign. Now it is one of 
outright sale of majority shares to so call strategic partners, with a clear 
commitment to ultimately off-load the rest of the shares after a time lag. 
And with such a strategy, the anxiety of the present goverrmient to 
bridge the fiscal deficit is creating a situation of distress sale of public 
sector units to private hands. Therefore, it is no longer disinvestments 
policy, but clear-cut policy conclusive privatization. The whole 
privatization process has become an instrument of transferring public 
property to private hands for a song much to the detriment of the 
national interest and the industrial economy of the country in 
particular. And with the whole process, corruption is woven 
intrinsically. The very concept of privatization of public sector units and 
more so the blue chip ones, in itself is a bankrupt corrupt policy 
perception, treachery with the nation and fraud on the people of the 
coimtry. Therefore, we oppose this policy and demand its reversal. 
4.2a. The Policy to Wipe Out Public Sector 
Under the on-going drive of privatization, the Government has 
mainly targeted most of the blue chip profit making PSUs which were 
decorated with the classification of 'Ratnas'. Further, the most strategic 
sectors have been engulfed under the drive for privatization. Notable 
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among them are oil & petroleum, power, telecom, rail, road and air 
transport, ports & docks, airports and of course the financial sector. The 
game plan is to completely erase the public sector network from the 
industrial map of the country. The creation of a separate disinvestments 
ministry clearly demonstrates the present government's point of 
priority to completely destroy the public sector. This fact was reflected 
in the budget-speech (2000-01) of the uruon finance minister 
pronouncing that "Government have recently established a new 
Department for Disinvestments to establish a systematic policy 
approach to disinvestments and privatization and to give fresh impetus 
to this programme, which will emphasize increasingly on strategic sales 
of identified PSUs". 
As given above, when the government is desperately taking steps 
to wipe out public sector from the country, the mention in the agenda 
note that the Government strategy is "strengthening strategic imits, 
privatizing non-strategic ones" is nothing but travesty of truth. 
The Government has refused to recognize the strategic 
importance of the PSEs in energy, telecommunication and defence 
production sectors including the airports in protecting the economic 
sovereignty and even security of the country's independence. They 
have identified these CPSUs as non-strategic and selling them off 
chaotically. And after that talking about strategic and non-strategic 
sectors is nothing but extreme hypocrisy and self deception. 
Similarly, it is nothing but a stupid argument that "Price realized 
through the sale of minority stakes, was low as compared to price 
realized through strategic disinvestments ...". It is natural that 
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conclusive privatization is bound to fetch higher yields than off-loading 
of minority shares. The price differential is bound to be there between 
simple share holding and acquiring the ownership including whole sole 
control of the enterprise and its management which in turn open up 
host of private commercial interest to the buyer. On the other hand, the 
dangerous fall out of conclusive privatization is also colossal. Realizing 
higher price by so-called 'strategic sale of PSUs is short sighted and 
suicidal for the country. Therefore, there is no rational behind the 
suicidal steps of strategic sale of CPSUs, particularly the blue chips 
ones. 
The claim of the Government that "The concerns of the various 
Stakeholders are taken care of through the shareholders' Agreement 
(SHA), Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) and Parent Guarantee 
Agreement (PGA)" is not correct, except extending due and undue 
benefits to the private buyers, the strategic sale cause immense harm to 
all the nation, the people and of course the workmen. 
4.3a. Asset Stripping 
The Tata Tele Services Limited (TTSL) acquired 25 percent stake 
of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) from the Government at a price 
of Rs. 1,439 crore. The company further acquired another 20 percent 
stake of VSNL through open offer at a cost of Rs. 1,151 crore. Now, with 
45 percent stake. The TTSL has been handed over the total management 
control of the telecom giant. VSNL is a classic example of pre and post 
privatization asset stripping. 
Immediately prior to privatization, the Government compelled 
the VSNL to pay an abnormal 500 percent dividend and mopped up Rs. 
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741 crores against its 52 percent equity holding. The amount of 
dividend for the remaining equity of 48 percent worked out to Rs. 684 
crores. Further, the PSU had to declare a special dividend of 750 percent 
and pay to the Government an amount of Rs. 1,411 crores. Here again 
the amovmt of dividend for the remaining part of equity worked out to 
Rs. 1,025 crores. Thus, pre-privatization stripping game took away an 
amount of Rs. 3, 561.5 crores from the reserve of VSNL. The post 
privatization asset stripping has already been initiated by the Tata's 
with the decision to take away Rs. 1,200 crores from the reserve of 
VSNL. In the controversial May 28 meeting, the VSNL Board has 
approved the proposal to sale out part of the equity holding of VSNL 
with Intelsat and immarsat, which is expected to generate an amount of 
Rs. 1,000 for the company. The VSNL scandal has brought in to light 
how the public sector companies are looted both by the Government 
and the foreign and Indian private big business houses. Inferring from 
the Tata - VSNL episode it has been observed that in coming days, "we 
will see all other divested PSUs being stripped off their assets in the 
shortest possible time. They may end up dumped as sick companies. 
4.4a. The Fund Bank Design in Operation 
The Indian ruling polity cannot claim any originality in their 
disastrous design on the country's economy and her people. Each and 
every move is designed under the prescription of the World Bank and 
the IMF and at the behest of the imperialist powers and the 
Multinational companies. The world bank publication, called 'Research 
Report' and titled "Bureaucrats in Business" has already detailed out 
each and every step, the Indian rulers have been taking since 1991 to 
dismantle the public sector network in the country including the 
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various modalities of privatization. The publication also had written 
down with every detail the game plan to create downward pressure on 
wages of the public sector employees, curtail worker's rights, and stop 
industry - wise wage settlement and to make the PSUs an unholy 
destination by suitable policy engineering from Government level. 
It is amusing that the current model of outright privatization 
through strategic disinvestments' pursued by the Government has been 
copied from the World Bank prescription. The 'Research Report' of the 
World Bank has prescribed that "If potential buyers caimot raise the 
fimds, the enterprise can be sold in trenches with freedom to hire and 
fire. This is an important factor in successful management contracts. 
The message of the World Bank's guideline is loud and clear: tune your 
privatization strategy to the advantage of the potential buyers, the 
foreign and Indian corporate without bothering for the immense 
financial loss and harm to economic sovereignty caused to the country. 
Thus, it is clear to the country that the public sector is not guided 
by financial or managerial prudence but it is the ideological position 
taken by IHF/WB/WTO with rich coimtries led by united states 
pushing from behind, that there should be no public sector any where 
in the world. Private sector want complete command over the entire 
world economy and they would not tolerate even a token presence of 
PSU on their way. 
4.5a. Revival of Sick PSUs 
The Government has finally declared that they are not going to 
do anything for revival of the sick and loss-making PSUs, made to turn 
sick by the Governments' own discriminatory policies only. Such PSUs 
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are stated for closing down and decision of closure of eight public sector 
units have already been aimounced and for many more are actively 
processed by the Government. The irony is that the government is hell-
bent to close down those eight PSUs despite the fact that the cost of 
closing down (only on account of VRS to workers - Rs. 517 crores) is 
much more than the cost of revival (around 300 crores) as per proposals 
lying with BIFR. 
Besides the BIRF route, the Government of the day has also been 
trying to hasten up the closure process in respect of many PSUs by way 
of granting liberal permission for closing down through the labour 
ministry in exercise of the provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act. 
And while doing so the central Government did not bother to even 
consult the concerned state Governments. 
4.6a. Manual on Disinvestments & Strategic Sale Agreement 
On the basis of the experience of disinvestments in the last 
decade in more faithful tune with the World Bank guidelines, the union 
ministry of disinvestments has brought out a "Manual on 
Privatization". By the said manual, the process of drain on national 
wealth through fast track privatization as prescribed by the World Bank 
has been sought to be systematized and legitimized with deceptive 
posture of transparency. While dealing at length various methods of 
valuation of the PSUs under sale, the manual recommends a particular 
method - The discounted cash flow method (DCF), which ensure price 
fixing for the PSUs imder sale at a low level, without any consideration 
of its huge asset base and replacement cost, solely to the advantage of 
the prospective buyers. 
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The said manual published by the Disinvestments ministry has 
squarely discarded the asset valuation method which could capture the 
real value of the huge national assets created by the public sector 
industries over a long period. While recommending the Discounted 
cash flow method (DCF), the manual went a step a head to advise that 
the prospective cash flow to the company imder sale must also capture 
for discoiint the future (after sale) presumable cost for modernization, 
capital replacement, market etc that may be incurred by the new owner, 
which would lead to assessment of the 'cash flow' at a lower level and 
facilitate low pricing to facilitate the prospective customer. 
The love and affection of the Government of the day at the centre 
for the private business is further exposed in yet another document 
published by the ministry of disinvestments 'imderstanding The 
strategic sale agreement'. As if the under valuation and other undue 
concessions granted while transferring the national assets to the private 
buyer for a petty cash are not enough, provision has been made to pay 
cash 'reward' in the name of 'post closing adjustment'. The perception 
of the government has been expressed in the statement of the 
disinvestments minister Anm Shourie to the financial express on 
07.03.2002: "This means that the Government could actually end up 
paying private bidders to rid itself of loss making PSUs, now a concrete 
example is the sale of Paradip Phosphates Ltd. (PPL). PPL has been 
privatized and purchased by the sole bidder Zuari - Maroc combine at a 
cost of Rs. 151.7 crore against the reserve price of Rs. 176 crore. Taking 
advantage of the "Post closing adjustment" clause, Zuari - Maroc has 
claimed an amoimt of Rs. 190 crore from the Government. Thus, the net 
outcome of the privatization deal is the private business combine got a 
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PSU plus a cash gift of Rs. 39 crore. In the deal of modern foods, the 
Hindustan Lever also got some money under the same consideration. 
So was the case of ITDC hotels deal where an amount of Rs. 27.5 crore is 
being returned to the buyers.^ 
4.7a. Deliberate Statistical Distortion 
It is important to expose thoroughly the game of defaming the 
CPSUs with alleged 'inefficiency' with the help of false formulations 
and twisted projection of facts and figtires by the privatization lobby. 
The return on the total investment, return on the equity and the 
payments on account of interest on loans, taxes and duties paid by the 
CPSUs are not clearly shown. Thus, a distorted picture is painted about 
profit earned and total contribution to Government exchequer made by 
the PSUs. To conceal the truth and to hoodwink the people of the 
country, the break up of equity and loans in the total investment of the 
government in the entire public sector is kept under cover by the 
advocates of privatization while pleading their case.The aimual reports 
of public enterprises survey[2000-01] shows that the total investment in 
CPSUs as on 31.3.2001 is Rs. 2,74,114.00 crore, which consist of a total 
paid up capital of Rs. 86,152.00 crore and long-term loan of Rs. 1, 
84,777.00 crore plus Rs. 3, 185.00 crore share application money. 
Further, the share of the central government in the total equity amount 
is Rs. 71,864.00 crore and in the total long-term loan is Rs. 48,977 crore 
only. 
4.8a. Contribution to the Exchequer 
It has been correctly observed that, "PSUs provide good returns 
to the government in many cases, which will disappear once the 
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enterprises are sold"2. As would be eviderit from the discussion below 
that the CPSUs have been contributing to the central exchequer in a big 
way on an ever increasing scale as against the reverse situation of ever 
increasing default of the private sector in this matter. The other financial 
manipulation apart, the ever increasing defaulting track record of the 
private business in the matter of payment of taxes and duties to the 
governments and repayment of loans taken from the public sector 
banks and financial institutions and the indulging role of subsequent 
governments, is too well known to the people of the country. The long-
run dangerous impact of dismantling the public sector in the matter of 
revenue earnings of the govenunent is a very important question that 
requires consideration. The fund bank dictated policy of privatization 
carried out by the NDA government is nothing but frittering away of 
revenue earning assets and consuming the capital for addressing the 
fiscal deficit. This is what has been rightly termed as 'selling the family 
silver to pay the butler'. 
Along with the desperate move of privatization the 
disinvestments mirustry has been carrying on a tirade against the public 
sector. In fact, almost all the debates in parliament on public sector 
witnessed a harmful campaign by the ministers and government 
spokesman against the performance of the public sector industries 
while justifying wholesale privatization. It is disgusting that the note 
circulated by the labour ministry noted, "Private sector has matured in 
to vibrant sector, the public sector has been reduced to a symbol of 
inefficiency", but what is the reality. In their own parameter of stock 
market status, it is pertinent to note, "Among top 200 companies quoted 
in the list of stock exchanges, 32 were identified as central PSEs. Their 
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market cap is placed at Rs. 1, 21, 226.00 crore, which exceeds the total 
investment of 246 PSEs. The equity total Rs. 17,778 crore. During the 
capital of these 32 organizations decade of 1991-92 to 2000-01 central 
PSEs mobilized over Rs. 1,39654.00 crore of total extra budgetary 
resources which is more than total capital invested by the government 
so far by way of both capital and loans (Chairman, SCOPE - July 2002). 
Is this not a shiiming example of performance? The financial 
performance of the public sector if judged from the above facts and 
figures, it clearly establishes how it intentioned and unfounded is the 
claim of union ministry of disinvestments that in the matter of "price 
earning ratio .... privatized enterprises generally perform better than 
state enterprises". In the year 2000-2001 the net profit earned by the 
PSUs is Rs. 15,653 crore which is 18.17% of equity share capital and 
14.16% of return on capital employed which is no way inferior to 
private sector, if not superior in many cases. Compared to the previous 
year the net profit has increased by 9.22%. The total contribution of the 
PSUs to the exchequer on account of corporate tax, excise duty, customs 
duty and other duties, dividend and interest on loan etc. for the year 
2000-2001 is Rs. 60,977.97 crore. It would be worth noting that the 
unpaid outstanding from the most favored private sector on account of 
corporate tax, income tax, custom duty etc was more than Rs. 60,000.00 
crore. In the same year, the PSUs also generated gross internal resources 
to the tune of Rs. 37,802.00 crore.3 Here it will be befitting to quote from 
an editorial note, "Not only can PSEs, match private sector companies 
(in performance), they can even do better over time. The chrorucally 
visceral critics of PSEs ought to shed their tinted glasses" .^  
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Further, it must be ensured that the return on the total 
investment, return on the actual equity capital and the contribution to 
the exchequer under the nomenclatures of dividend, interest on loans, 
host of taxes and duties paid by the PSUs, must be properly spelt out 
while calculating the financial contribution to Government exchequer 
and the total return on actual investment. 
Moreover, there are other socio-economic contributions of CPSUs 
those must be taken in to consideration before jumping in to the too 
much simplistic and slanderous advocacy of 'price-earning ratio' with 
the motive to discredit the CPSUs. Some immeasurable contributions of 
the CPSUs in the socio-economic fields of the country are: ancillary 
industries development, overall development of rural areas, special 
programmes for welfare and rehabilitation of physically handicapped 
and mentally retarded persons, ecological balance, promotion of 
cultural and sports activities, preservation of Indian' heritage and 
culture etc.5 very rightly, it has been noted that, "Any study of the 
benefits flowing from the central public sector enterprises to the 
economy will remain incomplete if these contributions (socio-economic 
and welfare measures, promotion of balanced regional development) to 
the state economies are not taken into account" .^  Ignoring the shinning 
records and significant contribution to the government exchequers by 
the CPSU, the impudent pen pushers, serving the cause of big business 
houses, advocating dismantling of the public sector and making too 
much noise of imaginary efficiency of the private sector, better take 
lesson from the aforementioned efficient record of performance of the 
public sector in our country. 
4.9a. Current Targets: The cash-Rich PSUs: 
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The blame of inefficiency attributed to the so-called sick and 
'uneconomic' PSUs are also nothing but a plans to justify the closure of 
such PSUs. Had that not been so, then why the most efficient and profit 
making PSUs are being privatized. It is evident that whether loss 
making or profit making, good or bad record of performance, the 
onslaught of Fund Bank dictated policy of closure and privatization of 
public sector shall spare none is mainly raised by the critics of 
disinvestment. It has been aptly said that, "what is shourie's argument? 
PSUs are loss making, therefore profit making PSUs should be the first 
to be sold.'' 
The Government has been repeatedly projecting the performance 
records of the comparatively weak PSUs to justify the privatization 
policy. However, the interesting fact is that the recent past cases of 
privatization and the ones lined up for the forthcoming period, are all 
profit-making cash-rich public sector companies. Indian Petrochemicals 
Corporation Ltd. (IPCL) has been handed over to the Reliance 
Industries Ltd. (RIL) own by the Ambanies. While RIL has acquired the 
controlling share of IPCL at price of Rs. 1,491.00 crore, at the time of 
privatization the IPCL had an amount of Rs. 2,946.13 crore as reserve 
and surplus. The sterlite group has acquired the equity and 
management control of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (HZL) at a price of Rs. 
445,00 crore and the PSU has a reserve fund of Rs. 737.00 crore and 
estimated asset base of around Rs. 10,000,00 
crore, [kaleidoscope,march,2002] 
Infact, the CPSUs which are under current prioritized initiative of 
the Government for privatization are from among the top ten profit 
making public sector companies with huge invertible surplus and 
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belong to very important sectors of the economy namely: oil, power and 
Telecommunication. The two cash rich profit making oil PSUs which 
are in the advanced stage of privatization are Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
(HPCL). These two CPSUs together have earned a profit of Rs. 1,908.13 
crore in the year 2000-01. 
4.10a. The International Experience 
To derive justification of the privatization policy of the 
goverrunent, the labour ministry note has observed that 'Countries all 
over the world .... Started declining in the role of the state in 
commercial activities and privatization of the state owned enterprises". 
Privatization did take place in different countries of the world. But the 
policy of privatization has ruined the economies of many countries and 
the process of reversal has already started. 
The International experience of the privatization is very much 
shocking. Argentina is one of the countries went for large-scale 
privatization under the dictate of the fund-bank in the initial period. 
The economy of the country has gone bankrupt as an after effect of 
privatization. The number of job losers has reached to a devastating 
figure of around 2,80,000 on an average per month the unemployment 
figure has gone up to around 30 percent. Starving people have come out 
on the street and food riots are taking place. The government revenue 
has gone dov^ni by 29 percent; GDP has been reduced by 16.3 percent in 
the first three months of 2002. There are many more such examples. The 
baiikruptcy of the policy of privatization has already started to surface 
glaringly in many countries in the world signaling a reverse process. 
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The failure of the policy of privatization is also evident from the 
increasing popular opposition across the globe-Seattle - Genoa - Doha -
Washington and so on. 
The countries which pioneered privatization during the last 
decade and half have silently started a reversal process. The power 
sector in the state of California in USA, was privatized into multiple 
companies had created such a mess that the government had to take 
back the control again. Amongst the advanced capitalist countiies. 
Great Britain was identified as the 'showcase' in the matter of 
privatization. British experience would be better evaluated with the 
experience of privatization of two vital industries, railways and coal 
mines. The British railways were privatized in 1984. On 8 * October 
2001 Rail Track, the biggest of the private rail company in Britain went 
into official liquidation and the British Government had to take it over. 
The cost for the British Government to reorganize the railway system 
could be as much as 21 billion pound starling. The Rakesh Mohan 
Committee has suggested privatization of Indian Railways along the 
lines of Britain. The Government will have to take a decision whether to 
learn any lesson from the costly British experience or blindly follow the 
suit of Mrs. Thatcher. In 1987, the Thatcher Government transformed 
the National Coal Board into the British coal and the newly 
corporatized entity was given a mandate to privatize the coal mines. 
The story of subsequent ruination of the British Coal is too well known. 
In the process, about 1.5 lakh coal workers have been thrown into the 
street. The present move of the government to privatize the coal mines, 
if imposed upon, "a major industry in India is bound to become extinct 
in the same way as it happened in Britain". Same is the story of 
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privatization of Airlines in New Zealand, where after a visible mess in 
the entire Airlines the government re-nationalized it. There are many 
such examples spread all over the world to show the utter failure of the 
policy of privatization. The irony is that the leading capitalist economies 
of the world - the USA, the UK and others are prescribing the wholesale 
privatization for India and other developing countries disregarding the 
failure in their own countries. The claim and counter claim, the support 
and opposition apart, either we learn from experience or pay the price 
for the neglect. 
4.11a. Workers Worst Affected 
The background note circulated by the labour ministry has 
projected that the post privatization danger of retrenchment and 
detrimental change in service condition is totally unfoimded, but the 
reality is different. 
Contrary to the promises of the Government, privatization of 
CPSUs involves reduction of workmen. Such reduction takes place both 
immediately before and after privatization, as we have seen in the case 
of 'asset stripping' in the VSNL. To cite an example of pre- privatization 
reduction of workmen, let's take the case of Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
(HPCL). These two PSEs have drawn plan to reduce the number of 
workmen by arotmd 4,000. The aim of such reduction is to shape the 
PSEs slim to attract private buyers has been admitted by the Director of 
BPCL who said, "The VRS was part of efforts to cut cost and make 
the company leaner - a leaner orgaruzation would attract better 
valuation" .8 ]n fact ever, since the govermnent has launched the 
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privatization onslaught, the management of CPSUs under orders from 
the Government has been reducing the workmen. The labour ministry 
note itself has mentioned "during last ten years, the workforce in the 
public sector undertakings has reduced from 2.3 million to 1.7 million". 
In BALCO, most widely noticed case of privatization, several hundred 
workmen has been retrenched after privatization. In IPCL 400 workmen 
are being dislodged and further "Reliance has identified 2,000 excess 
staff at the vadoda plant alone". So far as the question of wage revision 
is concerned, the experience of the CPSU workers in privatized 
companies is very bad. The big claims by the Ministry of 
Disinvestments citing the example of wage revision of the BALCO 
workers is rather a case of deprivation. It is a case of suffering and not 
rejoicing. The wage revision was kept pending by the Government 
keeping in mind the impending privatization. Further, "the guaranteed 
benefit of 20% of basic pay" is one of the lowest in a profit making 
company like BALCO. During its entire period in the public sector, 
BALCO workers never got such a paltry wage rise. In fact, in many 
CPSUs the workers got guaranteed benefit of more than 80% of basic 
pay. The ex-gratia payment of Rs. 5,000 referred in the note of the 
ministry is in lieu of the unpaid wages of the workers on an average 
amounting to Rs. 15,000 per worker and hence got gratis from the 
management. The experience with Modem Foods. ITDC Hotels, Maruti, 
VSNL are more or less same. The Hindustan lever Ltd. (HLL) 
management have declared that the acquired modem food employee 
shall continue to get less pay than the HLL employees. An executive of 
the company is quoted "we will not pay a modern foods employee the 
same salary. If, however, we recruit a new employee and post him at 
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modem foods, he will get the same compensation as his Hindustan 
Lever Coimterparts". In case of workers in the privatized ITDC hotels, 
there has been a "Cut in their overall compensation due to some perks 
getting nixed post disinvestments".' 
As is generally the case in the private sector, rampant violation of 
labour laws and blatant refusal to trade rights is seriously confronted by 
the workers in the post privatized era. Unable to bear the insult and 
humiliation in the hands of the new private sector management, case of 
suicide has also been reported. 
4.12a. Need for Referendum on Privatization Policy 
The economic reform and for that matter, the dismantling of the 
public sector is carried out by the successive governments keeping the 
mass of the people rather in dark. It is imfortunate that the national 
asset built with public money and at the cost of the sweat and blood of 
out a nation wide public debate. Even the pro-reform forum has noted, 
"Reforms have been debated in the English language in parliament and 
in elite forums of discussion, but even though India had two 
parliamentary elections since 1991, reform have not been thrust into 
electoral politics as a major issue", (India in the era of economic reform, 
Harward University, 1996). 
The government while spreading Canard against the trade union 
movement in the public sector opposing the dismantling of public 
sector claim that they have peoples support in their policy of privatizing 
the public sector industries. That such claim of the government is 
baseless is exposed from the foregoing observation. Further, it is 
relevant to mention that a referendum was held among the public 
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sector workers on 11*^ January 2000, seeking their opiruon on the 
government policy of privatization. The referendum evoked 
unexpected response from the workers and overwhelming majority of 
the PSU workers gave their opinion against privatization and supported 
the strike against the Anti PSU and Anti-National policy of the 
Govenunent. 
There are examples of referendum in other countries on such 
issues. In Uruguay, a referendum was conducted on the question of 
privatization, 73 percent of the people voted against the move of 
privatization. Yet another example is Peru, on the issue of privatization 
of mining of copper, silver and gold in the Tambo Grande valley in 
Peru a referendum was orgaiuzed. An overwhelming 95 percent people 
expressed their opposition to the proposal. 
It is analyzed that in our country also a referendum should be 
conducted to take the opinion of the people on the government policy 
and steps of privatization of public sector. 
B. Issues of Disinvestments in post liberalized Era 
The disinvestments of public sector companies has always been 
accompaiued by vociferous protests on the ground that the country is 
selling off valuable 'Crown Jewels' each phase of disinvestments has 
been mirred in controversy. Allegations of irregularities and corruption 
fly furiously as political parties, analysts and government audit 
agencies leap in to the fray. As a result, disinvestments has been carried 
out in fits and starts with the government of the day caught between 
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compulsions of raising revenue and the equally urgent need to protect 
itself from corruption charges. 
4.1b. Selling Profit Making Public Sector Enterprises 
The Government's decision to sell 10% of its stake in NALCO 
meets with stiff resistance in Orissa. On June 22, the Cabinet Committee 
on Economic Affairs (CCEA) announced the decision to divest 10% of 
the governments' stake each in National Aluminum Company Ltd. 
(NALCO) and the Neyveli Lignite Corporation (NLC). The sale would 
result in government equity in NALCO falling to 77.15 percent. 
The reactions of the governments of the two states where the 
companies are headquartered were swift. Orissa chief miiuster Naveen 
Patnaik wrote to the Prime Minister asking him to review the decision. 
His party, the Biju Janta Dal (BJD) launched an agitation in the state. 
The Union Finance Minister Mr. P. Chidambram said, "that the 
proceeds of the sale of 6.4 crore NALCO shares would go to the 
National Investment Fund (NIF), which will be managed, by the Life 
Insurance Corporation (LIC), the state Bank of India (SBI) and the Unit 
Trust of India (UTI). 
Mr. Chidambram further said that the two companies "will very 
much remain Public sector units because the overwhelming majority of 
shares would still be owned by the government. He mentioned that the 
proceeds from NALCO and NLC disinvestments would go to the NIF, 
While 75 percent of the returns earned by the NIF would be spent on 
social sector programmes, the remaining would be spent on revival of 
viable PSUs. Union Minister for mines Sir Ram Ola said, "We are 
against disinvestments of profit making PSUs under the mines ministry. 
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and NALCO has been doing reasonably well. However, we have agreed 
10 percent stake in the PSU, but money accrued from the 
disinvestments should be reinvested in NALCO. 
In Orissa, NALCO employees struck work at the three main bases 
of the company. And in Delhi, the central trade unions attacked the 
move strongly. Dipankar Mukharjee secretary, centre of Indian trade 
unions (CITU) said that the disinvestments move could be used by 
Nalco's competitors to gain entry into the company. 
Mr. Chidambram, had earlier said that Nalco, which had 
performed admirably, ought to be a Navratna, a status that would give 
it greater autonomy. 
The aluminum industry in India is oligopolistic in nature. There 
are three main players, Nalco being the only countervailing force to the 
other two Hindalco, which is part of the Aditya Birla group, and the 
Vedanta group. Both companies have demonstrated their eagerness to 
acquire companies to enhance Market shares. They have also shown 
their eagerness to acquire Nalco if and when it is placed on the block. 
Nalco's stellar performance raises more questions about the 
governments' motives. Why would the government want to dilute its 
stake in a company that gives it fairly good returns? Between 200-01 
and 2005-06 the company's sales have more than doubled, gross profits 
have almost trebled. Moreover, the govenunent has earned almost Rs. 
1,500 crores as dividend from the company in the last six years. The sale 
of 6.4 crore shares at the current market price will fetch the goveniment 
Rs. 1,429 crores. Letting the stock market set the value of the stake is 
risky and sure to generate controversy. A month ago, before the market 
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crashed, the Nalco share was trading at Rs. 335. At that price, the 
government's 10 percent stake would have been valued at Rs. 2,157 
crores, suggesting a notional loss of Rs. 728 crores if the stake is sold at 
the current price. The wide range in values in the space of a few weeks 
only indicates just now hazardous - and controversial - the process of 
valuation can be. 
Nalco has undertaken significant expansion in capacity in the last 
few years. Phase-I of the expaiision programme, which was completed 
in 2004, was undertaken at a cost of Rs. 3,700 crores. The second phase 
is set to cost the company Rs. 4,091 crores by the time it is completed in 
2008. Nalco has stopped drawing anything from the union budget for a 
long time. However, the sale of equity in a growing company raises 
several questions. How can the company's intrinsic value be computed 
when it is regularly ploughing profits for exparision in the future? 
Nalco is a zero-debt company with reserves of more than Rs. 4000 
crores. 
Shivaji Patnaik, the veteran CITU leader who heads the 
federation of trade unions in Nalco said that the fight to save Nalco has 
caught the popular imagination because the company is one of its kind 
in Orissa. Nalco is the only publicly owned integrated aluminum 
producer. More important, its entire operation - from mining bauxite to 
smelting ore to finished aluminum production is done within the state. 
The spin-offs are substantial, especially when seen in the context of the 
fact that most private industries mine ore and take it out of Orissa, 
deriving the state of value addition and the prospect of employment 
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generation. No wonder the move is often characterized as an assault on 
oriya pride. This explains the posture of strident opposition that the BJD 
has adopted.io 
4.2b. Birth of a Monopoly 
The acquisition of the public sector Indian Petrochemicals 
Corporation Limited by the Reliance Group threatens to unleash a 
domineering monopoly in the Indian Petrochemical Industry. Reliance 
winning bid for the 26 percent stake of the government, at a price of Rs. 
231 a share and aggregating Rs. 1.491 crores, effectively makes it a 
monopolist in the petrochemicals business. 
Reliance's wirming bid was way ahead of the other two bids. 
While the public sector petroleum major. India oil corporation Ltd. 
(lOCL), bid Rs. 128 a share, Nirma better known as a soap-maker, 
offered Rs. 110 a share. After the wirming bid was aimounced on May 
18, the disinvestments Ministry revealed that the adviser on the IPCL 
deal, UBS Warburg, had presented the government with four 
alternative valuations based on four different methods. The evaluation 
committee of the government fixed the reserve price at Rs. 131 a share 
by valuing the company on the basis of the discounted cash flow 
method. The total cost of Reliance acquisition would be Rs. 2,641.45 
crore. Including the mandatory 20 percent open offer that it has made at 
the same price of Rs. 231 a share to public shareholders. 
Established in 1969, IPCL represented India's attempt to develop 
self reliance in the field of petrochemicals. Until then the Indian market 
was dominated by multinational companies such as Hoechst, ICI (then 
the imperial chemical industries) and union carbide. The economies of 
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scale associated with the industry and its capital intensive nature were 
significant barriers to the entry of private firms. 
By 1979, IPCL had established the first integrated petrochemical 
manufacturing complex at Vadodara in Gujarat. Several state-owned 
companies among them lOCL, the state trading corporation and 
engineers India Ltd. provided crucial support to IPCL at this stage. In 
the early 1980s, IPCL established its second plant at Nagothane, to use 
natural gas from the Bombay High oil fields as a feedstock. In the early 
1990s the company established its third complex at Gandhar in Gujarat. 
As a result of the takeover. Reliance gains control of IPCL's two 
gas based crackers with a total capacity of 700 lakh tones per annum 
and one naphtha based cracker with a capacity of 130 lakh tonnes per 
annum. 
J.P. Margon has welcomed the acquisition, pointing out that "the 
new petrochemical giant will wield pricing power in the Indian 
petrochemical products market". Infact, an interesting aspect of 
Reliance own reaction to the fears of monopoly dominance after the 
merger is that it addresses the concerns of IPCL's shareholders the 
public at large and its own shareholders in two different voices. It has 
sought to alloy the public's fears of a rising monopoly by arguing that 
the threat of "freely importable". Petrochemicals and the governments' 
commitment to reduce tariffs will restrain Reliance's ability to impose 
prices on consumers. It has also highlighted the distinct in between 
dominance and "abuse of dominance", which it says is what is bad for 
business. 
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Since December 2001, prices of products in the IPCL - Reliance 
portfolio have increased substantially. Between December 2001 and 
February 2002, the price of polyester staple fiber (an old Reliance 
mainstay) increased from Rs. 42,000 a tonnes to Rs. 48,000 a tonne in 
February. Polypropylene prices increased from Rs. 37,000 to Rs. 43,000 a 
tonne in the same period. Polyethylene prices also increased by a 
similar magnitude during this phase. 
The valuation of an acquisition is always difficult, but when the 
takeover establishes a monopolist, it is even more so. This is because the 
merge entity is capable of setting the price in the market without 
challenge. The privatization process will remain controversial as long as 
public sector companies, particularly those that hold the commanding 
heights" in their areas of business, are sold to monopoly interests. The 
price just cannot be right because the valuation cannot account for 
monopoly power. 
Although Reliance has issued statements including one from Anil 
Ambani, RIL managing Director - to the media, welcoming the 14,000 
workers in to "the family", the staff say they have not heard anything 
first hand. A general Manager at the IPCL, headquarters in Vadodara 
remarked "what you tell us is what we know". Referring to the IPCL 
disinvestments, he added that "these were share holders' decisions, 
taken at the Ministry level". 
The sale of IPCL imder the stewardship of disinvestments 
minister Arun Shourie must have been doubly sweet for the Ambanis, 
the family that controls the Reliance Group." 
4.3b. Under Valuation of Public Sector Units 
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An important and perhaps most critical issue in the process of 
disinvestments or privatization of public sector units is valuation. Be it 
disinvestments of 1991-92 or that of BALCO in 2001, Valuation has 
always been at the core of controversy. This is because there are several 
methods of valuation and different methods yield widely varying 
results. 
Disagreement on the pricing is one of the major reasons for 
sluggishness in disinvestments programme in India as different people 
put different values on the public sector uruts leading to suspicions and 
controversy and consequent confusion. 
The government had sold 51% equity of profit earning public 
enterprise BALCO (Bharat Aluminum Company) to a private company 
SIL (Sterlite hidustries Ltd.) for Rs, 551.50 crore. A lot of hue and cry 
was made in 2001 by the BALCO employees, Chhattisgarh government 
and opposite groups in the parliament. Trade unions launched a strike 
and complaints about wrong valuation of assets voiced in the Media. 
According to them the real worth of BALCO was Rs. 965 crore. The Net 
result was that industry was forced to shut down for days leading to 
damaged equipment in the smelter and resulting in loss to the 
company. 
The deed, which was scheduled to be signed in February 2001 but 
due to strong objections of the opposition, government decided to have 
debate on the issue in the parliament. After the approval of the 
parliament the deed between the government and SIL was signed on 
March 2, 2001 and SIL presented a cheque of Rs. 551.50 crore to the 
government. After signing of this deed, the control and management of 
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BALCO got transferred to SIL and the promoter of SIL Mr. Anil 
Agarwal took the responsibiUties of chairman and managing director of 
BALCO. According to the conditions mentioned in the deed, BALCO 
caimot traiisfer its 51% share in equity to any other party for the next 
three years while the government is free to sell its 49% share but the 
first right to buy this government will go to SIL itself. BALCO 
employees and Chhattisgarh government opposed this deed. But the 
Supreme Court in its order dated December 10, 2001 validated BALCO 
disinvestments. 
In the BALCO, case some people thought that the price realized 
from sale of 51% share of BALCO was reasonable, others thought that 
price realized was only a fraction of the real value and the deal smacked 
of scam and corruption. 
The other case, which was recently under controversy, was the 
undervaluation of Airport Centaur Hotel. The airport Centaur Hotel at 
Mumbai, which was bought from the government by Batra Hospitality 
for a sum of Rs. 83 crore early this year, was resold to the Sahara Group 
for Rs. 115 crore six months later, which works out to be a capital gain 
of Rs. 32 crore or an annualized return of T7%. This is more than the 
profits made by the Hotel during its entire life. In a sense, 
disinvestments have ended up handing over the country's wealth to 
private parties. Similarly HPCL was sold for Rs. 243 against the market 
price of Rs. 550 crore. NLC was sold for Rs. 11 crore against the market 
price of Rs. 82 crore. 
Another aspect which makes the valuation as sensitive issue is 
that disinvestments of public sector units involves transfer of 
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ownership of public assets to private individuals and any suspension 
on account of valuation can give the impression that undue benefit has 
been given to the buyers who are private individuals at the expense of 
public exchequer.i2 
4.4b. Growing Politicization and Intransparency in the Process of 
Disinvestments 
The major area of uncontrolled policy-making has been 
disinvestments especially since 1998. This 'bonanza' dispensation came 
in various forms. It was not always clear what the disinvestments were 
for? To offload loss-making commercial mistakes? To raise revenue? Or 
to simply sell national resources? 
One of the biggest sales of the last half century is the plan to 
'privatize' the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and the 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited through sale of shares. Amidst 
considerable publicity, the Attorney General, Soli Sorabjee opinion was 
sought. Mr. Sorabjee declared that the disinvestments of HPCL and 
BPCL could take place without reference to parliament. 
In September 16, 2003, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
governments' decision to sell the shares of these companies to private 
parties without parliamentary approval. In the court the Government 
pursued its usual public policy argument that just as the Maruti and 
BALCO sales were matters of Public policy, so were these investments 
which were good for the nation and the public interest. The union's 
counsel pointed out that the de-regulation of the petroleum industry 
was already taking place and referred to the authorization to Reliance 
and Essar in certain critical areas. This raised other questions not 
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brought to the fore. Who was the government dismantling its 
petroleum apparatus for? But since the government got away with 
disinvestments imder the broad banner of public policy, it expected the 
court to permit it to do so again. But justice Rajendra Babu's judgement 
in this petroleum case not only stopped the disinvestment, but also 
added important insights into questions of disinvestments generally. 
Thus, the growing politicization and intransparency in the 
processes of disinvestments, especially in the case of BALCO, HPCL 
and BPCL has marred the objectives of the policy. 
The government had taken an in principle decision to privatize 
HPCL and BPCL in February 2002. Due to difference between within 
the government and more especially, between the disinvestments and 
petroleum ministries on the quantum of shares to be off-loaded and the 
mode of sell-off. 
After four-month old political impasse ended when the 
government announced that HPCL will be sold to a strategic investor 
while BPCL sell-off through public offerings in the domestic and 
international markets. Public sector companies have been barred from 
bidding for HPCL. The government has decided to sell 34.01 percent in 
HPCL to a strategic investor. Another 5 percent will be given to 
company's employees.^^ 
4.5b. Disinvestment Programme at a Crossroads 
The debate over the appropriateness of one method over the 
other is far from over and is at the core of the opposition to 
disinvestments. 
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Two separate announcements regarding the sale of government 
stake in banks and central public sector undertakings appear to be 
related but they are not. Other than the basic fact that the govenmient, 
the Majority shareholder in both cases is not willing to cede control, that 
is bring down its shares to below 51 percent in a PSU or a bank, the 
objectives of the two announcement differ enormously. 
In fact there is very little common between the public sector 
disinvestments programme and the dilution of a bank's public sector 
character through a stock sale by the government. The decision not to 
let the government stake fall below 51 percent in a public sector bank is 
not surprising at all. Unlike a PSU sale, the dilution in a PSB was 
intended to boost its capital adequacy, an issue that has come to the fore 
in the light of the new Basel norms. 
4.6b. Banks on Different Footing 
Most Public sector banks were funded by the government. The 
NDA government had thought of reducing the goverrunent stake to 
33.33 percent while maintaining their public sector character". In two 
banks, oriental bank of commerce and Dena Bank, the government 
stake is below 51 percent. In other banks, there is still room but that 
may not be enough to increase their capital adequacy. In four banks 
central bank of India, Indian Bank, imited bank of India and Punjab and 
Sind Bank, the government owns 100 percent of the capital. The 
disinvestments programme, one of the important components of the 
economic reform programme since the early 1990s, usually refers to the 
sale of government stake in public sector enterprises under central 
government control. 
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While several states too have their own versioris of 
disinvestments, it is the programme at the centre that has been 
identified with the reform agenda and is in many ways the most 
controversial of all its items. We can say that the disinvestments 
programme has been beset with not just one but a number of 
controversies right from inception. The methodologies chosen by the 
government have drawn plenty of flak. So much so, on many occasions, 
the chorus of criticism directed at one particular method was 
mistakenly perceived as a condemnation of the entire programme. 
4.7b. Row over Strategic Sale 
The latest government announcement clarified by the Finance 
Minister is about shutting out one method, namely the strategic sale 
route while keeping alive the other option of selling its stake in tranches 
with the objective that the government holding should not fall below 51 
percent. The armouncement refers to 13 PSUs, all profit making and 
identified by the NDA government as candidates for strategic sales. 
Strategic sale involves the sale of a large chunk of the unit's 
shares to a strategic investor who takes control of the management too. 
The method was adopted with a fair amount of success. Beginning with 
modem foods, the government sold a number of PSEs such as BALCO, 
VSNL and CMC through this route. 
Expert opinion, including that of the disinvestments commission, 
supported the decision to rely on strategic sale in preference to the offer 
for sale route. In terms of realization to the government. It can be 
argued that this route will fetch more. Since the strategic investor is 
obliged to make an open offer to the non-government minority 
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shareholders (after entering into an agreement with the government) 
the control premium will be shared equitably by all shareholders. 
4.8b. Fear of Privatization 
However, strategic sale came to be associated with privatization. 
It was contended that the unit will cease to be in the government fold. 
As the present controversy over the strategic sales of the two Centaur 
Hotels shows, this method will be successful only if its nuances are 
articulated properly. In a strategic sale, the conventional valuations 
involving concepts such as asset value, profit earning capacity and so 
on are useful but the allegation of subjectivity has remained. Especially 
in cases like the Centaur Hotels where there were few or just one bid. 
Finally, ideological objections to the change in ownership from 
the public to the private sector can never be wished away. 
The shelving of the strategic sale route in 13 profit making 
companies, therefore, has not come as a surprise. It is possible that the 
government may still find a way to Gamer political support and sell 
small lots of shares in these profit making PSEs without ever 
countenancing a dilution to below 51 percent.^ -* 
4.9b. Timing Issue of Disinvestments: (Airlines disinvestments nms 
into rough weather) 
There were some controversial issues in the disinvestments of 
Air India and Indian Airlines that the government has ignored. For one, 
the draft of the shareholders agreement, the share purchase agreement 
and the guidelines came just on the eve of the call for financial bids, 
leaving room for litigation by disqualified companies. Secondly, the 
government has discounted meeting with seven trade unions of Air 
149 
India, where a categorical assurance was given on the grievances of 
19,000 employees, mostly concerning retrenchment and protection of 
salary and perks. Despite assurance, the government has only offered a 
safety net of a year and shares at par. The most emphasized offer is, of 
course, the VRS at the pre-disinvestments level. 
The government also ignored the issue of its global advisor, J.M. 
Morgan Stanley's chairman having a brief stint as director of the Tata-
owned India Hotel Groups. There are appreheiisions that the 
connection might influence the valuation of the airline on which the 
reserve price would be based. The figure doing the rounds is about Rs. 
6000 crores. If that is correct, then the 40 percent equity for the strategic 
partner would allow the partner to buy stake at a price just above Rs. 
2400 crores, which would at best be enough to purchase 3 or 4 aircraft. 
However, an internal assessment by Air India puts its value 
between Rs. 15000 and Rs. 20,000 crore. The Rs. 3,250 crore debts on Air 
India that the Government talks of is the term loan incurred for the 
purchase of aircraft over the years. But there seems to be a strong 
political will to justify the sale of Air India by undermining it and 
playing on its drawbacks. The fact that the Maharaja was one of the top 
players till the government started interfering in its day to day 
ftmctioning - the demand on its limited fleet for Hajj and W I P travel 
and the virtual ban on purchase of new aircraft has been lost in the 
cacophony for disinvestments. 
In contrast, after a freeze on revising bilateral air services 
agreement for two years, the government went on a signing spree in 
2000 to the advantage of the new strategic partner. Moreover, there is a 
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more now to lower the price of the aviation turbine fuel (ATF) for Air 
India by removing the high rate of domestic sales tax on it. If that is 
done, then the strategic partner would make an annual saving of about 
Rs. 1000 crore in operational costs. This was not done for the 
nationalized Air India, but is now being done for privatized Air India. 
There are also appreher\sions about the sole bidder, Tata Group's 
partner, Singapore Airlines, being owned by the Singapore government 
and whether the new partnership will not give access to a foreign 
government. It must be understood that the first rate Singapore Airline 
is cash rich and is looking for profitable ventures to invest in. It has 
eyed India for a few reasons, one to make India a hub for its operations. 
Secondly, to gain access to various destinations all over the world 
through the bilateral that will pass on to privatized Air India and 
thirdly, to pick up traffic. 
When the centre set out to disinvestments in Air India and Indian 
Airlines, the market was showing signs of growth. But suddenly there 
has been a slump. Capacity is available and fares have fallen. Also, 
about seven airlines are up for sale in the world, including three Latin 
American Airlines and Iberia of Spain, Malaysian Airlines, Thai 
Airways and Ansett of Australia. But there are no takers. In that sense, 
it is good time for bidders to buy, but bad time for the government to 
sell.15 
4.10b. Debating India - Disinvestments Designs 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, incorporated in 1964, is India's 
leading producer of power generation equipment and a pioneer in the 
field. Over the years, it has faced competition from multinationals and 
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symbolized self sufficiency in its area of expertise. However, its fortunes 
took a turn for the worse after the government announced its new 
power policy in 1991. The policy, aimed at wooing foreign capital, 
proved not orily controversial but also costly, as the Enron affair has 
demonstrated. Despite these disadvantages, BHEL has managed to stay 
afloat in the face of a hostile policy environment. In 2004-05 the 
company had a turnover of Rs. 10,686 crores, an increase of about 22 
percent over the previous year and made a net profit of Rs. 1,003 crores 
against Rs. 658 crores the previous year. 
Reports indicate that while the department of disinvestments had 
initially proposed to sell 16 percent government stake in BHEL, the 
department of heavy industry gave approval for offloading only 10 
percent. 
The left greeted the move with protest leaders of the left parties 
insisted that they had been kept in the dark. Dipanker Mukherjee, 
communist party of India member of the Rajya Sabha, said his party 
had stated its opposition to the disinvestments of the government stake 
in BHEL in its pre-budget memorandum to the Finance Minister. 
To recall Chidambaram of the commitment in the common 
minimum programme (CMP) to desist from privatizing profit-making 
PSUs the memorandum referred specifically to BHEL as a case where 
there ought to be no disinvestments. 
The CCEA mandated a book-building route for the 
disinvestments. After several rounds of creeping disinvestments in the 
company, the government now holds 67.72 percent stake in it. The 10 
percent disinvestments amounts to offloading about 2.2 crore shares 
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foreign institutional investors have cornered a substantial portion of the 
shares that are not in the hands of the government. 
Chidambaram's defense has centered on two counts. First, he has 
argued that the disinvestments did not violate the coalition dharma as 
enshrined in the common minimum programme. He asserted that the 
CMP provided for the sale of shares to retail investors. He also argued 
that the CMP required the government to find ways to revive ailing 
PSUs. His second set of arguments centered round what he proposed to 
do with the money mobilized through the sale. 
He said that the money collected by the sale of BHEL equity 
would remain off Budget. The money is to be deposited in the national 
investments fimd. Chidambaram said that fimd managers would 
ensure that 75% of the funds shall be utilized for health and education 
and the remaining portion shall be used for reviving sick PSUs. 
Chidambaram also said that the proposed stock-split would 
ensure that small investors and BHEL employees would be able to 
acquire them. This approach, justifying that disinvestments would be 
used for laudable purposes, begs important questions. 
First, why should BHEL, a company already suffering at the 
hands of a government that exposes it to unfair foreign competition, be 
used for what the govenunent ought to do anyway? BHEL has already 
suffered in recent tenders for power projects. It has been imable to 
compete with foreign companies, which enjoy the advantage of zero 
import duty on finished equipment. Critics have also pointed out that 
the disinvestments, even if only partial, makes things uncertain for the 
company, its employees as well as its clients. 
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Second, how does the company plan for the future when there is 
no certainty about who the owner is going to be a few months or years 
down the road? The most serious problem relates to the fact that 
investments in the company's future are likely to be affected seriously. 
The owner (the govt.) may well see little rationality in investing in the 
company when it is going to be bought by a private company in the 
near future. 
Third, why should a publicly owned company be used to pay for 
dubious objective of rewarding small investors and its employees? In 
fact studies of privatization have shown that positioning disinvestments 
as an "investor friendly" measure is used by governments to deflect the 
flak that privatization attracts for selling public assets at throw away 
prices. Shares parked in the hands of small investors could come in 
handy to private investors who may acquire control of the company 
later if and when it is sold outright. Shareholders who acquire a BHEL 
share would only be too willing to sell their shares for a small premium 
to a company that acquires a controlling stake in the company later that 
would be a cheap option for the acquirer as well. 
The other justification for the sale that it would find schemes for 
education and health or the revival of ailing PSUs is also seen as a 
cynical excuse. Critics argue that the government could have raised 
taxes for these schemes instead of milking its own company.^^ 
4.11b. TTL Controversy and the Larger Issues it poses Regarding the 
Ongoing Disinvestment Process: 
Controversy continues to dog the union governments' 
disinvestments programme and ensnared in it are some of India's 
154 
leading corporate entities. The latest involves the Tatas, one of the 
country's oldest and biggest business groups, which in February 2002 
acquired Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), one of the public 
sector crown jewels. The controversy erupted as soon as the Tatas 
announced that VSNL would invest Rs. 1,200 crore in one of its own 
group companies in the basic telephony sector, Tata Tele Services Ltd. 
(TTSL). The union cabinet was divided, amid speculation that it was a 
reflection of an ongoing corporate tussle over how the Indian 
telecommunications pie was to be divided among private corporate 
entities. 
The principal protagonists in the cabinet were minister for 
communications and information technology Pramod Mahajan and 
minister for disinvestments Arun Shourie. Home Minister L.K. Advani 
played the role of mediator in the drama. After prolonged negotiations, 
Pramod Mahajan made peace with the Tatas. The Tatas annoimced that 
they would go ahead with the plarmed investment of VSNL fimds in 
TTSL, amid growing unease that the issue that Mahajan had raised, 
citing the public interest, remained largely uriresolved. The only 
concession made by the company was its acceptance of a government 
nominee in the committee to monitor VSNL's investment in TTSL. 
Soon after the Tatas' announcement Mahajan responded with the 
charge that the Group was indulging in "asset stripping". He alleged 
that the more violated the spirit of the deal that the Tatas had struck 
with the government when the former handed over its 25% stake in 
VSNL to the Tatas as a strategic partner". Mahajan claimed that the 
VSNL board's decision was made in haste and that due processes were 
not followed. 
155 
On May 28, 2002, the VSNL board decided to invest up to Rs. 
1200 crore in the shares capital of TTSL. The group claimed that the 
"Strategic" investment will be in tune with the company's initiative to 
reach out to the end-customers. The Tatas claimed that the move would 
enable VSNL, which did not have any end-customers in the basic 
telephony segment, to establish "forward Integration". 
Pramod Mahajan was quick to object to the investment Mahajan 
said that the two goverrunent. Nominees would be issued show cause 
notices to explain their conduct at the meeting of the VSNL board. 
Officials in Mahajan's ministry said: The Tatas have no right to transfer 
resources from VSNL to any of their group companies without seeking 
permission from Department of Telecommunication (DOT). 
Critics allege that Mahajan's claims to be acting in public and 
national interest are not justified by the marmer in which VSNL was run 
in the last couple of years before the Tatas gained control of it. First, the 
deadline for the end of its monopoly on international traffic was 
advanced to April 2002 from 2004. VSNL was also prevented from 
establish in a cellular telephony facilities. Ironically, the reason cited 
was that BSNL and MTNL were already allotted the licence for the third 
operator in the circles. While every other Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
could obtain a licence for a mere Rs. 1 to establish operations anywhere 
in the country, VSNL was not allowed to expand beyond the six cities. 
In another twist to the controversy, the VSNL sale was challenged 
in the Delhi high court. In a public interest petition filed in the Delhi 
high court, R.K. Maheshwari, an advocate representing the forum for 
peace and justice, argued that the VSNL sale was violative of the 
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constitution. He argued that the deal violates constitutional provisions 
that governed the transfer of land immovable properties of VSNL. 
The political controversy over the Tata - VSNL affairs is 
perceived to be a proxy war between two of the biggest industrial 
houses in the country. Reliance and the Tatas. While Mahajan has 
attacked the Tatas, Shourie has defended the group on the grounds that 
it was well within its rights to do as it pleased with VSNL's reserves. 
Sections of the BJP leadership also took sides in the controversy until 
Advani stepped into settle the issue amicably. 
The VSNL disinvestment was the first "big ticket" sale of a public 
sector company. A significant feature of the three instances of strategic 
sale of public sector companies - of VSNL, IBP and Indian 
Petrochemicals corporation limited (IPCL) - has been that there were 
few bidders. The VSNL disinvestments started off with six bidders. 
However, as the process unfolded there were just two players - The 
Tatas and the Reliance group. The Tata bid for VSNL was higher by Rs. 
92 crores.i7 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, the researcher observes that the 
disinvestment policy adopted as a matter to restore budgetary balance, 
after the crisis in 1991, has undergone a shift from offering a part of the 
equity to various Private Sector players both domestic and foreign to 
strategic partners as a means to overcome the inefficiencies. 
Disinvestment could not gain much momentum and secure high 
revenue due to a number of issues which cropped up during the 
implementation of disinvestment programme in India like imder 
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valuation of public sector units, birth of monopoly, growing 
politicization and intransparency in the process of disinvestment, 
selling of profit making public sector units etc. are some of the 
important issues which need to be solved and good future strategy is 
the need of the hour to make the disinvestment programme productive 
in India. 
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5.1. Company Background 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) was incorporated in 1986 as a 
public sector enterprise to cater to overseas conununication services. In 
2002, the Indian government privatized VSNL and the Tata Group 
acquired a controlling stake in the company. VSNL is India's largest 
player in international long-distance services and has a strong pan-
India presence in domestic long-distance services. The company 
operates landing stations, undersea cables. Managed services, leased 
lines and data centres across India. It also runs a network of earth 
stations, switches and submarine cable systems and offers international 
telecommunications services including mobile, IP and voice services. 
VSNL is the world's largest international wholesale carrier with 
more than 415 direct and bilateral relationships with leading 
international voice telecommunications providers, providing more than 
17 billion minutes of international whole sale voice traffic annually. It 
was the first telecom services provider to acquire the TL 9000 
certification globally. The company provides connections to over 400 
mobile operators world wide. It is also the principal provider of 
signalling conversion services to enable GSM roaming to and from 
North America.i 
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a) VSNL Traffic 
In 2001, the world international telephone traffic was 167 billion 
minutes (voice and data, April 18, 2002). India's was 1.6% of this global 
traffic. In comparison with VSNL, the two largest ILD carriers in the 
world, world OM and AT & T carried 16.8 and 14.3 billion minutes 
respectively in 2000. Compared with a world wide average of 145 
outgoing international minutes per person, the figure for India works 
out to 18 corresponding figures for developing countries and low 
income countries are 100 and 155 respectively (www.worldbank.org). 
Table 1 compares VSNL's international minutes with that of the world. 
VSNL during the period averaged a much higher growth rate. 
Table - 23 
International outgoing calls VSNL and World (Billion minutes) 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
AGR1994 
to 2000 
VSNL 
0.742 
0.942 
1.147 
1.384 
1.684 
1.935 
2.245 
20.3% 
World 
54.6 
61.6 
71.7 
82.5 
93 
108.9 
132.7 
15.9% 
Source: (1) WWW. Telegraph.com 
(2) VSNL Annual Reports 
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The ratio of inbound to outbound calls had been 4 :1 in 2001. One 
important reason for this is the discriminatory pricing by VSNL. 
Another factor is that India is a much poorer than the typical countries 
to which it connects (US, Europe and Gulf). So that inbound calls are 
bound to be more than outbound calls. This issue is dealt with in detail 
in the section on Accounting Rate Reform (ARR). As per industry 
estimates in India, about 80% of the international telephone traffic was 
from corporate users for the year 2000-01, the total revenue for VSNL 
stood at Rs. 64,307 crore. The profit after tax stood at Rs. 1,778.8 crore. 
This resulted in an earning per share of Rs. 62.41 out of which Rs. 50.00 
was declared as the dividend per share. VSNL had no debt. Its P/E 
ratio of each VSNL share was 4.68. It is seen that a large part of the cost 
is the network and transmission charge. Much of this were charges paid 
out to the DOT as traffic costs. In this fixed revenue agreement, VSNL 
paid Rs. 2,734 crore to DOT and Rs. 1,386 crore to foreign operators 
during 2001 (VSNL Annual report 2001). 
b) Products and Services 
VSNL till recently was the monopoly provider of ILD. It also 
provides specialized services such as internet, Tr up-linking, direct to 
Home (DTH) etc. After the recent disinvestments to a strategic partner, 
the domestic long distance (DLD) sector has also licensed to VSNL. This 
is however been accompanied by the loss of monopoly in the internet 
and ILD sectors. 
There has been a change in the service pattern of VSNL over the 
years. Private internet services provides (ISPs) have been expanding 
rapidly and have overtaken the earlier dominant market share of VSNL 
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out of the Rs. 2050 crore revenue generated by ISPs, VSNL earned only 
around Rs. 300 crore in 2001 (www.ispai.com) 
c) Investments 
VSNL had invested in globally promoted projects like 
international undersea cables and satellite commurucations including a 
sum of US$150 million in ICO global communications (holdings) 
limited. ICO aimed to provide global mobile personal communication 
services. On August 1999, ICO filed for bankruptcy and the amount 
invested has been considered as a write off. Rs. 33 crore were also 
written off, on accoimt of the failed investments in Iridium's Indian 
operations. This was expected to be part of the Iridium satellite system 
which was planned as a global fully mobile satellite voice and data 
solutions provider enabled by a set of constellation of 66 low earth 
orbiting satellite. Due to various problems, the plan never took off. 
VSNL also held a 2.02% and 5,4% share respectively in Inmarsat and 
Intelsat. Inmarsat was the world's largest commercial satellite 
communications provider and Intelsat has a network of 21 satellite 
offering telephony corporate networks, Internet and Broadcast services 
world wide. The majority of international carriers use the accounting 
rate revenue division procedure promulgated by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) for revenue sharing for incoming and 
outgoing calls. 
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d) Accounting Rate Reform 
There has been a growing imbalance between incoming and 
outgoing calls in the united states due to interalia to lower priced 
international calls originating from there. In August 1997, the US 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued on order 
establishing benchmarks with which US carriers needed to comply for 
establishing accoimting rates with non US carriers (Jan. 2001). As a 
result the accounting rate of US carriers with VSNL came down from 
$0.425/minute to $0.340/minute in 2000-01. In India, international 
prices did not fall at the same pace. This resulted in increasing 
imbalance between incoming and outgoing traffic leading to increasing 
disbursements from the US through the international accounting rates 
system. US carriers reduced their settlement rates by about 11% after 
seeking a 25% reduction during 1997-98. That decline was compensated 
by a revenue increase of 17% in response to rate declines for 
international calls. Given the size of the payments that needed to be 
made by the US to India review of the accounting rate system and its 
consequents impact on VSNL's revenue was important. US based 
companies contributed 38% of the total revenue of VSNL in 2001 (VSNL 
Annual Report 2000-01), in 1997 VSNL had 64% of its revenue coming 
in from settlements. 
With the opening of the ILD sector, there is a further reduction of 
rates increasing the outgoing calls to the US and UK. For example, 
Bharti has already slashed the international tariff to Rs. 24 a minute. 
This would reduce the income from settlement rate due to VSNL. The 
revenues of VSNL were expected to experience a downward impact 
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following this decision. VSNL had been protected from changes in 
accounting, settlement and collection rates by virtue of its 
interconnection agreement with DOT (Later BSNL). The agreement 
effectively allowed VSNL to retain approximately Rs. 10 per minute for 
both incoming and outgoing calls Since VSNL passed on the balance 
revenues to DOT as network charges and a decline in accounting rate 
revenues meant lower revenue surpluses for the DOT. As a part of the 
privatization package, BSNL and MTNL were required to route their 
international traffic through VSNL for another two years, contingent on 
VSNL continuing to offer the best deal available. However, due to rapid 
development in the sector this policy is not clear as the government had 
agreed to allow BSNL and MTNL in ILD. 
e) WTO 
Under WTO's basic telecommunication agreement by February 
2002, nearly three fourths of the outgoing traffic originated in cotmtries 
that had at least two international operators, while India was to review 
VSNL's monopoly in 2004. Under pressure from the WTO, the 
monopoly was removed in 2002, with the removal of restraint on ILD, 
any communication consortium could set up landing points in India 
and go in for direct agreements with basic land line operators. This 
meant that VSNL would lose any privilege it might have had as a 
dominant player in the Indian segment. It was also expected that in the 
liberalized market atmosphere in the wake of WTO imposed situations. 
The present complex system of accoimting and settlement rates may be 
replaced by cost sharing on a market dictated basis. 
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Table-24 
Share Capital History of VSNL 
Dates 
19.03.86 
01.04.86 
March 91 
06.02.92 
Jan-Feb. '92' 
1994-95 
27.03.97 
04.04.97 
Feb. 99 
May 99 
Sept. 99 
15.08.00 
24.11.00 
Particulars 
Allotted as purchase 
consideration for assets and 
liabilities of OCS 
Allotted as purchase 
consideration for assets and 
liabilities of OCS 
Shares of 1000/- each 
subdivided into shares of 
10/-each 
Bonus of 1:3 issued to Govt, 
of India 
12 million shares divested in 
favour of Indian Financial 
institutions by GOI @ 
123/share 
2,382,529 shares transferred 
to divested parties as bonus 
shares 
VSNL raised its share capital 
by way of GDR issue and 
also GOI divested in GDR 
markets @ US$ 13.39 per 
GDR equivalent 1000/- per 
share 
VSNL raised its capital by 
way of GDR issue green shoe 
option @ US$ 13.29 per GDR 
equivalent 1000/- per share 
10,000,000 shares divested by 
GOI in GDR markets @ US$ 
9.25 per GDR equivalent to 
786.25/- per share 
3,96,991 shares divested by 
GOI by way of offer of shares 
to employees of VSNL @ 
294/- per share locked in for 
a period of 3 years. 
1,000,000 shares divested by 
GOI in Domestic markets @ 
750/- per share 
Listing of ADR's on NYSE 
Bonus shares in the ratio of 2 
:1 
No. of New 
Shares 
126 
5,99,874 
20,000,000 
12,165,000 
2,835,000 
-
190,000,000 
Total No. of 
Shares 
126 
6,00,000 
60,000,000 
80,000,000 
80,000,000 
80,000,000 
92,165,000 
95,000,000 
95,000,000 
95,000,000 
95,000,000 
95,000,000 
2,850,000,000 
Nominal 
Value of 
Shares 
1,26,000 
600,000,000 
600,000,000 
800,000,000 
800,000,000 
800,000,000 
921,650,000 
950,000,000 
950,000,000 
950,000,000 
950,000,000 
950,000,000 
2,850,000,000 
Source:- VSNL Annual Report (2000-01) 
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Table-25 
VSNL Stock holding pattern as of March 31,2001. 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Category 
Central Government 
including nominees of the 
president of India 
Indian Public Financial 
Institutes and Mutual 
Funds 
Indian Nationalized Banks 
Foreign Financial 
Institutions 
Foreign Companies (shares 
held by Bank of New York 
or depository for ADRs 
Non-resident individuals 
Other Indian Corporate 
Bodies 
Others (including 
employees) 
In transit demat shares 
No. of 
Shareholders 
3 
64 
13 
137 
1 
202 
1,548 
66.303 
-
Voting 
Strength 
52.97 
6.78 
0.08 
7.82 
29.22 
0.02 
0.68 
1.96 
0.47 
Source:- VSNL Annual Report (2000-01) 
f) Domestic Developments 
The central government's policy of disinvestments has evolved 
over the last ten years. It started with the selling of minority shares in 
1991-92 and today continues with the emphasis on strategic sale (Baijal 
2002). Many of the government owned PSUs were known to be 
inefficient. Many others with their commercial profits may also not 
have been efficient owing their profits to either their monopoly 
positions or administered prices, such secure arrangements were no 
longer possible with the WTO related agreements for opening up of 
several sectors coming in to force. 
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The ministry of disinvestments cited the non-availability of funds 
for critical areas like education, health and social ir\frastructure because 
of fiscal burden in the flow of government fimds in to PSUs, as a strong 
argument for the disinvestments. There was also a need to stem further 
outflow of resources in to unviable, non-strategic PSUs. The 
disinvestments was also expected to reduce the unmanageable public 
debt. 
Distributing government held stock to the public can help 
investors to directly enjoy the benefits of ownership. Even as their 
pressures helped to improve performance. However, the perception 
was that such an approach did not usually bring about efficiencies and 
effectiveness in management as it was usually not accompanied by 
management change. Strategic sale was viewed as a way to increase the 
valuation of a company and also to bring in private capital and 
managerial acumen into the organization. Importantly, it was also 
necessary to separate the policy making and operational responsibilities 
of the government, which otherwise caused a clash of interest and an 
unhealthy environment for competition. Especially in areas of 
infrastructure that required some kind of regulation. This approach 
paved the way for the political acceptance for the strategic sale of 
VSNL. 
5.2. Prior Disinvestments 
When the privatization process of VSNL began in 1991-92, there 
was no blueprint for the same. In retrospect, there have been three 
phases (1) the offloading of shares to domestic investors (2) the 
offloading of shares in the international market (3) strategic sale. 
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In 1991-92 VSNL disinvested equity of the face value of Rs. 12 
crore in favour of various financial institutions, banks and the public 
held another 15%. The shares were listed in the stock exchanges of 
Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi and Chennai. As of 1995, the share of the GOI 
had come down to 82.02%. This accompanied the transfer of shares 
from the GOI as a bonus offer. The Indian investors share holding 
remained around 16.5% in 1999-2000 which came down to 9.97% as on 
March 31,2001. 
5.3. GDR Issue 
The Global Depository Receipt (GDR) issue for VSNL was the 
first of its kind by the GOI. It helped VSNL to raise a substantial surplus 
that was earmarked for investments for its Growth. The first GDR issue 
(Listed on the London stock exchange) was offered in 1996-97. It fetched 
US$526.6 million in the market. At that time, it was the largest GDR 
issue from India. The offer was oversubscribed, drawing 662 investors 
from 28 countries. 
The second GDR issue was completed in February 1999. It 
involved disinvestments of 10 million shares by the government of 
India to international investors. Priced at US$9.25, it was at a 15% 
premium on the last closing domestic price of Rs. 682 and a 10% 
discount to the ten-day average GDR price of US$ 10.275. The 
government realized US$ 185 million from the sale of 20 million GDRs 
with each GDR being equivalent to half a share. 
The organizational problems in VSNL around the time of the 
second GDR issue could have been one of the factors that led to lower 
valuations. During the process of the second GDR issue, the VSNL staff 
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had threatened a walkout owing to the pending issue of allotting shares 
to employees. Due to delays in the government processes, VSNL did 
not have a chief executive and many other crucial director level posts 
were vacant. The first GDRs investment promises were not fulfilled and 
a promised domestic offering had not been made. The sanctions against 
hidia also created an environment of high perceived country risk which 
lowered VSNL's valuation. 
5.4. Sale of Strategic Partner The Valuation 
The government had fixed a reserve price of Rs. 1,218,375 crore 
for its 25% stake in VSNL. In an effort to bolster the VSNL valuation, 
the government of India limited (GOI) intended to compeiisate the loss 
of monopoly through special concessions. The government owned 
MTNL and BSNL would have to use VSNL as their ILD carrier for two 
years on the condition that it would offer the most competitive terms in 
the market. VSNL would also get a free license to provide NLD and a 
nationwide ISP license. In addition VSNL possessed prime real estate in 
Mumbai and Delhi and also cable capacities to facilitate international 
traffic. One of the major assets was the cash stock pile of Rs. 5,182 crore 
which was considerable even after disbursement of the special 
dividends. Among the concerns were the loss of monopoly and the 
uncertainty of the loyalty of BSNL and MTNL to continue to use VSNL 
for their international traffic, the dipping share prices of VSNL and the 
falling accounting rates that could lead to lower revenues. 
One of the major issues involved during the valuation process 
included the management of real estate owned by VSNL. The 
disinvestments process stipulated that at least four VSNL surplus 
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properties valued at Rs. 778 crore would not be available and were to be 
disassociated from VSNL after the disinvestments. Even so, real estate 
value that would accompany. VSNL was around Rs. 1,200 crore. 
(Economic Times, February 15,2002). 
For the government going in for a strategic sale was better than 
the previous market offloading option as strategic investors were likely 
to pay a higher price than financial investors. There was also a pressing 
need to bring in a fresh, market oriented approach to the organization 
in the changed economic situation. As stated by the former union 
disinvestments minister Arun Shourie, VSNL had reserves of about Rs. 
4500 crore with a 'bank check' given by the cabinet to enter new 
businesses and prepare for the loss in monopoly. The fact that it had 
failed to do so was a clear indication of the lethargic decision-making 
and the constraints of continuing to be a state owned enterprise. The 
sense of urgency given the potential loss in value, due to the annulment 
of its monopoly status and the threat of internet telephony ensured that 
the government acted promptly in executing the disinvestments 
process. 
5.5. The Bidding Process and after 
Companies, joint ventures and consortia interested in 
participating were required to have a net worth of Rs. 2500 crore. The 
net worth of only those promoters was to be counted who had more 
than a 10% equity stake in the total equity of the company. The SEBI 
takeover code required that the strategic partner would come out with 
an open offer for an additional 20% stake. The strategic partner was 
expected to bring in expertise and managerial acumen. 
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The bid was open to international parties but did not draw any 
interest because of the 49% capital of foreign direct investments in the 
telecom sector. GDRs and FIIs already accoimted for 38% of VSNL's 
equity capital that left only a remaining 11% for the foreign company. 
This left out foreign firms like MCI world com, France Telecom, 
Telecom Italia, BT and AT & T, who had shown interest earlier among 
the domestic players, the initial 7-8 players who showed interest were 
paired down to Reliance and the Tata Group by the time the bidding 
process began. In choosing between prospective strategic partners, the 
government way to pay due attention, interalia, to the security 
requirements of the country. 
The Reliance Group Bid Rs. 1,347 crores, loosing out to the Tata 
Group bid of Rs. 1439 crore. The Tata bid for the 25% stake worked out 
to Rs. 202 per share as against the then prevailing market value of Rs. 
168 per share. The total realization from VSNL was expected to fetch the 
government Rs. 3,689.25 crore after factoring in Rs. 1,887 crore as 
dividend and Rs. 363 crore as dividend tax. The Rs. 1300 crore required 
for the extra 20% stake were obtained through zero coupon non 
convertible debentures backed by guarantees from Tata sons and Tata 
power. After disinvestments and the acquisition of equity by the Tatas, 
the government share had dropped to 26%, The Tata group had 45% 
and an extra 1.97% had been disbursed to employees. Most of the Tata 
acquisition of 20% stake in the open market came from the foreign 
holders.2 
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5.6. Tatas Hit Jackpot with VSNL 
The Tata group seems to have hit a jackpot by acquiring strategic 
stake in Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL). According to analysts, 
with one stroke, it will be able to be a dominant player in the 
International Long-Distance (ILD) and internet services, even as it is 
readying to make a foray in the National Long Distance (NLD) segment. 
The group already has a presence in the cellular and the basic services, 
making it the first fully integrated telecom player in the country. 
While its rival in the VSNL bid - Reliance has for long been 
talking of being the first such player in the Indian market, its ground 
operations are yet to take off. It has a limited basic and cellular network, 
which is operational, its internet, NLD and ILD services have not yet 
seen the Ught of day. 
Bharti, the other big player, does not have presence in the ILD 
segment, having opted out of the race for VSNL a couple of months ago. 
It does have a sizeable cellular and internet presence, even while its 
basic and NLD operations are in the take-off stage. Analysts noted that 
having acquired control over VSNL, the Tata group will now be able to 
synergize all its existing operations even as it can cut cost by availing 
itself of the concessions being granted by the government for early 
termination of the monopoly on ILD services. 
The financial benefits given to VSNL include a five year 
reimbursement of license, entry and revenue sharing fees and 
exemptions from performance bank guarantees, all which the Tata 
group will get. What is more, VSNL has also planned to go full steam 
ahead with its NLD services, ii\stead of picking up a license for the 
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same, the Tata group can now avail itself of this shortcut. The group 
had earlier made a tentative investment of Rs. 1000 crore, for rolling out 
these services. This could now be scaled down considerably. 
As regards basic services across the country, at present it offers 
the services in Andhra Pradesh, and is due to roll out new operations in 
the four circles of New Delhi, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Kamataka. 
Meanwhile in the internet segment, it was earlier proposed to merge 
Tata Internet Services Ltd. with its basic services operation. This was 
being considered in the light of the plans for offering broadband 
services in all its circles of operations. 
However, since VSNL is the market leader in this business with a 
share of about 50 percent in the major cities, the internet services of both 
these companies could be merged. 
VSNL already has a ready internet subscriber base of 6.6 lakh, 
having rolled out ISP services in the four metros and its own internet 
nodes at 18 cities. The Tata internet services network is now present 
across 32 cities in the country.3 
5.7. VSNL Enters Tata Family 
The Tatas formally acquired 25% equity stake in Videsh Sanchar 
Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) by signing the shareholder's agreement with the 
government. 
Mr. Ratan Tata, Chairman of the Tata Group, handed over a 
cheque for Rs. 1,439 crore to Mr. Pramod Mahajan, Union Minister for 
Parliamentary Affairs, Information Technology and Communications. 
The Tatas can now have four directors on VSNL's reconstituted board. 
They are Mr. Ratan Tata himself as VSNL's non-executive chairman. 
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Mr. S.K. Gupta, reaffirmed as VSNL's managing director and Mr. N. 
Srinath, CEO, Tata Internet, who joins as executive director. 
Mr. Tata at the first board meeting of VSNL said disinvestments 
at VSNL was "a vindication of the government's intent to privatize 
major comparues". 
VSNL will be integrated into the telecom plans of the Tatas "we 
will develop those synergies over the next few days or weeks. By and 
large, we will try to find synergic solutions", Mr. Tata said when asked 
how he proposed to handle the separate internet services of VSNL and 
Tata Nova. Speaking to newspersons after signing the agreement, he 
said that a committee would be set up to oversee the larger process of 
integrating VSNL. From the Tatas' side, Mr. Srinath may head the 
committee. There are no plans to introduce any Voluntary Retirement 
Scheme (VRS) at VSNL. In a presentation on the telecom sector, Mr. 
Kishore Chauker, Managing Director, Tata Industries, said that the 
Tatas aimed to capture a significant market share of the 25 million 
subscribers in the private sector from a total base of 85 million forecast 
for 2006.4 
a) 10 - lakh Block Deal 
VSNL shares registered an increase in volumes as well as price on 
the bourses. Total Shares traded on the Bombay stock exchange after the 
disinvestments of VSNL were 21.46 lakh and on National Stock 
Exchange (NSE), traded volumes were 21.76 lakh shares, up from 6.35 
lakh shares. A dealer said there was a block deal of 10 lakh shares on 
BSE other deals were of smaller quantities. 
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b) The New Board 
VSNL has informed the Bombay Stock Exchange of 
reconstituted board. According to its statement, the new board consist 
of Mr. Ratan Tata - Chairman, Mr. S.K. Gupta - Managing Director, Mr. 
N. Srinath - Director (operations), Mr. Sadhana Dikshit - Director, Mr. 
Rakesh Kumar - Director and Mr. N.R. Narayana Murthy - Director. 
Mr. Rajneesh Gupta, Director (Network) and Mr. R.S.P. Sinha, 
Director (Finance) have resigned. 
"The holding of the Government stands reduced to 27.97 
percent", the statement said.^ 
c) The TTL Controversy 
The controversy over the TTL investment began when the VSNL 
board (under Tata management) decided to invest Rs. 1,200 crore in 
TTL. The Tatas justified the decision being part of the effort to extend 
VSNL's activities to the basic services customer. The investment was to 
be made over 3-4 years for a 20-26% stake in the company. TTL was 
planning projects worth Rs. 8,247 crore over the next four years with 
equity amounting to Rs. 4,325 crore. Out of this, the Tata group was to 
put in Rs. 2,552 crore, VSNL was to put in Rs. 1200 crore and Rs. 573 
crore were to come in from non Tata sources. The union 
commimications minister (Mr. Pramod Mahajan) objected to the 
decision. To him it was unethical that the Tata group was using up cash 
reserves of VSNL to fund its own subsidiary. In miiuster's perspective, 
TTL was a new company that was yet to prove itself. In his opinion, if 
VSNL wanted investment in basic services, BSNL and MTNL might 
provide better opportunities. The ministry had threatened legal action if 
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it were not able to persuade the VSNL board to reverse the TTL 
decision. The government also had the option of forcing VSNL to pay 
dues worth Rs. 1,050 crore to BSNL as pass through charges for using 
BSNL's network. The ministry of communications (MOC) as well as 
some other sources felt that VSNL's investment in TTL was based on an 
over valuation.* 
The Tata led management has decided to sell 75% of its holding 
in Intelsat and 100% of its holding in Irunarsat. The revenue from 
hitelsat/Inmarsat for the year 2000-01 was Rs. 115.6 crore. The sale of 
stock in these companies is expected to fetch VSNL Rs. 1200 crore. 
Apart from the realization of this amount from the sale, the Intelsat-
Inmarsat sale is also expected to help open other competitively priced 
options for VSNL for meeting its satellite commuiucation requirements. 
Others are 2.6% in Netherlands passed New Skies satellite NV, lOCOM 
cable (Chennai-Penang), South-East Asia - Middle East-Western Europe 
2 (SE-ME-WE-2) optic fibre connecting 14 countries of the regions, and 
the SE-ME-WE 3 cable that cormect 39 countries. 
After some deliberations between the MOC and VSNL, the 
government had indicated that if a higher stake of around 50% in TTL 
were to be available (at the same price) then it would not have any 
objection to the investment. 
Legally though, the Tata group was well within its rights to 
move. According to the companies Act, strategic partners were free to 
utilize cash reserves of public sector units. The disinvestments ministry 
also did not forsee any future change in the shareholders' agreement 
with respect to use of company reserves. The unnecessary spat that 
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developed led to a drop in the share price of VSNL from 188 on May 28, 
2002 to 161 on June 10,2002. 
t 
d) Issues on Disinvestments 
1. Does Disinvestments Lead to a More Efficient Public 
Expenditure 
During the last two years of strategic disinvestments, only 1% of 
the governments equity of face value Rs. 744 crore had been sold. The 
government had recovered Rs. 7,164 crore from these sales. 
Goverrunent of India's borrowing rate is 10%. Hence, this realization 
would lead to a benefit of Rs. 721.96 crore to the country every year in 
perpetuity. As against this benefit, the dividends received by the 
government on its equity, which had been sold, averaged Rs. 23.17 crore 
during the last eight years. However, some of the companies were loss-
making, leading to an overall out go of Rs. 102.83 crore from the 
goverrunent for the maintenance of its PSUs. This worked out to an 
annual real benefit to the economy to the tune of Rs. 721.96 crore. In the 
case of VSNL, the goverrunent had been receiving Rs. 10.4 crore as 
dividends (average of eight years upto 2000) from VSNL. 
The sale of 25% stock resulted in an inflow of 3,689 crore 
(including the special dividends) leading to an earrung of Rs. 368.9 crore 
in perpetuity (as interest on 10% deposit armually). Viewed from this 
perspective, the privatization has led to a better expenditure 
management. It may be argued that by the privatization process, the 
goverrunent had lost claim on its assets or shareholding. But this may 
be compensated by the higher cash returns generated from the sale. 
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Moreover, service quality and prices, and efficiency can improve for the 
consumers and citizens. 
2. Public Issue Versus Strategic Sale 
Before the year 2000, the government was selling minority shares 
in VSNL. The price to earning ratio was 6.0 at that time. The strategic 
sale gave a much higher price to earnings ratio of 11.0. This was an 
indication of the market expectation of better performance under a 
private management. However, it is not always true that strategic sale 
alone leads to better valuations. In the case of British Telecom's (BT) 
privatization that was done through sale of shares to the public, the 
government made sigiuficant changes in the board membership to 
indicate the greater business orientation the future privatized BT was 
likely to have. The Indian government could have brought in greater 
accountability of performance in its PSUs and specifically VSNL even 
prior to privatization by implementing similar changes. In the absence 
of such changes, VSNL's share prices could not gain from IT/telecom 
boom. A more proactive approach to managing VSNL even before 
privatization would have increased the valuation of VSNL and led to 
better public expenditure accountability. 
3. Valuations 
Critics of the present process of disinvestments have pointed out 
that many PSUs have been sold below their actual value. They also 
point out that short term perspective of reducing the fiscal deficit 
should not drive the process of privatization. The claim of privatization 
boosting share prices of PSUs had also been proved wrong by the case 
of VSNL. The advisors and professionals who assist the ministry of 
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disinvestments may not be entirely disinterested parties either. This 
could lead to improper evaluation of the PSU and its bidding process. 
In addition, there are several steps that the government or VSNL 
board could have taken prior to the privatization to increase its 
valuation. But a lack of accountability to the citizen, led to a situation 
where VSNL was functioning with out a CEO and senior officials, 
highly undermining the share prices and losing out on initiating 
strategic businesses such as domestic long distance. Often, the DOT 
thwarted VSNL's business plans. For example, VSNL was not given a 
nation wide ISP license or a domestic long distance license. This 
prevented both DOT (now BSNL) and VSNL from learning about how 
to deal with competition and starting into new business areas. 
Government Role 
Even after a strategic sale, it is the government's responsibility as 
a shareholder, to ensure that such enterprises are allowed to function 
smoothly without interference from politicians. The Tata Tele services 
(TTL) controversy highlights the difficulties it faces in doing so. 
Although the government's role in privatized PSUs in ensuring public 
expenditure accountability is clearly reduced, it could continue to be 
significant. The MOC as a stakeholder had the right to question the 
investment decision vis-^-vis TTL. But this should have been done 
through the decision making structures and committees within the 
board and not subsequent to the decision. 
The govenmient seems to be taking an ad-hoc view by not having 
a clearly set out action plan. For example, it is not known how long the 
government plans to retain the 26% stake.^ 
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Conclusion 
The disinvestments of VSNL is seen as leading to public 
expenditure accountability through a realization of higher return on the 
goverrunent's asset formation. It also leads to an appreciation of the 
remaining shares that are held by the government. To the citizen, the 
process is a step towards the provision of better quality communication 
services at the most competitive prices. 
Public flotation of stock might have led to better values for 
VSNL's stock, had the company been correctly 'prepared' for 
privatization. Considering that such a process was not underway, the 
present route of strategic sale seems an appropriate option. 
e) Summary of VSNL Disinvestments 
VSNL Disinvestments 
a Profitable, Cash Rich - Navaratna 
• Had Monopoly in ILD, Internet. 
• WTO Stipulations led to loss of monopoly 
• Strategic sale in April 2002 
a Tata's holding - 45% 
p Goveniment's holding - 26% 
a Concerns over Rs. 1200 crore investments in Tata Tele services. 
Events Leading to Disinvestments 
a Domestic Developments 
• Minority Shares' sale in 1991-92 
• Strategic sale considered better than minority sale. 
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• Pressure due to WTO agreements 
• Government keen on reducing burden of running PSUs. 
• Sale proceedings to reduce public debt. 
• In 1991-92, VSNL first disinvested. 
a Prior Disinvestments 
• Offloading to domestic investors. 
• Offloading of shares in International Market 
• Strategic Sale 
• GDR Issues 
• First issue fetched US$526.6 million (1996-97) 
• Second issue fetched US$185 million (1999) 
Sale of Strategic Partner 
a The valuation 
Reserve Price of Rs. 1218 crores for 25% stake. 
MTNL, BSNL to use VSNL for 2 years. 
NLD license thrown in 
Cash stockpile of Rs. 5182 crores. 
Some prime real estate not included in deal. 
Potential loss of value led to Urgency. 
a The bidding process and after 
• SEBI takeover code needed bidder to purchase 20% post 
bidding. 
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• Tata bid Rs. 1439 crores, Reliance bid Rs. 1347 crores 
• After takeover, Tatas - 45%, Govt. - 26% 
• 1.97% given to employees, 
a The TTL controversy 
• VSNL boards decided to invest Rs. 1200 crores in TTL 
• Over 3-4 years for 20-26% stake 
• Tata's justifications 
• Extend VSNL's reach to basic services. 
• Part of Tata group's overall telecom strategy, 
a Communication Minister's objection. 
• Unethical to use VSNL's cash reserves. 
• BSNL, MTNL might provide better investment 
opportunities. 
• TTL might have been overvalued 
a Issue resolved 
• VSNL board sets up a committee to review the quantum 
and valuation of the proposed investment, 
a Result of TTL Controversy 
• Government had made bad decisions in the past (ICO, 
Iridium) 
• Legally, Tata was well within its rights. 
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• Issue could have been handled better by better 
information availability to 26% share holder 
(government) 
• Bad publicity - share prices fell from Rs. 188 on May 28, 
2002 to 161 on June 2002. 
Issues on Disinvestments 
• Does disinvestments lead to more efficient public 
expenditure? 
• Compare perpetual returns (with 10% annual rate) due 
to govenunent. PSU sale realization against dividends 
received (722 crores versus 23 crores). 
• For VSNL (including special dividends), perpetuity 
amount is Rs. 369 crores whereas dividends were Rs. 
10.4 crores. 
• Public issue versus strategic sale 
• During disinvestments period, price/earnings (P/E) 
was 6. 
• Strategic sale gave price/earning of 11. 
• Market expects more from private management. 
• Better Management in the past might have led to more 
valuation and therefore greater performance 
accountability. 
a Valuation 
• Critics claim sale below actual value. 
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• Share prices did riot go up as expected. 
• Advisers and professionals might not be disinterested 
parties. 
• Lack of accountability (Vacuum in top management for 
a long period). 
• Government's Role 
• Even after sale, government has responsibility as a 
shareholder to ensure smooth functioning. 
• Ministry of commimication's questioning might be 
right, but should be through decision-making structures 
and not in public. 
• Government should learn to 'let go' 
• Road Map for the remaining 26%? ^ 
f) Conclusion 
a Disinvestment of VSNL led to greater Public expenditure 
accountability through higher return on government's asset 
formation, 
a Better quality communications for the citizen, 
a Strategic sale is good as it leads to less confusion among the 
government's roles as a policy formulator and a service 
provider, 
5.8. VSNL Performance after Disinvestments 
1, VSNL, a member of the US$29 billion Tata Group, is a leading 
global commxmications company offering next generation voice, 
data and value-added services to enterprises carriers and retail 
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consumers. Voted the best wholesale services provider at the 
world Communications Awards, 2006, VSNL is one of the largest 
providers of wholesale International voice services and operates 
one of the largest global submarine cable networks, VSNL's 
customer base includes 1500 global carriers, 450 mobile operators, 
10,000 enterprises, 100,000 broadband and internet subscribers 
and 300 wi-fi public not spots. VSNL has offices in over 35 
countries including the United Kingdom, South Africa, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Sri LaiJca and India. VSNL's global 
transmission network of over 2,00,000 route kilometers and its IP 
core with 200 points of presence enable a range of services that 
include voice, private leased circuits, IPVPN, internet access, 
global Ethernet, hosting, mobile signaling and other IP services. 
VSNL (www.vsnl.com) is listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
and the National Stock Exchange of India and its American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
2. VSNL's Executive Director, Mr. N. Srinath has been named the 
'Telecom CEO of the Year' by the leading publishing group, 
Telecom Asia in the 2006 edition of their awards. 
The 2006 Telecom Asia award has been given in recognition of 
Mr. Srinath's role in transforming VSNL from a domestic 
monopoly to a major global telco in just four years. This 
makeover was achieved at a time when the Indian 
telecommunication market was becoming de-regulated and 
fiercely competitive. 
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3. In 2005, VSNL acquired Tyco global network, a state of the art 
undersea cable network that covers Europe. 
4. On February 14, 2006, VSNL completes acquisition of teleglobe 
International Holdings Ltd. The new combined company will 
own and operate one of the world's largest International mobile, 
data and voice networks with coverage to more than 240 
countries and territories, with its acquisition of teleglobe, the 
company's wholesale customers will benefit from superior 
network reach and scalability from a single partner worldwide 
for voice, data and mobile services. 
5. On July 31, 2007, VSNL launches next generation dedicated 
global Ethernet services for the Australia Market. Metro Ethernet 
Forum (MEF)9, and 14 certified Global Ethernet Services enables 
Australian enterprises to connect to India and throughout the 
world. The Metro Ethernet Forum is a global industry alliance 
that develops Ethernet standards with the cooperation of over 120 
companies worldwide including telecommunications service 
providers, cable MSOs, Network /Equipment Software 
manufacturers, semi conductors vendors and testing 
organization. 
6. VSNL has been chosen as the network administrator for one of 
the world's largest and sophisticated, trans-continent cable 
systems - SEA-ME-WE4 (South East Asia - Middle East -
Western Europe). This is the first time that an Indian company 
has been chosen as the network administrator for a global 
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consortium cable system. The SEA-ME-WE4 consortium has 16 
members. 
VSNL also hosts the network operating centre in Mumbai. The 
twin role of network administrator and hosting the operating 
centre will enable VSNL to play a key role in the day to day 
operations of the cable system. 
7. Tata Indicom wi-fi services at Eden Garderis. Tata Indicom wi-fi 
service will eventually roll out 1000 hot spots all over India and is 
already providing its services at some airports, hotels, stadiums 
and restaurants, wireless fidelity (wi-fi) enables computers, 
PDA's and other computing devices to use high speed internet 
without the need for any wires or cables. This services can be 
availed at places which wi-fi enabled and in common parlance 
called "Hot Spots" 
8. Currently, the company has 52 subsidiaries in 21 coimtries as well 
as operations across four continents. VSNL International a 
subsidiary of the company, takes care of its international 
operations. It has its offices in Virginia, New Jersey, London, 
Paris, Madrid, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Singapore and Tokyo. Its 
ADRs are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.^ 
5.9. VSNL International 
VSNL International, the Intemations arm of Videsh Sanchar 
Nigam Limited is a leading global communications services provider 
offering a comprehensive portfolio of next generation carrier and 
enterprise solutions, including Voice, mobile, data and Ethernet. VSNL 
International owns and operates one of the world's largest international 
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mobile, voice and data networks providing global reach to over 240 
countries and territories. In addition, VSNL international owns' the 
world's largest designed global backbone capacity network, spanning 
across 4 continents and comprises of Major ownership in 206, 356 km of 
terrestrial network fibre-optic networks and sub-sea cables. It is also one 
of the largest carriers of wholesale voice globally. 
VSNL and VSNL International are a part of the Tata group, a $29 
billion global conglomerate comprising 93 operating companies, VSNL 
International is headquatered in Singapore with regional offices in the 
North America, Europe and Asia pacific. VSNL International had a 
work-force of about 2000 employees. 
5.10. Factors for success 
VSNL has a world class infrastructure, it offers multiple 
connectivity options internationally, using its robust network 
infrastructure. It operates a total of 26 switches 5 international gateway 
switches and 21 national long distance switches worldwide. It has over 
50 earth stations and terrestrial cable systems with 2,00,00 kilometers of 
fibre and cable. The company offers high-end services to its EU clients 
by successfully leveraging infrastructure.^ 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, it is observed that the VSNL a cash 
rich public sector enterprise has become from 'Good' to 'Better' 
enterprise after disinvestment. A comparative study of EBIDTA of 
VSNL before and after disinvestment is given below, which further 
justifies the above statement. 
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EBIDTA of V S N L Before Dis inves tment 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
1401 
1410 
1665 
2000 
2235 
Source : VSNL Annual Report 1996-97,1997-98,1998-99,1999-2000, 2000-01 
EBIDTA of VSNL After Dis investment 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
5154 
7691 
8759 
9306 
13,087 
Source: VSNL Annual report 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08 
www.vsnl.com 
^ i. Jain, Rekha, IIR [2001], oxford university press, "a review of the Indian telecom sector". 
ii The Economic Times June 28,2002, "World Com Scam Rocks VSNL, Rs 500 crores dues 
in limbo voice& data, April 18,2002, ILD: Riders are many" 
' Rambabu.G, The Hindu Business Line: Tatas hit Jackpot with VSNL, NEW DELHI, 
February 06, 2002. 
* Bureau, The Hindu Business Line : VSNL enters Tata family, Mumbai, February 14,2002 
' i Economic Times, February 15,2002 " Tata's get Rs 1300 crore worth of property with 
VSNL deal" 
ii Bajaj, Pradip, Economic and Political weekly, April 27,2002 
* Baijal, Pradip, Economic and Political Weekly, April 27,2002, "Privatization : Gains to 
Taxpayers and Employees". 
'.Jain$Venkataraman,Professor Indian institute of Management, Ahemdabad "Privatization of 
Videsh SancharNigam Limited".pp 1-16, Rekha@iimahd.emet.in.March 31,2002. 
* www.vsnl.com 
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CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Findings and Conclusion Pertaining to Disinvestment 
Programme in India 
In a mixed economy such as India, public sector had been 
assigned an important role. They were considered 'Temples of Modem 
India'. These temples were built during socialist Indian politics and 
planned economy. However, in the year 1991, due to balance of 
payment crisis and budgetary deficits the national economic policy 
imderwent a radical transformation. The new policy of liberalization, 
privatization and globalization de-emphasized the role of the public 
sector in the nations' economy. It is also contended that the functioning 
of many public sector units has been characterized by low productivity, 
unsatisfactory quality of goods, excessive manpower utilization, 
inadequate human resource development and low rate of return on 
capital. For example, between 1980 and 2002, the average rate of return 
on capital employed by PSUs was about 3.4% as against the average 
cost of borrowing which was 8.66%. Disinvestment of the PSUs has 
therefore been offered as one of the solution in this context. 
Disinvestment means withdrawing investment or reduction of 
investment which occurs by selling of equity and bond capital invested 
by the government in public sector units to private sector. This in turn 
would enable the much needed revenue generation by the government 
and help reduce deficit financing. Since the sale of the state owned 
assets are highly visible projects in India's political economic life. 
Disinvestment are treated with great caution and care by the 
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government to do it right. After the initial round of disinvestments in 
1991-92, the process has been guided by recommendations made by a 
committee on disinvestments set up in 1993. Further, in 1996, the 
government constituted an independent body called the disinvestments 
commission to design and execute the privatization of the public sector 
units. To ensure a high degree of transparency of the deals, the 
commission submits all documents and papers regarding every 
disinvestments case to the office of Comptroller and Auditor General 
(CAG). The CAG office will then prepare a thorough assessment and 
send it to parliament before releasing it to general public. Thus, in some 
cases, the government seeks the parliament's prior approval for the 
execution of the deal. Although there is a three-tier mechanism for 
decision making and implementation of disinvestments yet the basis of 
selection of an enterprise for disinvestments is still not clear. 
The govenunent has adopted two methods of disinvestments 
over the period 1991-92 to 2006-07 (i) first method adopted was partial 
disinvestments whereby the government still retained effective control 
by holding 51% or more of equity. This method was used in majority 
cases over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99. (ii) second method is strategic 
sale with complete transfer of management of a public sector unit to a 
private sector company. Since 1999-2000 the emphasis shifted to the 
latter method. Modem Food Industries Ltd. (MFIL), BALCO, CMC, 
HTL, IBP, VSNL, Pradeep Phosphates Ltd, HZL, IPCL and Maruti 
Udyog Ltd., were sold off in this maimer. 
The public sector employment has come down during the post 
reform period due to economic pressures. There has been a uniform 
decline in growth rate of employment among all state owned 
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enterprises during this period. Therefore, the fear that disinvestments 
would severely undermine employment is largely exaggerated. 
The objectives of disinvestments have not been precisely stated. 
However, based on budget statement, it can be inferred that the 
objectives sought to be achieved are fiscal discipline and improvement 
in efficiency. Although, encouraging wider public participation in the 
disinvestments programme was initially an objective, it was dropped 
later and the strategic sale route was followed. By following the 
strategic sale route higher realization has been achieved, but the public 
has been excluded from the process. Whether this yield of higher return 
in the short rim will benefit the public in the long is debatable. The 
current declared policy is that the government is prepared to reduce its 
stake in the non-strategic PSEs to even below 26% if necessary. 
However, rationale of retairung minor share holding in a non-strategic 
public sector enterprise is debatable. The Govenunent can realize better 
price while undertaking 100% sale and no useful purpose is served by 
retaining a minority holding in a non-strategic sector. The interest of 
workers can be safeguarded through shareholder agreement even in a 
100% sale. 
However the performance on the disinvestment front over the 
period 1991-92 to 2006-07 has been dismal. The value of the 
disinvestments realized in the past years have fallen far short of their 
target. During the period 1991-92 to 2002-03, the Government had 
targeted the mobilization of about Rs. 78,300 crores through 
disinvestment, but from 1991-92 till may 2007 the central government 
has raised just Rs. 51,609 crore from disinvestments transactions with 
the highest receipts of Rs. 15,547 crore realized in 2003-04 through 
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strategic sale. This is partly due to the slowing dowri of the political 
opposition etc. However, the main reason is that the valuation of the 
public sector units is low. For example, the Airport centaur Hotel at 
Mumbai, which was bought from the government by Batra Hospitality 
for Rs. 83 crore. Early this year was resold to the Sahara Group for Rs. 
115 crore six months later. Which works out to be a capital gain of Rs. 
32 crore. This is more than the profits made by the Hotel during its 
entire life. Even the sale of shares in Blue chip public sector units like 
Indian Oil corporation, Bharat Petroleum Corporation and Hindustan 
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) were less than their actual value. 
There are several issues that are responsible for the stop and start 
manner behind the disinvestment drive in India, not least opposition 
from the political organization and union fronts. In 1991, Singapore 
Airlines withdrew its bid for Air India, allegedly citing intense 
opposition from politicians, unions and Media. In cases where 
privatization has occurred, the benefits are not always obvious and in 
some instances have generated monopolies. This has in many instances 
provided fuel to those opposing privatization. The fierce standoff 
regarding the sale of majority stake in BALCO to private sector sterlite 
in 2001 highlighted the narrow self interest among political classes. The 
chief minister of the new state of Chattisgarh opposed the sale despite 
its attractiveness and the transparent manner in which it was handled. 
Such resistance could dampen enthusiasm for and jeopardize future 
disinvestments efforts, A political party that introduces some reforms 
could just as quickly oppose them when it is no longer in power. 
In many instances, disinvestment has gone hand-in-hand with 
widespread corruption and insider dealings, particularly in cases of 
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privatization through asset sales and vouchers. The inadequacy of 
institutional and regulatory systems have contributed to a series of 
scams in the financial system including those in 1992 (Harshad Mehta) 
1995-96 (IPO disasters) and 2001 (Ketan Mehta). 
The backlash against disinvestments has been fuelled by the 
misuse of power by new owners of the privatized entities, their actions 
being driven by their own private interests at the expanse of the 
company. This issue recently surfaced following its acquisition of VSNL 
by Tata, the largest Indian group. Tata invested more than Rs. 1200 
crore of surplus cash of VSNL in to its sister company Tata teleservices, 
the returns of which were considered uncertain. This move smacked of 
asset stripping and while it would be positive for Bombay House it was 
negative for VSNL. 
There have been instances when the sale of the government's 
stake in a public company to a private company has provided it with 
monopoly power. One recent example was the purchase of IPQL, 
(Indian Petrochemical Corporation Ltd.) by Reliance, which led to an 
almost total monopoly in the petroleum industry. 
Thus, there are several various issues that India faces in its 
disinvestment drive. Disinvestment is a complicated process. As India 
continues to privatize its public sector units, the government needs to 
pay particular attention to these areas of concern and strengthen its 
institutions to avoid pitfalls of disinvestments. The researcher 
highlighted some issues and propose future strategies and 
recommendations to tackle them. 
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6.2. Future Strategies Relating to Emerging Issues in the 
Disinvestment Process of Public Sector Enterprises in India 
Disinvestment is an important policy initiative of the present 
government. Successive budget speeches of the finance minister had 
emphasized the resolve of the Government to privatize all non-strategic 
public sector enterprises (PSEs) and liquidate all chronically loss-
making public sector units. 
Following up on this policy, the Government had succeeded 
admirably in privatizing quite a few PSEs since 1999. However, of late, 
there appears to be considerable opposition not only on the modalities 
of disinvestment but against the very idea of privatization. Therefore, 
clarity is needed on some of these issues that are bothering policy 
makers. 
What to Sell :-
One of the repeated objections relates to the wisdom of selling 
profitable units. At the outset, it is essential to clarify that privatization 
of only loss-making units is neither feasible nor desirable. Every effort 
has to be made to privatize all loss-making units, failing which they 
should be shut down after suitably compensating the workers. On this 
question, there can be no two opinions. 
In the case of profit-making imits, the question to be asked is 
whether they will continue to be profitable a few years hence when they 
will have to face competition without Government props such as 
purchase/price preference, subsidies and reservations. If the answer is 
in the affirmative, then these PSEs need not be privatized on economic 
grounds. 
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If the PSEs are of strategic importance to the economy, their 
control can remain in government hands. Privatization of profit-making 
PSEs can, however, be justified on ideological grounds, namely, that the 
governments has no business to be in business. 
How to Sell:-
The second issue on which there appears to be considerable 
opposition is the modality of disinvestment. Now, this issue has 
assumed importance in view of the goveniment's likely loss of control 
over petroleum companies, following moves to privatize some of them. 
The concept of strategic sale has been opposed even though it is 
admitted that it will fetch more for the government. Those opposed to 
strategic sale have suggested that a portion of the government's equity 
in these companies may be disinvested through an offer of shares in the 
capital market without relinquishing government control over 
management. This has obviously been suggested on ground's of oil 
security. Such a method of disinvestments may help in broadening 
share ownership. However, uiUess there is change of management, 
there will not be much enthusiasm for the shares among the public. This 
method will also result in the government becoming the largest 
shareholder, though its shareholding may be less than 51%. This will 
take the enterprise out of the "Public Sector" and consequent 
accountability to parliament and other investigating agencies such as 
the central vigilance commission and the Central Bureau of 
Investigation while giving the government the power to indulge in back 
seat driving ! such an arrangement should be avoided at all costs as it 
endows power without accountability. 
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A strategic sale of companies engaged in retail selling of 
petroleum products caimot be coi\sidered 'Strategic by any means, 
especially as the oil and natural gas corporation and Indian Oil 
Corporation are still in government hands! The petroleum sector does 
not find a mention in the list of industries defined as 'Strategic by the 
government for the purpose of disinvestment. 
Probably, all this talk of 'Oil Security' is nothing but a cloak to 
cover the real purpose, namely, to retain management control and 
consequent power of patronage. The disinvestment exercise has also 
thrown up other issues such as timing, valuation and transparency, 
shareholder agreements, monopolies, surplus labour and public 
support. Matter of concern and few but important points in this respect 
are as follows: 
Timing 
At present, there is an impression that there is unseemly haste in 
privatizing public sector units, especially the profit making ones. One 
would wonder whether the present time is right for disinvestment in 
PSEs in the hospitality sector. 
In the past, govermnent procedures did not allow it to realize 
opportunities of selling when the prices were favourable. This was the 
case in the GDR issues of VSNL and GAIL. At the same time, inordinate 
delay in disinvestment has a deleterious effect on the companies 
concerned. It not only precludes timely investment in the company, 
resulting in missed opportunities and profitability. It also saps the 
morale of the employees and gives a wrong signal to investors in the 
domestic and international commxmity about the Government's 
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Intentions. Hence, disinvestment, once announced should be completed 
within the shortest possible time and at the best price. Postponement 
should be orUy on the ground that the market situation is not favourable 
for obtaining a proper price. 
Valuation and Transparency 
An often repeated criticism heard is that Government holdings 
have been sold for a low price. Valuation arrived at by the Government 
is questioned and motives are attributed. It should be remembered that 
there is no such thing as a perfect valuation. Though most inputs that 
go in to valuation are objective, the ultimate judgement on the price is 
subjective, what is essential is that the reserve price arrived at by the 
time-tested methods of valuation should be kept secret and the highest 
bid above the reserve price should be accepted. A little more 
transparency in acceptance of bids should be preferable. For iristance, 
the bids can be opened in the glare of TV Cameras and the highest bid 
aimounced to the bidding parties and the press. It is essential to 
generate confidence in the society that the government has secured the 
best price for its equity. 
Shareholder Agreements 
Before finalizing disinvestment deal, the shareholder agreement 
has to be clearly and carefully drafted to take care of interests of the 
Government and the purchaser. If this is not done, then the government 
may face problems such as the one relating to VSNL's investment in 
Tata Teleservices from VSNL's reserves. In this case, it was found that 
the shareholder's agreement provided for consultation with the 
government in the case of Mergers or granting of loans but did not 
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mention anything on equity participation in other companies. Whether 
this was deliberate or somebody goofed up is anybody's guess. 
Monopolies Issue 
It is essential that the disinvestment process should not result in 
the creation of monopolies. In the absence of adequate legal safeguards 
and a strong regulatory machinery, it will be difficult to ensure that 
consumers are not exploited by monopolies. For example, the requisite 
regulatory machinery is absent to prevent over exploitation of scarce 
Natural resources for commercial gains. 
Some have tried to explain away the governments decision to sell 
majority stakes in Indian Petrochemicals corporation to Reliance 
Industries by averring that it is not monopoly per se but abuse of 
monopoly that we should be bothered about. But, is there any 
regulatory machinery now that will decide what constitutes abuse of 
monopoly? Are there adequate laws to prevent such abuse? In the given 
circumstances in India, it will be referable to pre-qualify bidders for 
disinvestment from the monopolistic angle also. After all a government 
monopoly will be infinitely better than a private monopoly. 
Surplus Labour 
The next issue is what to do with surplus labour in PSEs that are 
being disinvested. Merely assuring employment for a period of one or 
two years after disinvestment is not a remedy. The headache of dealing 
with surplus labour is transferred to the strategic buyer along with the 
assets of the company. In a scenario where fresh investment is not 
forthcoming due to the adverse security climate, any attempt to retain 
labour for a certain period is likely to bring down the value of the 
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equity sold. The challenge is to minimize the ill effects of labour 
restructuring by providing adequate compensation, 
training/counselling for alternative jobs and the like. 
Public Support 
Ultimately, disinvestment will succeed or fail depending on the 
support the process gets from the public. It is easy to mislead the public 
by alleging that the priceless jewels of the country are being gifted away 
to unscrupulous businessmen. Unless the public understands the issue 
involved, their support for disinvestment will not be forthcoming. It 
was with this intention that the disinvestment commission had 
recommended the setting up of a disinvestment fund, into which all 
receipts from disinvestment would go and the monies would be spent 
on earmarked social sector projects such as housing, education and 
health. The public would then be convinced of the benefits of 
disinvestment. 
So far, the goveniment has not agreed to the creation of the 
disinvestment fund on the ground that prudent financial management 
precludes keeping of funds outside the consolidated fund of India. But 
it has agreed to set up a road fund into which receipts from levies on 
fuel would be deposited and the funds would be spent on development 
of roads. It is clear that unless urgent and radical measures aimed at 
reform are taken, most of the PSEs will be unable to overcome 
competition. It will be in the goverrunent's interest to remain in 
businesses that are highly profitable and contribute substantially to 
public interest and not fritter away its energies in running a host of 
Sundry, unprofitable businesses. 
200 
All such enterprises that are not of strategic importance will have 
to be disinvested urgently. And those that do not have to remain in the 
public sector and that cannot be disinvested must be liquidated without 
any delay. PSEs should not get any more financial assistance from the 
government in the form of equity, loans or grants. If they have 
worthwhile projects, they should approach financial institutions for 
assistance. 
The time has come when the public sector has to be lean, efficient 
and capable of taking on domestic as well as international competition. 
6.3. Suggestions And Recommendations for the effective 
Implementation of Disinvestment Programme in India 
1. Fair, just and equitable procedure should be followed in 
carrying out disinvestment. 
2. Lack of transparency and the decisions taken in hurry should 
be avoided. 
3. Sale proceeds should not only be used to reduce fiscal deficit. 
They can also be used to finance National Renewal Fund. This 
fund can be utilized to take care of the workforce displaced as 
a result of disinvestment of public sector enterprises. 
4. So far Government has focused on the Voluntary Retirement 
Schemes (VRS) that provides one time cash compensation. 
While providing unemployment compensation it is important 
to ensure that the unemployed do not fall in to the poverty 
trap. Focus should be given in creating alternative job in other 
segments of the economy. Government should also negotiate 
an agreement with the new owners concerning layoffs. 
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5. Strong domestic financial institutions and a well designed 
capital markets are necessary foundations for the success of 
privatization. 
6. Economy should further be opened to private and foreign 
investors to increase competition. As it will give access to 
newer technology, increased scope for increasing export 
turnover and possibility of setting up third country 
operations. 
7. The government should also strengthen its corporate 
governance institutions to ensure that privatized entities are 
not abused by their new owners through asset stripping. 
8. Few changes should be done in the architecture of the 
corporate sector. There also needs to be a sound Internal Audit 
System and clear guidelines regarding intra-company 
transactions. 
9. The dilution of the stake of the government should be 
carefully analyzed. The dilution which leads to transfer of 
management in areas of strategic importance should be 
avoided. 
10. The policy of Navratna should be encouraged, 
11. Disinvestment must be done on realistic basis. There must be a 
proper evaluation not only from the commissions point of 
view but also from the market point of view. For this eminent 
economists must be involved and professional appraisers 
should be used. 
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12. Targets should not be fixed as it leads to distress selling in 
order to meet the target. 
13. A more comprehensive disinvestment policy should be 
announced by the authorities that defines a list of enterprises 
eligible for disinvestment, sets a guideline for their sales to the 
private sector and establishes a mechanism for disinvestment. 
14. The authorities should establish a regulatory framework prior 
to the disinvestment of natural monopoly enterprises and 
deregulate industries to encourage competition. 
15. Labour Retrenchment programme should be implemented to 
compensate workers who lose their jobs due to shutdown of 
non-viable enterprises. 
16. Government should neither extend special privileges nor 
impose extraordinary conditions for the operation of 
disinvested companies. 
17. Disinvestment process should be given maximum publicity 
and the enterprises should be sold through auction openly. 
18. The authorities should ensure equal access to information for 
all potential investors. The disinvestment programme in the 
non reserved sector should be opened to foreign investors to 
attract continued overseas interest in the development of the 
Indian economy. 
19. Rising uncertainty and delays in the disinvestment process 
due to opposition from various parties should be avoided as it 
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causes a low realization and a reduced foreign interest in 
Indian disinvestment. 
20. Government should initiate efforts to evaluate unprofitable 
enterprises and consider their sales. The sale proceeds of these 
enterprises should be deposited in to a bank, as it will give 
better revenue gains instead of suffering losses with its 
continuation. 
21. Authorities should give special consideration for restructuring 
and rehabilitation of vulnerable public sector enterprises. 
22. Adequate legal safeguards and a strong regulatory machinery 
should be adopted to avoid monopolies issue. It will be 
preferable to pre-qualify bidders for disinvestment from the 
monopolistic angle also. 
23. A long term policy for training and educating the large work 
force in technical and managerial aspects, software design and 
maintenance and service development should be an integral 
part of any future telecom policy. 
24. Decision making committees must consist of professional from 
a wide range of fields to strengthen the analytical component 
of any policy design and implementation, 
25. In the context of the changing business scenario, policy 
regarding marketing, usage and ownership of data com 
charmels and other telecom services needs to be amended. 
Thus, disinvestment of public sector enterprises is need of the 
hour. As it will encourage such public enterprises to work in a 
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competitive environment, thereby making their management more 
responsive towards the customers need and changing technology and 
raising their working efficiency and also the rising demands of their 
investors will make them more accountable too and the resultant rise in 
their revenues will be a good fruit. Beside this, selling of these white 
elephants on which crores of rupees have been wasted will give a large 
one time capital gain, which itself can be a panacea for a debt ridden 
country like India suffering from overload of nationalization 
Last but not the least disinvestment can be regarded as a sound 
economic policy, a good social strategy and a prudent political 
philosophy. But transparency is vital for a successful disinvestments 
programme to bring credibility in any deal. 
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